26 R. MILLS
Ford administration was concerned about nuclear weapons proliferation,
following some ambiguous statements from the Shah and India’s first
nuclear test, also in 1974. 28 At this point, Iran’s installed generating
capacity was only 14 GW, and observers questioned the very large size
of the planned power programme. 29
Iran also acquired an indirect 10% stake in the Eurodif enrichment
consortium in France. The USA, at this point, was not particularly
concerned about uranium enrichment, but was opposed to Iran’s having
a reprocessing facility, which could have allowed it to extract plutonium
from spent fuel for possible use in weapons. Concepts were floated for
Iran to invest in an enrichment plant in the USA, or somewhere else as
part of an international consortium. Etemad felt from the start that the
USA could be ruled out as a partner; a deal was initialled in 1978, when
the Shah conceded on reprocessing, but then fell foul of the revolution.
Yet Iran’s insistence on its nuclear ‘rights’, including enrichment, and its
view of nuclear power as a corollary of modernity have continued through
into the post-revolutionary period.
Agreement had been reached in 1974 with Germany’s Kraftwerk
(which became Siemens) to build two pressurised water reactors of
1293 MW each at Bushehr on the northern end of the Persian Gulf.
The first reactor was substantially complete and the second about halfcomplete when work was abandoned in 1979 as payment ceased after
the revolution. Framatome of France had just started construction of
two 910 MW reactors at Darkhovin, in the Khuzestan province near the
Iraqi border, but this was abandoned in April 1979. AEOI continued in
existence but many trained nuclear professionals also left the country at
this time. Ayatollah Khomeini saw the nuclear programme as an expensive legacy of the Shah’s programme of Westernisation, and annulled
the power plant contracts, though nuclear work with a possible aim of
developing weapons did resume in 1983. 30 The Iran-Iraq war denied the
nuclear programme further resources, and the Bushehr site was severely
damaged in Iraqi air raids during 1984–1988. 31
Following the war’s end in 1988, Iran’s nuclear activities picked up
again. However, the USA strongly opposed them because of concerns
over proliferation, and persuaded Russia, China and Argentina to drop
cooperation plans. Iran was reimbursed for its investment in Eurodif in
1991, but lost its right to enriched uranium from the plant. Instead, it
began to develop a clandestine enrichment programme from about 1986,
with the help of A. Q. Khan, the leader of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
Ford administration was concerned about nuclear weapons proliferation,
following some ambiguous statements from the Shah and India’s first
nuclear test, also in 1974. 28 At this point, Iran’s installed generating
capacity was only 14 GW, and observers questioned the very large size
of the planned power programme. 29
Iran also acquired an indirect 10% stake in the Eurodif enrichment
consortium in France. The USA, at this point, was not particularly
concerned about uranium enrichment, but was opposed to Iran’s having
a reprocessing facility, which could have allowed it to extract plutonium
from spent fuel for possible use in weapons. Concepts were floated for
Iran to invest in an enrichment plant in the USA, or somewhere else as
part of an international consortium. Etemad felt from the start that the
USA could be ruled out as a partner; a deal was initialled in 1978, when
the Shah conceded on reprocessing, but then fell foul of the revolution.
Yet Iran’s insistence on its nuclear ‘rights’, including enrichment, and its
view of nuclear power as a corollary of modernity have continued through
into the post-revolutionary period.
Agreement had been reached in 1974 with Germany’s Kraftwerk
(which became Siemens) to build two pressurised water reactors of
1293 MW each at Bushehr on the northern end of the Persian Gulf.
The first reactor was substantially complete and the second about halfcomplete when work was abandoned in 1979 as payment ceased after
the revolution. Framatome of France had just started construction of
two 910 MW reactors at Darkhovin, in the Khuzestan province near the
Iraqi border, but this was abandoned in April 1979. AEOI continued in
existence but many trained nuclear professionals also left the country at
this time. Ayatollah Khomeini saw the nuclear programme as an expensive legacy of the Shah’s programme of Westernisation, and annulled
the power plant contracts, though nuclear work with a possible aim of
developing weapons did resume in 1983. 30 The Iran-Iraq war denied the
nuclear programme further resources, and the Bushehr site was severely
damaged in Iraqi air raids during 1984–1988. 31
Following the war’s end in 1988, Iran’s nuclear activities picked up
again. However, the USA strongly opposed them because of concerns
over proliferation, and persuaded Russia, China and Argentina to drop
cooperation plans. Iran was reimbursed for its investment in Eurodif in
1991, but lost its right to enriched uranium from the plant. Instead, it
began to develop a clandestine enrichment programme from about 1986,
with the help of A. Q. Khan, the leader of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons