2 THE POLITICS OF LOW-CARBON ENERGY IN IRAN AND IRAQ
27
effort. Russia did commit in 1995 to complete the Bushehr-1 plant, using
the Russian-model VVER-1000 but reusing the remaining infrastructure
as far as possible. Russia agreed to supply fuel and to take back spent fuel,
so that enrichment in Iran would not be required. After numerous technical problems, the reactor started up in May 2011 and began commercial
operations in September 2013. 32
Iran also pursued a variety of plans for additional nuclear power plants.
This included up to four more VVER-1000 reactors at Bushehr and four
at another unspecified site, to be built by Rosatom. Limited work on the
site for the first two reactors was carried out between March 2017 and
November 2019. 33 In March 2019, it was announced that construction
of Bushehr-2 and Bushehr-3 was underway, to be operational by October
2024 and April 2026, respectively, 34 at a cost of $10 billion, financed by
Iran.
A further string of announcements has come out between 2007 and
2014 for an indigenous 360 MW light water reactor at Darkhovin, two
100 MW reactors to be built by the China National Nuclear Corporation
on the Makran (southern) coast, and possibly others on the Caspian Sea
coast. Under the JCPOA, China also committed to reconstruct Iran’s
Arak reactor so that it could not produce or reprocess weapons-grade
plutonium.
Russia and China are, of course, the two main diplomatic supporters of
the Islamic Republic, and China is its sole remaining paying customer for
oil. This presents an opportunity for Rosatom to market its reactors with
little competition. Deals with China allow Iran to use barter or renminbidenominated trade offset against oil sales. Iranian officials are frustrated
with the actual practical support from these countries, which has done
little to shield them from the effect of unilateral US sanctions, but have
few alternatives.
During this period, Iran also carried out numerous nuclear activities
not directly related to power production, including construction of a
heavy water plant, the Arak research reactor and uranium enrichment.
Various revelations of these projects led to growing international pressure,
particularly from 2003 onwards, for more inspections and restrictions.
Some of the justification for Iran’s indigenous enrichment effort, and
related endeavours such as domestic uranium mining, has been the need
to guarantee a fuel supply for its reactors, partly because of the Eurodif
experience, partly because of mistrust of various international offers to
27
effort. Russia did commit in 1995 to complete the Bushehr-1 plant, using
the Russian-model VVER-1000 but reusing the remaining infrastructure
as far as possible. Russia agreed to supply fuel and to take back spent fuel,
so that enrichment in Iran would not be required. After numerous technical problems, the reactor started up in May 2011 and began commercial
operations in September 2013. 32
Iran also pursued a variety of plans for additional nuclear power plants.
This included up to four more VVER-1000 reactors at Bushehr and four
at another unspecified site, to be built by Rosatom. Limited work on the
site for the first two reactors was carried out between March 2017 and
November 2019. 33 In March 2019, it was announced that construction
of Bushehr-2 and Bushehr-3 was underway, to be operational by October
2024 and April 2026, respectively, 34 at a cost of $10 billion, financed by
Iran.
A further string of announcements has come out between 2007 and
2014 for an indigenous 360 MW light water reactor at Darkhovin, two
100 MW reactors to be built by the China National Nuclear Corporation
on the Makran (southern) coast, and possibly others on the Caspian Sea
coast. Under the JCPOA, China also committed to reconstruct Iran’s
Arak reactor so that it could not produce or reprocess weapons-grade
plutonium.
Russia and China are, of course, the two main diplomatic supporters of
the Islamic Republic, and China is its sole remaining paying customer for
oil. This presents an opportunity for Rosatom to market its reactors with
little competition. Deals with China allow Iran to use barter or renminbidenominated trade offset against oil sales. Iranian officials are frustrated
with the actual practical support from these countries, which has done
little to shield them from the effect of unilateral US sanctions, but have
few alternatives.
During this period, Iran also carried out numerous nuclear activities
not directly related to power production, including construction of a
heavy water plant, the Arak research reactor and uranium enrichment.
Various revelations of these projects led to growing international pressure,
particularly from 2003 onwards, for more inspections and restrictions.
Some of the justification for Iran’s indigenous enrichment effort, and
related endeavours such as domestic uranium mining, has been the need
to guarantee a fuel supply for its reactors, partly because of the Eurodif
experience, partly because of mistrust of various international offers to