28 R. MILLS
provide fuel or third-country enrichment and partly because of the experience of struggling for survival in the face of international isolation during
the Iran-Iraq War. But Iran’s own uranium resources do not appear sufficient in quality or quantity to fuel a large power generation fleet, and it
still has difficulty manufacturing usable fuel rods, making imports of some
kind a necessity. 35
Iran’s nuclear power programme has thus taken some forty years, of
which about 22 years were spent in active work, to construct 1 GW of
generating capacity, at an estimated direct cost in current dollars of $11
billion, 36 and a much higher cost in terms of sanctions and lost economic
opportunities. For comparison, the country’s total installed capacity as of
2019 amounted to about 99 GW and peak demand to about 61 GW. The
UAE’s nuclear programme started construction in 2012 and should have
5.6 GW operational by about 2024, a period of 12 years, at a construction
cost of $24.4 billion. This can be seen either as a story of Iran’s remarkable persistence in the face of revolution, war and sanctions, giving it a
nuclear capacity that will now be able to yield a significant number of
new reactors; or an odd and indecisive commitment to a very expensive
programme which will eventually meet only a small part of the country’s
electricity needs.
However, the nuclear programme since its revival in the late 1980s,
and indeed from its inception in 1974, has been about much more
than power generation. Barzegar notes that, ‘the Iranian nuclear program
exceeds mere access to nuclear energy and economic growth and is
concerned with more substantial issues, like mastering indigenous knowledge of nuclear technology; in other words, having access to an “independent nuclear fuel cycle”. This is the embodiment of progress and
regional and international prestige for Iran, as the nuclear program has
become a symbol of national unity, the country’s desire for development
and advancement, as well as resistance to foreign powers’ unacceptable
demands’. 37 Li-Chen Sim, in this volume, further addresses the regional
geopolitical implications of nuclear power programmes.
Indeed, technology transfer and the training of Iranian nuclear engineers have been an important part of the agreements with Russia.
This narrative is therefore convenient for the leadership of the Islamic
Republic, as it plays into the ideology of self-sufficiency and the ‘resistance
economy’, while it also finds favour on nationalist grounds with Iranians
who would not otherwise be supportive of the regime. In polling in
October 2019, 75% said that Iran should not accept a deal requiring it to
provide fuel or third-country enrichment and partly because of the experience of struggling for survival in the face of international isolation during
the Iran-Iraq War. But Iran’s own uranium resources do not appear sufficient in quality or quantity to fuel a large power generation fleet, and it
still has difficulty manufacturing usable fuel rods, making imports of some
kind a necessity. 35
Iran’s nuclear power programme has thus taken some forty years, of
which about 22 years were spent in active work, to construct 1 GW of
generating capacity, at an estimated direct cost in current dollars of $11
billion, 36 and a much higher cost in terms of sanctions and lost economic
opportunities. For comparison, the country’s total installed capacity as of
2019 amounted to about 99 GW and peak demand to about 61 GW. The
UAE’s nuclear programme started construction in 2012 and should have
5.6 GW operational by about 2024, a period of 12 years, at a construction
cost of $24.4 billion. This can be seen either as a story of Iran’s remarkable persistence in the face of revolution, war and sanctions, giving it a
nuclear capacity that will now be able to yield a significant number of
new reactors; or an odd and indecisive commitment to a very expensive
programme which will eventually meet only a small part of the country’s
electricity needs.
However, the nuclear programme since its revival in the late 1980s,
and indeed from its inception in 1974, has been about much more
than power generation. Barzegar notes that, ‘the Iranian nuclear program
exceeds mere access to nuclear energy and economic growth and is
concerned with more substantial issues, like mastering indigenous knowledge of nuclear technology; in other words, having access to an “independent nuclear fuel cycle”. This is the embodiment of progress and
regional and international prestige for Iran, as the nuclear program has
become a symbol of national unity, the country’s desire for development
and advancement, as well as resistance to foreign powers’ unacceptable
demands’. 37 Li-Chen Sim, in this volume, further addresses the regional
geopolitical implications of nuclear power programmes.
Indeed, technology transfer and the training of Iranian nuclear engineers have been an important part of the agreements with Russia.
This narrative is therefore convenient for the leadership of the Islamic
Republic, as it plays into the ideology of self-sufficiency and the ‘resistance
economy’, while it also finds favour on nationalist grounds with Iranians
who would not otherwise be supportive of the regime. In polling in
October 2019, 75% said that Iran should not accept a deal requiring it to