282 L.-C. SIM
more so than other places in the world where a service economy dominates. A lot of the population here are engineers of one form or another
and that has an impact on their ability to consume information about
technical topics. And that translates into a high level of support’. 77 Consequently, even Fukushima was not able to derail the nuclear project in the
UAE.
Public support and the aforementioned successful courting of domestic
stakeholders meant there was no significant competing narrative about
nuclear energy in the UAE. In Turkey and Iran, however, alternative narratives were offered by nuclear detractors and elite groups with
ambivalent views. The latter are not opposed to nuclear power per se
in a country’s energy mix, only the way safety issues or financing or
vendor selection are managed. 78 For instance, concerns were raised that
Turkey’s ‘double dependence’ on Russia—for gas and nuclear power—ran
counter to the energy security promised by nuclear energy. The membership and role of the nuclear ambivalent public partly explain the weakness
of sustained opposition to nuclear power in these countries.
In other MENA countries, the deficit in public support stems from
wider dissatisfaction with government in general. In Jordan, for instance,
the lack of trust in government feeds into negative public perceptions of
the country’s nuclear energy programme. With a Trust in Government
index of 3.5–3.9 out of 7 between 2010 and 2017 for Jordan compared
to 5.6–6.3 for the UAE, it is little wonder that the prevailing sentiment
is that ‘in Jordan we have witnessed fraudulent elections, a fraudulent
Parliament; it is not out of the realm of possibility that at the end of
the day we will receive fraudulent studies’ about the feasibility of nuclear
energy. 79 With a mandate to promote and implement nuclear energy,
the JAEC led by Khaled Toukan has tried to raise public awareness and
acceptance of nuclear energy through outreach on social and conventional
media. However, Toukan has been dogged by allegations of corruption,
use of misleading or fraudulent data and influence capture of the regulator. A parliamentary vote to suspend the nuclear programme in 2012
was ignored by the King and the programme continues under Toukan.
To a much greater degree than the UAE, prestige and identity play an
important role in sustaining nuclear energy adoption in other countries
although it is not the sole consideration. In the case of Jordan, its resolute
determination to develop nuclear power in the face of multiple challenges
has been explained by its contribution to regime legitimacy; the latter
is credited with resisting pressure to bandwagon with the US’s policy
more so than other places in the world where a service economy dominates. A lot of the population here are engineers of one form or another
and that has an impact on their ability to consume information about
technical topics. And that translates into a high level of support’. 77 Consequently, even Fukushima was not able to derail the nuclear project in the
UAE.
Public support and the aforementioned successful courting of domestic
stakeholders meant there was no significant competing narrative about
nuclear energy in the UAE. In Turkey and Iran, however, alternative narratives were offered by nuclear detractors and elite groups with
ambivalent views. The latter are not opposed to nuclear power per se
in a country’s energy mix, only the way safety issues or financing or
vendor selection are managed. 78 For instance, concerns were raised that
Turkey’s ‘double dependence’ on Russia—for gas and nuclear power—ran
counter to the energy security promised by nuclear energy. The membership and role of the nuclear ambivalent public partly explain the weakness
of sustained opposition to nuclear power in these countries.
In other MENA countries, the deficit in public support stems from
wider dissatisfaction with government in general. In Jordan, for instance,
the lack of trust in government feeds into negative public perceptions of
the country’s nuclear energy programme. With a Trust in Government
index of 3.5–3.9 out of 7 between 2010 and 2017 for Jordan compared
to 5.6–6.3 for the UAE, it is little wonder that the prevailing sentiment
is that ‘in Jordan we have witnessed fraudulent elections, a fraudulent
Parliament; it is not out of the realm of possibility that at the end of
the day we will receive fraudulent studies’ about the feasibility of nuclear
energy. 79 With a mandate to promote and implement nuclear energy,
the JAEC led by Khaled Toukan has tried to raise public awareness and
acceptance of nuclear energy through outreach on social and conventional
media. However, Toukan has been dogged by allegations of corruption,
use of misleading or fraudulent data and influence capture of the regulator. A parliamentary vote to suspend the nuclear programme in 2012
was ignored by the King and the programme continues under Toukan.
To a much greater degree than the UAE, prestige and identity play an
important role in sustaining nuclear energy adoption in other countries
although it is not the sole consideration. In the case of Jordan, its resolute
determination to develop nuclear power in the face of multiple challenges
has been explained by its contribution to regime legitimacy; the latter
is credited with resisting pressure to bandwagon with the US’s policy