302 M. LUOMI
Absence of a Two-Level Game
What then drives policy at these two levels in the Arab countries? And why
do they seem so disconnected? In the fields of International relations and
political economy, it is generally accepted that domestic and international
politics deeply influence each other and, as Putnam has noted, there are
‘powerful incentives for consistency between the two’. 7 In his seminal
article from 1988, Putnam described international negotiations as a twolevel game:
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek
power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international
level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign
developments. 8
Perhaps what then explains the observed discrepancies between the
domestic and international levels in Arab countries’ climate change
policies is a combination of weak domestic constituencies that favour
ambitious international climate policies (such as environment ministries
or NGOs) and low institutionalisation of regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms. In other words, a ‘low domestic political cost’ of
siding with conservative positions at the international level means that
negotiators are more likely to support positions that are promoted by
oil-exporting country delegations, which often are better-funded, have
stronger negotiating capacity and wield more power in the region overall.
The chapter will test whether these two factors explain the ‘absence’ of a
two-level game in Arab climate change policy.
Different Domestic Challenges
Climate change of course is a multidimensional policy challenge for many
countries of the Arab region. All Arab countries will need to find ways to
adapt to the physical impacts and socioeconomic risks of climate change,
such as abnormal weather, migration and food insecurity. A second major
challenge is the decarbonisation of energy systems, which in many Arab
countries are still heavily dominated by fossil fuels.
Climate change for the region’s oil exporters has a third dimension, commonly referred to in UN jargon as ‘response measures’. These
Absence of a Two-Level Game
What then drives policy at these two levels in the Arab countries? And why
do they seem so disconnected? In the fields of International relations and
political economy, it is generally accepted that domestic and international
politics deeply influence each other and, as Putnam has noted, there are
‘powerful incentives for consistency between the two’. 7 In his seminal
article from 1988, Putnam described international negotiations as a twolevel game:
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek
power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international
level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign
developments. 8
Perhaps what then explains the observed discrepancies between the
domestic and international levels in Arab countries’ climate change
policies is a combination of weak domestic constituencies that favour
ambitious international climate policies (such as environment ministries
or NGOs) and low institutionalisation of regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms. In other words, a ‘low domestic political cost’ of
siding with conservative positions at the international level means that
negotiators are more likely to support positions that are promoted by
oil-exporting country delegations, which often are better-funded, have
stronger negotiating capacity and wield more power in the region overall.
The chapter will test whether these two factors explain the ‘absence’ of a
two-level game in Arab climate change policy.
Different Domestic Challenges
Climate change of course is a multidimensional policy challenge for many
countries of the Arab region. All Arab countries will need to find ways to
adapt to the physical impacts and socioeconomic risks of climate change,
such as abnormal weather, migration and food insecurity. A second major
challenge is the decarbonisation of energy systems, which in many Arab
countries are still heavily dominated by fossil fuels.
Climate change for the region’s oil exporters has a third dimension, commonly referred to in UN jargon as ‘response measures’. These