11 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE ARAB REGION
311
Center (SEEC) to guide related programming. An energy conservation
law was also under development in 2019. 29
Saudi Arabia does not have a national climate change plan, economywide mitigation or adaptation strategies or absolute emissions targets.
Despite its significant contribution to domestic emissions the national
oil company Saudi Aramco has not set any quantitative targets aimed at
reducing emissions across its operations. The Saudi National Renewable
Energy Program, from 2016, contains domestic renewable power targets
of 3.45 GW by 2020 and 9.5 GW by 2023. (The targets were later revised
upwards to 27.3 GW by 2023 and 57.8 GW by 2030. 30 ) A 30% renewables and 70% natural gas power sector target for 2030 has also been
announced. 31 In addition, Saudi Arabia has nuclear energy-related plans,
but capacity targets have kept shifting over recent years. 32 As of 2019, the
government had not yet embarked on constructing nuclear energy, and
Saudi Arabia’s total renewable energy power generation capacity stood at
0.1 GW, equal to 0.2% of total capacity. 33
Saudi Arabia’s first Paris Agreement NDC, like that of the UAE, is
framed in the context of economic diversification-related co-benefits. It
contains an emissions avoidance target of 130 million tons of CO 2 equivalent by 2030 (albeit the absence of a baseline makes it impossible to
evaluate the actual emissions trajectory this would translate into), which
is conditional ‘on the Kingdom’s economy continuing to grow with
an increasingly diversified economy and a robust contribution from oil
export revenues to the national economy’. 34 Similarly to the UAE, Saudi
Arabia does not make its NDC mitigation target conditional on external
financing.
Given that Saudi Arabia’s NDC target year is 2030, it is not legally
required to update its NDC until most likely 2025.
Institutional Framework
According to Al-Sarihi, challenges facing Saudi domestic climate change
governance include ‘a lack of quantitative data, consistency, and certainty;
absence of a climate action plan; heavy involvement of the Ministry
of Energy and the energy industry itself in addressing climate-related
matters; and fragmentation of climate-related policies and efforts’. 35
While the involvement of the energy industry in climate action should
arguably not be seen as a problem, its dominance of climate change
policy could be. Saudi Arabia’s climate change policy is exclusively led
311
Center (SEEC) to guide related programming. An energy conservation
law was also under development in 2019. 29
Saudi Arabia does not have a national climate change plan, economywide mitigation or adaptation strategies or absolute emissions targets.
Despite its significant contribution to domestic emissions the national
oil company Saudi Aramco has not set any quantitative targets aimed at
reducing emissions across its operations. The Saudi National Renewable
Energy Program, from 2016, contains domestic renewable power targets
of 3.45 GW by 2020 and 9.5 GW by 2023. (The targets were later revised
upwards to 27.3 GW by 2023 and 57.8 GW by 2030. 30 ) A 30% renewables and 70% natural gas power sector target for 2030 has also been
announced. 31 In addition, Saudi Arabia has nuclear energy-related plans,
but capacity targets have kept shifting over recent years. 32 As of 2019, the
government had not yet embarked on constructing nuclear energy, and
Saudi Arabia’s total renewable energy power generation capacity stood at
0.1 GW, equal to 0.2% of total capacity. 33
Saudi Arabia’s first Paris Agreement NDC, like that of the UAE, is
framed in the context of economic diversification-related co-benefits. It
contains an emissions avoidance target of 130 million tons of CO 2 equivalent by 2030 (albeit the absence of a baseline makes it impossible to
evaluate the actual emissions trajectory this would translate into), which
is conditional ‘on the Kingdom’s economy continuing to grow with
an increasingly diversified economy and a robust contribution from oil
export revenues to the national economy’. 34 Similarly to the UAE, Saudi
Arabia does not make its NDC mitigation target conditional on external
financing.
Given that Saudi Arabia’s NDC target year is 2030, it is not legally
required to update its NDC until most likely 2025.
Institutional Framework
According to Al-Sarihi, challenges facing Saudi domestic climate change
governance include ‘a lack of quantitative data, consistency, and certainty;
absence of a climate action plan; heavy involvement of the Ministry
of Energy and the energy industry itself in addressing climate-related
matters; and fragmentation of climate-related policies and efforts’. 35
While the involvement of the energy industry in climate action should
arguably not be seen as a problem, its dominance of climate change
policy could be. Saudi Arabia’s climate change policy is exclusively led