322 M. LUOMI
climate change governance in many other MENA countries. This unfortunately tends to create discontinuities through unsuccessful knowledge
transfer and lack of follow-up mechanisms. Another common characteristic shared by Egyptian and MENA environmental authorities, also
pointed out by Sowers, is that ‘environmental ministries are widely viewed
as “weak” compared with the money and power concentrated in the
governmental ministries of the interior, industry, mining, oil and gas’. 84
Abdel Gelil has described Egypt’s climate change policy framework as
‘relatively mature’, noting that this has played ‘an instrumental role in
attracting donor funding’ for climate change vulnerability and adaptation
assessments, capacity building and participation in the Kyoto CDM. 85
As of 2019, Egypt was the Arab country with the highest amount of
registered CDM credits, totalling 4.193 million CERs. By comparison,
the UAE had 1.163 million registered CERs (each equivalent to 1 tonne
of CO 2 /year), Saudi Arabia 0.576 million and Morocco 1.740 million. 86
Also, by 2019, Egypt had secured a total of US$830 million from the
GCF for building climate finance markets, scaling up renewable energy
and private sector participation and building resilience to sea-level rise. 87
Non-state actors’ participation in Egypt’s climate change governance
is not well-documented. Some environmental NGOs work on domestic
climate change policy—many with an international link, either belonging
to a global NGO network (such as 350.org or Greenpeace) or supported
by foreign donors (e.g. the Cairo Climate Talks forum). 88
Alignment, Drivers and Future Prospects
Egypt’s climate change policy has been driven, as Abdel Gelil has affirmed,
by its energy policy requirements and its perceived vulnerability to climate
change. 89 Regarding the former, the 2016 energy strategy and its renewable energy and efficiency targets are part of a broader domestic energy
supply diversification strategy. Notably, in the early 2010s, Egypt suffered
from a severe natural gas shortage, and the Grand Renaissance Dam
constructed by Ethiopia is feared to potentially affect Egypt’s future
hydropower generation capacity. With domestic energy demand growing
and solar (and wind) technology costs falling, renewables have become
an attractive energy diversification option for many Arab countries—
including the ones studied in this chapter. Despite this, as in other
Arab countries, little is happening in Egypt to support the expansion
of renewables beyond the electricity sector, into transport and heating
climate change governance in many other MENA countries. This unfortunately tends to create discontinuities through unsuccessful knowledge
transfer and lack of follow-up mechanisms. Another common characteristic shared by Egyptian and MENA environmental authorities, also
pointed out by Sowers, is that ‘environmental ministries are widely viewed
as “weak” compared with the money and power concentrated in the
governmental ministries of the interior, industry, mining, oil and gas’. 84
Abdel Gelil has described Egypt’s climate change policy framework as
‘relatively mature’, noting that this has played ‘an instrumental role in
attracting donor funding’ for climate change vulnerability and adaptation
assessments, capacity building and participation in the Kyoto CDM. 85
As of 2019, Egypt was the Arab country with the highest amount of
registered CDM credits, totalling 4.193 million CERs. By comparison,
the UAE had 1.163 million registered CERs (each equivalent to 1 tonne
of CO 2 /year), Saudi Arabia 0.576 million and Morocco 1.740 million. 86
Also, by 2019, Egypt had secured a total of US$830 million from the
GCF for building climate finance markets, scaling up renewable energy
and private sector participation and building resilience to sea-level rise. 87
Non-state actors’ participation in Egypt’s climate change governance
is not well-documented. Some environmental NGOs work on domestic
climate change policy—many with an international link, either belonging
to a global NGO network (such as 350.org or Greenpeace) or supported
by foreign donors (e.g. the Cairo Climate Talks forum). 88
Alignment, Drivers and Future Prospects
Egypt’s climate change policy has been driven, as Abdel Gelil has affirmed,
by its energy policy requirements and its perceived vulnerability to climate
change. 89 Regarding the former, the 2016 energy strategy and its renewable energy and efficiency targets are part of a broader domestic energy
supply diversification strategy. Notably, in the early 2010s, Egypt suffered
from a severe natural gas shortage, and the Grand Renaissance Dam
constructed by Ethiopia is feared to potentially affect Egypt’s future
hydropower generation capacity. With domestic energy demand growing
and solar (and wind) technology costs falling, renewables have become
an attractive energy diversification option for many Arab countries—
including the ones studied in this chapter. Despite this, as in other
Arab countries, little is happening in Egypt to support the expansion
of renewables beyond the electricity sector, into transport and heating