11 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE ARAB REGION
309
sector. Electricity and heat production account for 36% of the UAE’s total
GHG emissions 25 —meaning that two-thirds of the UAE’s emissions are
not yet covered by a quantitative climate change policy target. Second,
some of the plans, including the Abu Dhabi 2020 target and the 2050
federal energy strategy have not been accompanied by (publicly-available)
implementation plans or, in the latter case, a baseline scenario. Third,
the 2050 climate change plan does not include any quantitative emission
reduction targets. The plan also does not refer to any processes for setting
such targets despite an article in the Paris Agreement (4.19) stating that
all countries ‘should’ develop long-term low GHG emission development
strategies that align with the goals of the Agreement.
Climate Change Policy in Saudi Arabia
Role in the UNFCCC
Saudi Arabia has since the 1990s been the most active, skilled and dominant Arab country in the UN climate change negotiations. In addition
to the Arab Group, it has been active in the LMDCs and G-77/China.
In an observation-based study published in 2008, Depledge examined
the Saudi positions through the concept of obstructionism, arguing that
obstructionists join negotiations ‘because they fear the agreement that
others might reach’. 26 She argued that the Saudi UNFCCC positions
were driven by ‘its fears over the potential negative impacts of climate
change mitigation policies on its economy’ and supported by ‘powerful
oil and coal lobbies within industrialized countries’. 27
Much of the positions emphasised, and tactics employed, by the Saudi
delegation in UNFCCC and IPCC meetings in the 1990s and 2000s are
still visible in present-day negotiations. These include an emphasis on
the costs of mitigation action and on the negative impacts of response
measures on oil-exporting countries’ economies. Saudi Arabia has also
consistently sought to slow or water down negotiating processes and
politically-negotiated documents that relate to climate science and IPCC
reports, in particular with regard to staying below 1.5 °C of global
warming. Many of Saudi Arabia’s skilful negotiators, with a few exceptions, come from the Ministry of Energy and many have remained in
the process for a long period of time—characteristics highlighted also by
Depledge in her 2008 article. 28
309
sector. Electricity and heat production account for 36% of the UAE’s total
GHG emissions 25 —meaning that two-thirds of the UAE’s emissions are
not yet covered by a quantitative climate change policy target. Second,
some of the plans, including the Abu Dhabi 2020 target and the 2050
federal energy strategy have not been accompanied by (publicly-available)
implementation plans or, in the latter case, a baseline scenario. Third,
the 2050 climate change plan does not include any quantitative emission
reduction targets. The plan also does not refer to any processes for setting
such targets despite an article in the Paris Agreement (4.19) stating that
all countries ‘should’ develop long-term low GHG emission development
strategies that align with the goals of the Agreement.
Climate Change Policy in Saudi Arabia
Role in the UNFCCC
Saudi Arabia has since the 1990s been the most active, skilled and dominant Arab country in the UN climate change negotiations. In addition
to the Arab Group, it has been active in the LMDCs and G-77/China.
In an observation-based study published in 2008, Depledge examined
the Saudi positions through the concept of obstructionism, arguing that
obstructionists join negotiations ‘because they fear the agreement that
others might reach’. 26 She argued that the Saudi UNFCCC positions
were driven by ‘its fears over the potential negative impacts of climate
change mitigation policies on its economy’ and supported by ‘powerful
oil and coal lobbies within industrialized countries’. 27
Much of the positions emphasised, and tactics employed, by the Saudi
delegation in UNFCCC and IPCC meetings in the 1990s and 2000s are
still visible in present-day negotiations. These include an emphasis on
the costs of mitigation action and on the negative impacts of response
measures on oil-exporting countries’ economies. Saudi Arabia has also
consistently sought to slow or water down negotiating processes and
politically-negotiated documents that relate to climate science and IPCC
reports, in particular with regard to staying below 1.5 °C of global
warming. Many of Saudi Arabia’s skilful negotiators, with a few exceptions, come from the Ministry of Energy and many have remained in
the process for a long period of time—characteristics highlighted also by
Depledge in her 2008 article. 28