310 M. LUOMI
In the negotiations, the Arab Group holds preparatory meetings in
the run-up to UNFCCC meetings and coordinates twice a day during
the negotiating sessions. Saudi Arabia is the de facto lead country of the
Group, and its national positions are visibly reflected in those of the Arab
Group (discussed in the UAE section above). Egypt is another country
that occasionally formally speaks for the Group. Kuwait and Qatar often
voice their support of Saudi Arabia’s views in semi-formal negotiating
settings—the latter seemingly less since the 2017 embargo.
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent other Arab countries’ inputs,
views and interests are aligned and/or reflected in the Arab Group’s
positions. This is due to many Arab countries’ low degree of formal
articulation of their international policy positions (e.g. in single-country
written submissions or public policy statements) and low levels of
active participation in formal and semi-formal negotiating settings in the
UNFCCC (which, unlike country group coordination meetings, are open
to observers and which the author has regularly attended since 2008).
Despite being perceived as a difficult player in the negotiations, Saudi
Arabia is not a heavyweight like the US or China and cannot therefore
decide alone on the rise or fall of major decisions. It did not publicly
oppose the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, for
example. Many long-term observers also suggest that Saudi Arabia has
softened its rhetoric in the past decade compared to the previous two,
after a change of the lead negotiator. It was also among the first few
Arab countries to ratify the agreement. The fact that the Saudi ratification happened exactly a day before the agreement’s entry into force, in
November 2016, could however either be interpreted as a more constructive approach to global climate action or merely further evidence to
support the obstructionism argument.
Domestic Policy Evolution and Main Elements
In the past decade, policies that support emissions reductions directly
or indirectly have emerged on the Saudi domestic policy agenda. Similarly to the UAE, Saudi Arabia began engaging in the UNFCCC Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) to pursue monetisation of some of its
emissions reductions projects through the sale of carbon credits. In 2003,
the government launched its first National Energy Efficiency Program,
followed in 2010 by the establishment of the Saudi Energy Efficiency
In the negotiations, the Arab Group holds preparatory meetings in
the run-up to UNFCCC meetings and coordinates twice a day during
the negotiating sessions. Saudi Arabia is the de facto lead country of the
Group, and its national positions are visibly reflected in those of the Arab
Group (discussed in the UAE section above). Egypt is another country
that occasionally formally speaks for the Group. Kuwait and Qatar often
voice their support of Saudi Arabia’s views in semi-formal negotiating
settings—the latter seemingly less since the 2017 embargo.
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent other Arab countries’ inputs,
views and interests are aligned and/or reflected in the Arab Group’s
positions. This is due to many Arab countries’ low degree of formal
articulation of their international policy positions (e.g. in single-country
written submissions or public policy statements) and low levels of
active participation in formal and semi-formal negotiating settings in the
UNFCCC (which, unlike country group coordination meetings, are open
to observers and which the author has regularly attended since 2008).
Despite being perceived as a difficult player in the negotiations, Saudi
Arabia is not a heavyweight like the US or China and cannot therefore
decide alone on the rise or fall of major decisions. It did not publicly
oppose the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, for
example. Many long-term observers also suggest that Saudi Arabia has
softened its rhetoric in the past decade compared to the previous two,
after a change of the lead negotiator. It was also among the first few
Arab countries to ratify the agreement. The fact that the Saudi ratification happened exactly a day before the agreement’s entry into force, in
November 2016, could however either be interpreted as a more constructive approach to global climate action or merely further evidence to
support the obstructionism argument.
Domestic Policy Evolution and Main Elements
In the past decade, policies that support emissions reductions directly
or indirectly have emerged on the Saudi domestic policy agenda. Similarly to the UAE, Saudi Arabia began engaging in the UNFCCC Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) to pursue monetisation of some of its
emissions reductions projects through the sale of carbon credits. In 2003,
the government launched its first National Energy Efficiency Program,
followed in 2010 by the establishment of the Saudi Energy Efficiency