11 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE ARAB REGION
323
and cooling. And despite its location in between Europe and Africa,
unlike Morocco, Egypt has not yet seriously explored renewable electricity exports or sought to position itself as source of policy leadership in
its neighbourhood.
Egypt’s vulnerability to climate change impacts, especially with regard
to sea-level rise and water resources, have been stressed in government
documents since the early 2010s. Awareness about the country’s physical
vulnerability to climate change, and in particular its impacts on agricultural production and food security, can also be seen reflected in its active
participation in the African Group in international negotiations.
In the UNFCCC context, Egypt’s diplomatic prowess has led it to
take on an active role in all its core peer groups: the Arab Group, African
Group and G-77/China. As a result, Egypt’s primary role in the negotiations has shaped up to be that of a coordinator, rather than a leader or
a laggard.
At the same time, while Egypt has not always agreed with Saudi
Arabia on all UNFCCC positions and tactics, its strong emphasis on
adaptation (over mitigation) and on developed countries’ responsibility
(over developing countries) has undoubtedly shaped and strengthened
the Arab Group’s conservative orientation in the negotiations. It has also
participated in the emerging economy-dominated LMDCs group which,
according to an Egyptian diplomat in 2012, came together from a mutual
perception of being pressured to take on more responsibilities despite still
struggling with significant development challenges. 90
Conclusions
The first of the three questions laid out at the start of the chapter asked:
why are recent years’ changes in Arab countries’ climate change policy
not reflected at the international level?
The chapter has confirmed that the prevailing view of the Arab countries acting as a unified group in the negotiations led by Saudi Arabia
is only partially correct: first, Egypt has actively participated in coordinating and shaping the group’s views since the 1990s. Second, Morocco
and Egypt also participate actively in the African Group, through which
they can pursue priorities that are not catered for though participation
in the Arab Group. Third, seeking to broaden their partnerships with
more proactive countries, Morocco and the UAE have joined dialogue
fora promoting ambitious action beyond the UNFCCC.
323
and cooling. And despite its location in between Europe and Africa,
unlike Morocco, Egypt has not yet seriously explored renewable electricity exports or sought to position itself as source of policy leadership in
its neighbourhood.
Egypt’s vulnerability to climate change impacts, especially with regard
to sea-level rise and water resources, have been stressed in government
documents since the early 2010s. Awareness about the country’s physical
vulnerability to climate change, and in particular its impacts on agricultural production and food security, can also be seen reflected in its active
participation in the African Group in international negotiations.
In the UNFCCC context, Egypt’s diplomatic prowess has led it to
take on an active role in all its core peer groups: the Arab Group, African
Group and G-77/China. As a result, Egypt’s primary role in the negotiations has shaped up to be that of a coordinator, rather than a leader or
a laggard.
At the same time, while Egypt has not always agreed with Saudi
Arabia on all UNFCCC positions and tactics, its strong emphasis on
adaptation (over mitigation) and on developed countries’ responsibility
(over developing countries) has undoubtedly shaped and strengthened
the Arab Group’s conservative orientation in the negotiations. It has also
participated in the emerging economy-dominated LMDCs group which,
according to an Egyptian diplomat in 2012, came together from a mutual
perception of being pressured to take on more responsibilities despite still
struggling with significant development challenges. 90
Conclusions
The first of the three questions laid out at the start of the chapter asked:
why are recent years’ changes in Arab countries’ climate change policy
not reflected at the international level?
The chapter has confirmed that the prevailing view of the Arab countries acting as a unified group in the negotiations led by Saudi Arabia
is only partially correct: first, Egypt has actively participated in coordinating and shaping the group’s views since the 1990s. Second, Morocco
and Egypt also participate actively in the African Group, through which
they can pursue priorities that are not catered for though participation
in the Arab Group. Third, seeking to broaden their partnerships with
more proactive countries, Morocco and the UAE have joined dialogue
fora promoting ambitious action beyond the UNFCCC.