2 THE POLITICS OF LOW-CARBON ENERGY IN IRAN AND IRAQ
29
cease permanently any enrichment on its territory, even in return for the
lifting of additional US sanctions. 38 Some influential groups within the
country, notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), benefit
from a continuing level of sanctions, which allows them to exploit lucrative smuggling opportunities and keep out foreign competitors. Their
engineering firms have also benefited from contracts connected to the
nuclear power programme. 39
And, of course, although debate continues on Iran’s past and current
intentions, enrichment allows it to progress towards potential nuclear
latency—the ability to produce a nuclear weapon on short order, as a
means of ensuring regime survival. The fate of Saddam Hussein in Iraq
(discussed below) and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, who both gave up
nuclear weapons ambitions, contrasts here with the continued survival of
the nuclear-armed Kim dynasty in North Korea. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed in 2015 with the USA under
the Obama administration, the other UN security council permanent
members and the EU, Iran accepted stringent restrictions on enrichment,
to the point of being useless either for weapons or reactor fuel, but it
achieved international recognition of its right to domestic enrichment, a
nationalist win for the regime.
Hydropower
Hydropower in Iran also has strong domestic and international political
implications, if not to the same level as nuclear energy. These implications
relate more to its control of water than of electricity. It is a major part of
the power mix, reaching 1.8 GW immediately before the revolution, 40
and now standing at 12.252 GW of installed capacity, generating 9.1% of
total electricity in 2019 (this was unusually high due to strong rainfall; the
average over the past decade has been 5.3%). Hydro generation is highly
variable because of changes in precipitation.
Domestic political factors have led Iran to overbuild dams in the 1990s
and 2000s, with the process accelerating particularly under former President Ahmadinejad. These include the drive for food security and national
self-sufficiency 41 ; rural employment; and lobbying from local MPs. The
IRGC, with whom Ahmadinejad was closely associated, has lobbied to
build excessive numbers of dams to benefit from contracts awarded to its
engineering subsidiary, Khatam Al Anbiya, often under its construction
affiliate Sepasad. For instance, in 2012, a Chinese company building the
29
cease permanently any enrichment on its territory, even in return for the
lifting of additional US sanctions. 38 Some influential groups within the
country, notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), benefit
from a continuing level of sanctions, which allows them to exploit lucrative smuggling opportunities and keep out foreign competitors. Their
engineering firms have also benefited from contracts connected to the
nuclear power programme. 39
And, of course, although debate continues on Iran’s past and current
intentions, enrichment allows it to progress towards potential nuclear
latency—the ability to produce a nuclear weapon on short order, as a
means of ensuring regime survival. The fate of Saddam Hussein in Iraq
(discussed below) and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, who both gave up
nuclear weapons ambitions, contrasts here with the continued survival of
the nuclear-armed Kim dynasty in North Korea. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed in 2015 with the USA under
the Obama administration, the other UN security council permanent
members and the EU, Iran accepted stringent restrictions on enrichment,
to the point of being useless either for weapons or reactor fuel, but it
achieved international recognition of its right to domestic enrichment, a
nationalist win for the regime.
Hydropower
Hydropower in Iran also has strong domestic and international political
implications, if not to the same level as nuclear energy. These implications
relate more to its control of water than of electricity. It is a major part of
the power mix, reaching 1.8 GW immediately before the revolution, 40
and now standing at 12.252 GW of installed capacity, generating 9.1% of
total electricity in 2019 (this was unusually high due to strong rainfall; the
average over the past decade has been 5.3%). Hydro generation is highly
variable because of changes in precipitation.
Domestic political factors have led Iran to overbuild dams in the 1990s
and 2000s, with the process accelerating particularly under former President Ahmadinejad. These include the drive for food security and national
self-sufficiency 41 ; rural employment; and lobbying from local MPs. The
IRGC, with whom Ahmadinejad was closely associated, has lobbied to
build excessive numbers of dams to benefit from contracts awarded to its
engineering subsidiary, Khatam Al Anbiya, often under its construction
affiliate Sepasad. For instance, in 2012, a Chinese company building the