30 R. MILLS
Bakhtiari Dam in Lorestan was muscled aside by Khatam Al Anbiya. 42
Similar stories have been noted in the conventional power sector, where
the IRGC held up a deal for five gas-fired power plants with international investors until Ghadir Holdings, one of its affiliates, was given
a stake in an oil-field development. 43 Saeed Mohammed, who became
head of Khatam Al Anbiya Construction Base in 2019, earlier led an
IRGC company that built dams in western Iran. 44 The poor location and
construction of dams built by the IRGC not only wastes water through
leakage and evaporation, and dries up fertile areas, but limits the amount
of electricity they can generate.
Drought, urbanisation and over-abstraction have led to water shortages and drying out of water bodies such as Lake Orumiyeh in the
north-west. 45 It is possible that growing awareness of the negative consequences of dams, and an increase in water tariffs, will lead to a slowdown
in future construction. Farmers, who tend to be politically conservative,
have come under increasing pressure from water shortages, which may
turn opinion against more impoundments. The administration of President Hassan Rouhani, in his first term, did stop some dam projects, in line
with its objective to reduce the role of the IRGC in the economy, 46 but
dam-building still benefits from the self-sufficiency narrative and powerful
political backing.
Dams also have international political consequences, most notable on
Iran’s western and northern borders. In October 2017 and June 2018,
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) announced that Iran had interrupted
the flow of the Lesser Zab. Kurdish media claimed the first cut-off was
to put pressure on the KRI over its referendum on independence, held
in September 2017. 47 In October 2018, Iran interrupted flows from the
Karun and Karkheh rivers into southern Iraq. 48 In the face of water and
power shortages at home, exacerbated by a heatwave, and also possibly
because of non-payment by Iraq, Iran also reduced its electricity exports.
These factors contributed to the protests centred on Basra, and to Prime
Minister Haidar Al Abadi’s failure to win a second term in the 2018
elections.
Dam-building has extended into Iranian diplomacy. For instance, in
December 2011, its government agreed to fund the Balaa Dam in
Lebanon on the condition that an Iranian company was awarded the
construction contract. This requirement was dropped due to concerns
about links to Khatam Al Anbiya. 49 In May 2020, Iran completed two
hydropower projects on the Aras River, forming part of the border
Bakhtiari Dam in Lorestan was muscled aside by Khatam Al Anbiya. 42
Similar stories have been noted in the conventional power sector, where
the IRGC held up a deal for five gas-fired power plants with international investors until Ghadir Holdings, one of its affiliates, was given
a stake in an oil-field development. 43 Saeed Mohammed, who became
head of Khatam Al Anbiya Construction Base in 2019, earlier led an
IRGC company that built dams in western Iran. 44 The poor location and
construction of dams built by the IRGC not only wastes water through
leakage and evaporation, and dries up fertile areas, but limits the amount
of electricity they can generate.
Drought, urbanisation and over-abstraction have led to water shortages and drying out of water bodies such as Lake Orumiyeh in the
north-west. 45 It is possible that growing awareness of the negative consequences of dams, and an increase in water tariffs, will lead to a slowdown
in future construction. Farmers, who tend to be politically conservative,
have come under increasing pressure from water shortages, which may
turn opinion against more impoundments. The administration of President Hassan Rouhani, in his first term, did stop some dam projects, in line
with its objective to reduce the role of the IRGC in the economy, 46 but
dam-building still benefits from the self-sufficiency narrative and powerful
political backing.
Dams also have international political consequences, most notable on
Iran’s western and northern borders. In October 2017 and June 2018,
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) announced that Iran had interrupted
the flow of the Lesser Zab. Kurdish media claimed the first cut-off was
to put pressure on the KRI over its referendum on independence, held
in September 2017. 47 In October 2018, Iran interrupted flows from the
Karun and Karkheh rivers into southern Iraq. 48 In the face of water and
power shortages at home, exacerbated by a heatwave, and also possibly
because of non-payment by Iraq, Iran also reduced its electricity exports.
These factors contributed to the protests centred on Basra, and to Prime
Minister Haidar Al Abadi’s failure to win a second term in the 2018
elections.
Dam-building has extended into Iranian diplomacy. For instance, in
December 2011, its government agreed to fund the Balaa Dam in
Lebanon on the condition that an Iranian company was awarded the
construction contract. This requirement was dropped due to concerns
about links to Khatam Al Anbiya. 49 In May 2020, Iran completed two
hydropower projects on the Aras River, forming part of the border