10 POWERING THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA …
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and cost-effectively available in the UAE. At the same time, some of the
inherent features of nuclear technology lent themselves to easy alignment
with regime level motivations. The combined result was a niche breakout
for nuclear power in the UAE. The innovation offered by nuclear energy
was perceived as an ‘add-on’ or ‘fix’ to the existing hydrocarbon-based
energy regime, instead of as a technological substitution that would
destabilize existing domestic stakeholders. Its adoption therefore posed
little significant threat to material and ideational interests of established
networks at the regime level.
More broadly, the cross-country comparisons in this chapter strongly
suggest that security-related motivations are much less of a driving force
for nuclear newcomers in MENA today, compared to established nuclear
powers such as the US, UK, France, Russia, and China. The rise of
SMRs further chips away at this link between the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and nuclear energy programmes. Security considerations do
exist, but they function more as fringe benefits or hedging potential rather
than as driving forces. For MENA countries interested in nuclear power,
enhancing energy security is the primary driver bar none. Consequently,
in addition to the institutional and financial capacity of a state to host a
nuclear plant, ‘you need a society that politically and publicly can stick
with the decision to go nuclear – a commitment that spans decades or
centuries, rather than just lasting years’ 92 due to lengthy project lead
times, the 60-year operating lifetime of a plant, decommissioning, and
waste disposal. The differences in stakeholder management highlighted
in this chapter therefore contributes to understanding why some nuclear
energy programmes in MENA are more successful than others.
Notes
1. IEA Data and Statistics, Electricity Consumption (Paris: International
Energy Agency).
2. APICORP cites a figure of 3.8% CAGR between 2018–2023 whereas IHS
Markit forecasts growth of 3.3% per annum until 2035. See APICORP,
MENA Power Investment Outlook (Dammam: Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation, 2019), p. 6, http://www.apicorp.org/Research/
InvestmentOutlook/APICORP_MENA_ANNUAL_ENERGY_INVEST
MENT_OUTLOOK_2019.pdf; and Siemens, Middle East Power: Outlook
2035 (Abu Dhabi: Siemens, 2018), p. 4, https://assets.new.siemens.
com/siemens/assets/public.1515594707.c2f5a6e2ab8cb3f50b1f8df1ce6
7ac4069710a86.middle-east-power-outlook-2035.pdf.
287
and cost-effectively available in the UAE. At the same time, some of the
inherent features of nuclear technology lent themselves to easy alignment
with regime level motivations. The combined result was a niche breakout
for nuclear power in the UAE. The innovation offered by nuclear energy
was perceived as an ‘add-on’ or ‘fix’ to the existing hydrocarbon-based
energy regime, instead of as a technological substitution that would
destabilize existing domestic stakeholders. Its adoption therefore posed
little significant threat to material and ideational interests of established
networks at the regime level.
More broadly, the cross-country comparisons in this chapter strongly
suggest that security-related motivations are much less of a driving force
for nuclear newcomers in MENA today, compared to established nuclear
powers such as the US, UK, France, Russia, and China. The rise of
SMRs further chips away at this link between the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and nuclear energy programmes. Security considerations do
exist, but they function more as fringe benefits or hedging potential rather
than as driving forces. For MENA countries interested in nuclear power,
enhancing energy security is the primary driver bar none. Consequently,
in addition to the institutional and financial capacity of a state to host a
nuclear plant, ‘you need a society that politically and publicly can stick
with the decision to go nuclear – a commitment that spans decades or
centuries, rather than just lasting years’ 92 due to lengthy project lead
times, the 60-year operating lifetime of a plant, decommissioning, and
waste disposal. The differences in stakeholder management highlighted
in this chapter therefore contributes to understanding why some nuclear
energy programmes in MENA are more successful than others.
Notes
1. IEA Data and Statistics, Electricity Consumption (Paris: International
Energy Agency).
2. APICORP cites a figure of 3.8% CAGR between 2018–2023 whereas IHS
Markit forecasts growth of 3.3% per annum until 2035. See APICORP,
MENA Power Investment Outlook (Dammam: Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation, 2019), p. 6, http://www.apicorp.org/Research/
InvestmentOutlook/APICORP_MENA_ANNUAL_ENERGY_INVEST
MENT_OUTLOOK_2019.pdf; and Siemens, Middle East Power: Outlook
2035 (Abu Dhabi: Siemens, 2018), p. 4, https://assets.new.siemens.
com/siemens/assets/public.1515594707.c2f5a6e2ab8cb3f50b1f8df1ce6
7ac4069710a86.middle-east-power-outlook-2035.pdf.