91
increasing sharply. Therefore, Iran is one of the market players where we expect the
supply of oil and gas to increase. Now, if Iran does not profit from companies and
other countries in this game, there is definitely no incentive for Iran to keep in the
game. One of the things that Iran wanted to make its market attractive to others was
the IPCs, but we see that this issue has not been implemented as initially proposed.
Thus, the combination of the world economy and trade and the benefits of other
countries and companies in the world is a major deterrent to Iran. It will not only be
harmful for the producing countries but for many investor countries that have
invested in the United States, for example. So this situation is not in the interest of
Iran and should be changed (energy diplomacy 2018).
The Great Game in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia
There are three reasons why the Caspian and Central Asia is the prime receptor of
diplomacy serving the interests of global powers (Kubicek 2013:172). The first of
these originate from the needs of the region itself, in that since the collapse of the
Soviet Union these newly independent actors, having been poorly invested regions,
desperately sought new technology and capital in order to exploit the potential of
their resources. Secondly, the landlocked Caspian Sea states are technically and
logistically dependent on the infrastructure of Russia in order to transit oil and gas
to world markets, which ties them to Russia’s sphere of influence. Thirdly, these
nations are militarily weak and suffer from issues of legitimacy, poor economic
output, and civil divisions (Kubicek 2013:172).
Brezinski put forward the idea that “as the U.S. cannot stop China’s rise, she
should form alliance with China and offer ruling the world together.” If this offer
were to be transformed into a concrete policy, then the question of how this will
reflect onto the region arises. In such a case, it is certain that the US and China will
not leave the Middle East to Russia. On the other hand, in case of such a situation,
by using her historical ties with the region, Russia wants to affiliate the countries in
the region with solid military and economic formations. To this end, she is forming
various alliances (Nogayeva 2013:303).
Finding the best route to transit oil and gas has been one of the main concerns
Caspian region states must consider. For Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, potential
export routes lie in all four geographical directions:
1. Northward through the old Soviet pipeline network to Russia or over newly built
pipelines,
2. eastward to China,
3. southward to Iran, or through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, or
4. westward through the trans-Caspian pipeline to be constructed to the South
Caucasus and on to the EU and world markets (Heinrich and Pleines 2015:110).
Azerbaijan has more immediate options to the north and west, but due to its geographical position on the west coast of the Caspian Sea, its southward option is
The Great Game in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia
increasing sharply. Therefore, Iran is one of the market players where we expect the
supply of oil and gas to increase. Now, if Iran does not profit from companies and
other countries in this game, there is definitely no incentive for Iran to keep in the
game. One of the things that Iran wanted to make its market attractive to others was
the IPCs, but we see that this issue has not been implemented as initially proposed.
Thus, the combination of the world economy and trade and the benefits of other
countries and companies in the world is a major deterrent to Iran. It will not only be
harmful for the producing countries but for many investor countries that have
invested in the United States, for example. So this situation is not in the interest of
Iran and should be changed (energy diplomacy 2018).
The Great Game in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia
There are three reasons why the Caspian and Central Asia is the prime receptor of
diplomacy serving the interests of global powers (Kubicek 2013:172). The first of
these originate from the needs of the region itself, in that since the collapse of the
Soviet Union these newly independent actors, having been poorly invested regions,
desperately sought new technology and capital in order to exploit the potential of
their resources. Secondly, the landlocked Caspian Sea states are technically and
logistically dependent on the infrastructure of Russia in order to transit oil and gas
to world markets, which ties them to Russia’s sphere of influence. Thirdly, these
nations are militarily weak and suffer from issues of legitimacy, poor economic
output, and civil divisions (Kubicek 2013:172).
Brezinski put forward the idea that “as the U.S. cannot stop China’s rise, she
should form alliance with China and offer ruling the world together.” If this offer
were to be transformed into a concrete policy, then the question of how this will
reflect onto the region arises. In such a case, it is certain that the US and China will
not leave the Middle East to Russia. On the other hand, in case of such a situation,
by using her historical ties with the region, Russia wants to affiliate the countries in
the region with solid military and economic formations. To this end, she is forming
various alliances (Nogayeva 2013:303).
Finding the best route to transit oil and gas has been one of the main concerns
Caspian region states must consider. For Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, potential
export routes lie in all four geographical directions:
1. Northward through the old Soviet pipeline network to Russia or over newly built
pipelines,
2. eastward to China,
3. southward to Iran, or through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, or
4. westward through the trans-Caspian pipeline to be constructed to the South
Caucasus and on to the EU and world markets (Heinrich and Pleines 2015:110).
Azerbaijan has more immediate options to the north and west, but due to its geographical position on the west coast of the Caspian Sea, its southward option is
The Great Game in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia