324 M. LUOMI
The two-level game hypothesis presented at the beginning of the
chapter—namely that the domestic-international policy disconnect is the
result of weak domestic constituencies favouring ambitious international
climate policies and low institutionalisation of regional cooperation and
coordination mechanisms—does seem to hold. However, this chapter
has also shed light on a much more subtle two-level game and highlydiverse ways of participating in the UNFCCC. Differentiating features
and characteristics in this regard include:
• Strength of UNFCCC negotiating capacity (Saudi Arabia and Egypt
being the strongest);
• Weight of oil industry interests and scepticism of climate science
(Saudi Arabia as the most vocal);
• Pursuit of an active role in peer groups (the UAE being the only
inactive one in this regard);
• Role of different authorities in shaping the country’s position
(Morocco and the UAE with multi-stakeholder participation, Egypt
led by two ministries and Saudi Arabia by one);
• Projection of domestic ambition in the UNFCCC (Morocco being
by far the most active); and
• Role vis-à-vis international climate finance (Egypt and Morocco
actively seeking foreign assistance and Saudi Arabia and the UAE
seeking to avoid being considered as donors).
The chapter has identified several discrepancies between the domestic
and international level policies of the countries studied, which lead to
unlocked opportunities. The UAE’s domestic policy ambitions and the
regional leadership role it has been seeking are not coupled with equally
ambitious domestic implementation or proactive UNFCCC participation.
Saudi Arabia’s ambitious domestic energy policies, which could form the
basis of a more overarching climate change policy, are held back by the
tight leadership of its energy ministry and its emphasis on the costs of
mitigation action both domestically and globally over their benefits.
In Egypt, an active diplomatic apparatus has engaged it in the work
of four major negotiating blocs, but at the domestic level, despite a
long institutional history and ambitious renewable energy targets, climate
change policy seems to be stagnating. Morocco’s climate change policies
are perhaps the best-aligned of all Arab countries: its renewable energy
The two-level game hypothesis presented at the beginning of the
chapter—namely that the domestic-international policy disconnect is the
result of weak domestic constituencies favouring ambitious international
climate policies and low institutionalisation of regional cooperation and
coordination mechanisms—does seem to hold. However, this chapter
has also shed light on a much more subtle two-level game and highlydiverse ways of participating in the UNFCCC. Differentiating features
and characteristics in this regard include:
• Strength of UNFCCC negotiating capacity (Saudi Arabia and Egypt
being the strongest);
• Weight of oil industry interests and scepticism of climate science
(Saudi Arabia as the most vocal);
• Pursuit of an active role in peer groups (the UAE being the only
inactive one in this regard);
• Role of different authorities in shaping the country’s position
(Morocco and the UAE with multi-stakeholder participation, Egypt
led by two ministries and Saudi Arabia by one);
• Projection of domestic ambition in the UNFCCC (Morocco being
by far the most active); and
• Role vis-à-vis international climate finance (Egypt and Morocco
actively seeking foreign assistance and Saudi Arabia and the UAE
seeking to avoid being considered as donors).
The chapter has identified several discrepancies between the domestic
and international level policies of the countries studied, which lead to
unlocked opportunities. The UAE’s domestic policy ambitions and the
regional leadership role it has been seeking are not coupled with equally
ambitious domestic implementation or proactive UNFCCC participation.
Saudi Arabia’s ambitious domestic energy policies, which could form the
basis of a more overarching climate change policy, are held back by the
tight leadership of its energy ministry and its emphasis on the costs of
mitigation action both domestically and globally over their benefits.
In Egypt, an active diplomatic apparatus has engaged it in the work
of four major negotiating blocs, but at the domestic level, despite a
long institutional history and ambitious renewable energy targets, climate
change policy seems to be stagnating. Morocco’s climate change policies
are perhaps the best-aligned of all Arab countries: its renewable energy