93
idea being that China and Caspian states themselves are set to emerge the winners
of the new great game (Stegen and Kusznir 2015:102).
In 2014, with the US and coalition troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the governments of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea began to prepare for a possible spillover of instability from the South. The US and Russia both offered military aid to a
number of Central Asian states in line with the withdrawal. Officially, this was to
bolster their capacity to defend against the possible resurgence of Islamist activity
however Russia was also motivated to weaken US influence in the region. Russia
has certain security interests in the region aside from its legitimate concerns over
stemming the flow of drugs and militancy from Afghanistan to Russia (www.thediplomat.com 2016a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i). The US’ military presence in the region plays
an important role in Caspian dynamics, and is a factor which some experts believe
has been overlooked in most accounts of the Caspian’s “New Great Game” (Stegen
and Kusznir 2015:102).
Aside from direct financial assistance, Russia has created multiple regional organizations to facilitate greater cooperation between the post-Soviet states. One of
these organizations is the Eurasian Economic Community (EuraAsEC), which aims
to promote a single market between member states. EuraAsEC includes Russia,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus. But some experts believe Russia’s
aim in establishing EuraAsEC was to develop to a proactive institutional framework
which would provide regional security for domestic political regimes while significantly curbing China’s influence. According to Stegen and Kusznir, the Central
Asian states themselves are little-compelled to object to such unions however as
(Stegen and Kusznir 2015:102);
…they also find it difficult to protect themselves from external interference. Their foreign
policy is dominated by the need for economic development and financial assistance.
Diplomacy in these circumstances is successful if it can widen the negotiating margin of
maneuver of a supplicant even a little’. …Multi-vectorism is the form of ‘diplomacy’ these
states have deployed to widen the margin of maneuverability. (Stegen and Kusznir
2015:103)
In the 1990s, the US played a key role in energy diplomacy in the region and especially in the BTC pipeline. The US established as its main policy in the region an
interest in promoting multiple pipeline routes from the Caspian in order to significantly boost both EU and US energy security interests. In this way, Bill Clinton’s
administration showed a stalk difference to the more recent Obama administration
in its active promotion of projects and other potential energy transit routes to the
Caspian Sea region (www.energypolicy.columbia.edu: 2018).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became deeply engaged in attempts
to realign its society and economy, but its ambitions were constantly hampered by
regional instability, ethnic conflict, and geopolitical competition in the Caucasian
and Caspian regions. Russia’s response was to transform into a powerful actor in the
region and become especially robust in Eurasia. Thus, the second incarnation of the
“Great Game” was born (Jaffe and Manning 1998:127). Soon after, with the advent
of Afghanistan on the US foreign policy agenda following the 9/11 attacks, the
region became a focal point for US supplies and logistics, adding further complicaThe Great Game in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia
idea being that China and Caspian states themselves are set to emerge the winners
of the new great game (Stegen and Kusznir 2015:102).
In 2014, with the US and coalition troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the governments of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea began to prepare for a possible spillover of instability from the South. The US and Russia both offered military aid to a
number of Central Asian states in line with the withdrawal. Officially, this was to
bolster their capacity to defend against the possible resurgence of Islamist activity
however Russia was also motivated to weaken US influence in the region. Russia
has certain security interests in the region aside from its legitimate concerns over
stemming the flow of drugs and militancy from Afghanistan to Russia (www.thediplomat.com 2016a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i). The US’ military presence in the region plays
an important role in Caspian dynamics, and is a factor which some experts believe
has been overlooked in most accounts of the Caspian’s “New Great Game” (Stegen
and Kusznir 2015:102).
Aside from direct financial assistance, Russia has created multiple regional organizations to facilitate greater cooperation between the post-Soviet states. One of
these organizations is the Eurasian Economic Community (EuraAsEC), which aims
to promote a single market between member states. EuraAsEC includes Russia,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus. But some experts believe Russia’s
aim in establishing EuraAsEC was to develop to a proactive institutional framework
which would provide regional security for domestic political regimes while significantly curbing China’s influence. According to Stegen and Kusznir, the Central
Asian states themselves are little-compelled to object to such unions however as
(Stegen and Kusznir 2015:102);
…they also find it difficult to protect themselves from external interference. Their foreign
policy is dominated by the need for economic development and financial assistance.
Diplomacy in these circumstances is successful if it can widen the negotiating margin of
maneuver of a supplicant even a little’. …Multi-vectorism is the form of ‘diplomacy’ these
states have deployed to widen the margin of maneuverability. (Stegen and Kusznir
2015:103)
In the 1990s, the US played a key role in energy diplomacy in the region and especially in the BTC pipeline. The US established as its main policy in the region an
interest in promoting multiple pipeline routes from the Caspian in order to significantly boost both EU and US energy security interests. In this way, Bill Clinton’s
administration showed a stalk difference to the more recent Obama administration
in its active promotion of projects and other potential energy transit routes to the
Caspian Sea region (www.energypolicy.columbia.edu: 2018).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became deeply engaged in attempts
to realign its society and economy, but its ambitions were constantly hampered by
regional instability, ethnic conflict, and geopolitical competition in the Caucasian
and Caspian regions. Russia’s response was to transform into a powerful actor in the
region and become especially robust in Eurasia. Thus, the second incarnation of the
“Great Game” was born (Jaffe and Manning 1998:127). Soon after, with the advent
of Afghanistan on the US foreign policy agenda following the 9/11 attacks, the
region became a focal point for US supplies and logistics, adding further complicaThe Great Game in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia