10 POWERING THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA …
283
preference, as has traditionally been the case. 80 As for Iran, despite an
earlier announcement in 1979 that the unfinished units at Bushehr would
be used as silos to store wheat, Ayatollah Khomeini reversed his stance
against weapons of mass destruction in the mid-1980s and ordered that
work be resumed at Bushehr. 81 His regime and subsequent ones thereafter recognized that nuclear technology could be usefully framed as a civil
religion to mobilize the Iranian population to make sacrifices to combat
arch-enemy Iraq or to assert sovereignty in the face of international sanctions by the West. For Iran’s leaders, therefore, it appears that spending
billions to fix ageing transmission lines, through which 15% of the country’s generated electricity is lost, is less visible and legitimacy-inducing
than acquiring a civilian and military nuclear programme. 82
The Future of Nuclear Energy in MENA
Having applied the MLP framework to examine the decision-making
and implementation process behind nuclear energy in the UAE and
other MENA countries, the chapter will now consider variables that may
prompt a niche breakthrough elsewhere in MENA in the near future.
At the landscape level, the continued evolution of the composition,
ownership, and capacities of nuclear reactor vendors since the 1980s will
shape competition among them to supply purchaser countries in MENA.
Russia’s Rosatom is the region’s (and world’s) front runner by far. It is
the only vendor that is a one-stop shop for the full nuclear cycle, including
fuel take-back arrangements. It offers extremely attractive financing terms
to purchasers, as the earlier examples of Egypt and Turkey demonstrate,
because it can draw up to 10% of its funding from one of Russia’s
sovereign wealth fund, the National Wealth Fund. 83 This is particularly
helpful for developing countries since lenders like the World Bank have
effectively placed a ban on financing new nuclear projects. Russia also
places less stringent legal obligations with regard to export controls on
clients than the US, and it has leveraged the anti-US mood in some
MENA countries to push Rosatom’s reactors and fuel services. 84
In contrast, the reorganization of French reactor vendors has not
halted their declining fortunes and reputational damage. The Flamanville
nuclear plant in France is seven years behind schedule while the Olkiluoto
3 plant in Finland is 10 years late and both are over budget by three
times the original estimate. In the US, the ever-increasing financial costs
283
preference, as has traditionally been the case. 80 As for Iran, despite an
earlier announcement in 1979 that the unfinished units at Bushehr would
be used as silos to store wheat, Ayatollah Khomeini reversed his stance
against weapons of mass destruction in the mid-1980s and ordered that
work be resumed at Bushehr. 81 His regime and subsequent ones thereafter recognized that nuclear technology could be usefully framed as a civil
religion to mobilize the Iranian population to make sacrifices to combat
arch-enemy Iraq or to assert sovereignty in the face of international sanctions by the West. For Iran’s leaders, therefore, it appears that spending
billions to fix ageing transmission lines, through which 15% of the country’s generated electricity is lost, is less visible and legitimacy-inducing
than acquiring a civilian and military nuclear programme. 82
The Future of Nuclear Energy in MENA
Having applied the MLP framework to examine the decision-making
and implementation process behind nuclear energy in the UAE and
other MENA countries, the chapter will now consider variables that may
prompt a niche breakthrough elsewhere in MENA in the near future.
At the landscape level, the continued evolution of the composition,
ownership, and capacities of nuclear reactor vendors since the 1980s will
shape competition among them to supply purchaser countries in MENA.
Russia’s Rosatom is the region’s (and world’s) front runner by far. It is
the only vendor that is a one-stop shop for the full nuclear cycle, including
fuel take-back arrangements. It offers extremely attractive financing terms
to purchasers, as the earlier examples of Egypt and Turkey demonstrate,
because it can draw up to 10% of its funding from one of Russia’s
sovereign wealth fund, the National Wealth Fund. 83 This is particularly
helpful for developing countries since lenders like the World Bank have
effectively placed a ban on financing new nuclear projects. Russia also
places less stringent legal obligations with regard to export controls on
clients than the US, and it has leveraged the anti-US mood in some
MENA countries to push Rosatom’s reactors and fuel services. 84
In contrast, the reorganization of French reactor vendors has not
halted their declining fortunes and reputational damage. The Flamanville
nuclear plant in France is seven years behind schedule while the Olkiluoto
3 plant in Finland is 10 years late and both are over budget by three
times the original estimate. In the US, the ever-increasing financial costs