11 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE ARAB REGION
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policies and domestic governance framework are among the region’s
best-performing ones, while its strategic positioning between Europe and
Africa is largely reflected in its UNFCCC policies.
The second question concerned the differences in policy choices
between oil exporters and non-oil exporters, and whether either the
rentier or leadership agency paradigm can help explain policy outcomes.
Surprisingly perhaps, the chapter has provided most support for Arab
countries’ domestic climate change policies being driven by domestic
energy diversification ambitions and to some extent existing natural
resource endowments—and not so much by entrenched rentier state
interests (with the clear exception of Saudi Arabia) or top leadership
members. Morocco’s and Egypt’s hydropower has given them a headstart in renewable electricity, and they also face high fossil fuel import
bills, which create an urgent incentive for energy diversification. In Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, in turn, the pressure to scale up renewables has not
been as urgent, but an added incentive for investing in domestic capacity
has been the role of renewables in decreasing the opportunity costs of
burning fossil fuels at home below international market prices.
At the international level, as demonstrated by the list above, policies
are explained by a broad range of institutional capacity and legacy factors,
which intermingle with how the country’s leadership sees its role in the
region and internationally.
The third question related to a possible future convergence of domestic
rhetoric, domestic policy and international policy positions both at a
country and regional level. At the time of writing, in a global comparison,
the four Arab countries analysed were at various stages of domestic ambition. In 2019, the Climate Action Tracker group ranked the Moroccan
NDC among only two that are compatible with the most ambitious goal
of the Paris Agreement, of staying below 1.5 °C of global temperature
rise. It rated the UAE’s NDC as ‘highly insufficient’, compatible with a
3–4 °C world, and that of Saudi Arabia ‘critically insufficient’, compatible
with a 4 °C+ temperature rise. 91 Another ranking, the Climate Change
Performance Index, by Germanwatch, rated Morocco’s performance as
‘high’, Egypt’s ‘medium’ and Saudi Arabia’s ‘very low’. 92
In an international context, the Arab countries are united by their
vulnerability to climate change impacts and their developing country
status. Climate change adaptation solutions are often local and contextspecific, but multidimensional risks related to migration, social unrest
and shared water resources, if addressed proactively, could create a new
325
policies and domestic governance framework are among the region’s
best-performing ones, while its strategic positioning between Europe and
Africa is largely reflected in its UNFCCC policies.
The second question concerned the differences in policy choices
between oil exporters and non-oil exporters, and whether either the
rentier or leadership agency paradigm can help explain policy outcomes.
Surprisingly perhaps, the chapter has provided most support for Arab
countries’ domestic climate change policies being driven by domestic
energy diversification ambitions and to some extent existing natural
resource endowments—and not so much by entrenched rentier state
interests (with the clear exception of Saudi Arabia) or top leadership
members. Morocco’s and Egypt’s hydropower has given them a headstart in renewable electricity, and they also face high fossil fuel import
bills, which create an urgent incentive for energy diversification. In Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, in turn, the pressure to scale up renewables has not
been as urgent, but an added incentive for investing in domestic capacity
has been the role of renewables in decreasing the opportunity costs of
burning fossil fuels at home below international market prices.
At the international level, as demonstrated by the list above, policies
are explained by a broad range of institutional capacity and legacy factors,
which intermingle with how the country’s leadership sees its role in the
region and internationally.
The third question related to a possible future convergence of domestic
rhetoric, domestic policy and international policy positions both at a
country and regional level. At the time of writing, in a global comparison,
the four Arab countries analysed were at various stages of domestic ambition. In 2019, the Climate Action Tracker group ranked the Moroccan
NDC among only two that are compatible with the most ambitious goal
of the Paris Agreement, of staying below 1.5 °C of global temperature
rise. It rated the UAE’s NDC as ‘highly insufficient’, compatible with a
3–4 °C world, and that of Saudi Arabia ‘critically insufficient’, compatible
with a 4 °C+ temperature rise. 91 Another ranking, the Climate Change
Performance Index, by Germanwatch, rated Morocco’s performance as
‘high’, Egypt’s ‘medium’ and Saudi Arabia’s ‘very low’. 92
In an international context, the Arab countries are united by their
vulnerability to climate change impacts and their developing country
status. Climate change adaptation solutions are often local and contextspecific, but multidimensional risks related to migration, social unrest
and shared water resources, if addressed proactively, could create a new