11 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE ARAB REGION
301
oil producers the US and Russia, prevented the UN from ‘welcoming’
a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on
the impacts of 1.5 °C of global warming and related emissions pathways,
instead calling for merely ‘noting’ the report. This was widely perceived
as an effort to undermine related science and policy discussions to push
back the global peak in oil consumption, as keeping global temperature
rise below 1.5 °C would require even more radical and rapid cuts to global
fossil fuel consumption than staying below 2 °C—both targets enshrined
in the Paris Agreement. 4
In simplified terms, the Arab Group’s long-standing position in international climate negotiations can be characterised as being based on a
static, binary worldview: it portrays all Arab countries, both rich and poor,
oil-exporting and non-oil-exporting, as developing countries (as opposed
to developed) that are highly-vulnerable to both the physical impacts of
climate change and the impacts of international mitigation measures (i.e.
cutting fossil fuel use). It also involves a view that none of the Arab countries—all of which are classified as developing countries under the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—bears notable
responsibility for reducing global emissions.
There are apparent disparities in Arab countries’ present and historical contributions to climate change: the six Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) member countries’ emissions account for 2.5% of present-day
global emissions—compared to a collective share of 3.0% by the other 15
Arab countries. 5 Historically, the oil exporters bear an even higher responsibility: a study from 2014 calculated that the state-owned oil companies
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Algeria are jointly responsible for
more than 5% of global cumulative carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and methane
emissions between 1751 and 2010. 6 As for the impacts of climate change,
while all Arab countries indeed are highly vulnerable to various direct
and indirect negative impacts, their capacity to adapt to these impacts,
including in infrastructure, urban settlements, agriculture, food and water
security and health, is highly varied.
Also typically, although some Arab countries have demonstrated leadership and eagerness for more ambitious domestic climate action, including
in other international fora, such views have not been reflected in the Arab
Group’s views.
301
oil producers the US and Russia, prevented the UN from ‘welcoming’
a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on
the impacts of 1.5 °C of global warming and related emissions pathways,
instead calling for merely ‘noting’ the report. This was widely perceived
as an effort to undermine related science and policy discussions to push
back the global peak in oil consumption, as keeping global temperature
rise below 1.5 °C would require even more radical and rapid cuts to global
fossil fuel consumption than staying below 2 °C—both targets enshrined
in the Paris Agreement. 4
In simplified terms, the Arab Group’s long-standing position in international climate negotiations can be characterised as being based on a
static, binary worldview: it portrays all Arab countries, both rich and poor,
oil-exporting and non-oil-exporting, as developing countries (as opposed
to developed) that are highly-vulnerable to both the physical impacts of
climate change and the impacts of international mitigation measures (i.e.
cutting fossil fuel use). It also involves a view that none of the Arab countries—all of which are classified as developing countries under the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—bears notable
responsibility for reducing global emissions.
There are apparent disparities in Arab countries’ present and historical contributions to climate change: the six Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) member countries’ emissions account for 2.5% of present-day
global emissions—compared to a collective share of 3.0% by the other 15
Arab countries. 5 Historically, the oil exporters bear an even higher responsibility: a study from 2014 calculated that the state-owned oil companies
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Algeria are jointly responsible for
more than 5% of global cumulative carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and methane
emissions between 1751 and 2010. 6 As for the impacts of climate change,
while all Arab countries indeed are highly vulnerable to various direct
and indirect negative impacts, their capacity to adapt to these impacts,
including in infrastructure, urban settlements, agriculture, food and water
security and health, is highly varied.
Also typically, although some Arab countries have demonstrated leadership and eagerness for more ambitious domestic climate action, including
in other international fora, such views have not been reflected in the Arab
Group’s views.