11 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE ARAB REGION
303
are actions taken by other countries to reduce or limit their fossil fuel
consumption, which is ultimately expected to lead to a decline in global
coal, oil and natural gas demand and, through this, low prices for the
exporters. Arguably, the higher the economic reliance on oil revenue and
the larger a country’s oil reserves, the more vulnerable it will be to the
negative impacts of climate change response measures. Based on International Monetary Fund estimates, oil revenue in ten Arab oil-exporting
countries accounted for 19–63% of the GDP and approximately 45–95%
of fiscal revenue in 2014. In the region’s three top oil-exporting countries, these figures were as follows: Saudi Arabia 43 and 75%, the UAE
34 and 65% and Kuwait 63 and 80%. 9 These three countries, along with
Iraq and Libya, also rank in the global top-10 in proven crude oil reserves,
with Saudi Arabia and the UAE accounting for 18 and 7% of total world
reserves, respectively. 10
For the non-oil-exporting (or net-importing) countries, the challenge
compared to the oil exporters is different in two ways: on the one
hand, the structural economic transformation needed will not be as
wide-reaching as in the oil-exporting countries. On the other, non-oil
economies generally have lower levels of income to spend in adapting
to climate change and transforming their energy systems. Climate action
also requires new technologies and human and institutional capacities that
less wealthy countries cannot afford to purchase, develop or import in a
similar way to higher-income ones.
Oil rent, therefore, is both a handicap and an enabler from a climate
policy perspective. But are there any specific characteristics in Arab oilexporting countries’ emerging domestic climate change policies compared
to Arab non-oil-exporters? Is it possible to identify structural factors that
influence climate policy in each case? And what is the role of agency, such
as leadership figures or ministers, and, related to this, institutional set-ups
in domestic climate change policy outcomes? The chapter will examine
these questions through the four case studies.
From Post-oil Rhetoric to Present-Day Climate Action
Recently, the region’s oil exporters have made bold statements about the
post-oil era. In 2015, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohammed
bin Zayed Al Nahyan declared that the UAE would celebrate the export
of its last barrel of oil in a few decades’ time if it invested now in the right
sectors. 11 In 2016, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
303
are actions taken by other countries to reduce or limit their fossil fuel
consumption, which is ultimately expected to lead to a decline in global
coal, oil and natural gas demand and, through this, low prices for the
exporters. Arguably, the higher the economic reliance on oil revenue and
the larger a country’s oil reserves, the more vulnerable it will be to the
negative impacts of climate change response measures. Based on International Monetary Fund estimates, oil revenue in ten Arab oil-exporting
countries accounted for 19–63% of the GDP and approximately 45–95%
of fiscal revenue in 2014. In the region’s three top oil-exporting countries, these figures were as follows: Saudi Arabia 43 and 75%, the UAE
34 and 65% and Kuwait 63 and 80%. 9 These three countries, along with
Iraq and Libya, also rank in the global top-10 in proven crude oil reserves,
with Saudi Arabia and the UAE accounting for 18 and 7% of total world
reserves, respectively. 10
For the non-oil-exporting (or net-importing) countries, the challenge
compared to the oil exporters is different in two ways: on the one
hand, the structural economic transformation needed will not be as
wide-reaching as in the oil-exporting countries. On the other, non-oil
economies generally have lower levels of income to spend in adapting
to climate change and transforming their energy systems. Climate action
also requires new technologies and human and institutional capacities that
less wealthy countries cannot afford to purchase, develop or import in a
similar way to higher-income ones.
Oil rent, therefore, is both a handicap and an enabler from a climate
policy perspective. But are there any specific characteristics in Arab oilexporting countries’ emerging domestic climate change policies compared
to Arab non-oil-exporters? Is it possible to identify structural factors that
influence climate policy in each case? And what is the role of agency, such
as leadership figures or ministers, and, related to this, institutional set-ups
in domestic climate change policy outcomes? The chapter will examine
these questions through the four case studies.
From Post-oil Rhetoric to Present-Day Climate Action
Recently, the region’s oil exporters have made bold statements about the
post-oil era. In 2015, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohammed
bin Zayed Al Nahyan declared that the UAE would celebrate the export
of its last barrel of oil in a few decades’ time if it invested now in the right
sectors. 11 In 2016, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman