10 POWERING THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA …
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as Chairman of the UAE’s International Advisory Board. In comparison,
the heads of the regulatory agencies in Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan are
local citizens; this raises questions since all three host countries are nuclear
newcomers albeit with limited experience of research reactors in the case
of Egypt and Turkey. Leveraging on the European Union’s stature as
Turkey’s trading partner and foreign director investor, the European
Parliament even recommended the termination of Akkuyu’s construction.
To further assuage foreign concerns, Abu Dhabi became a signatory
of all basic and additional protocols for acquiring civilian nuclear technology. It even voluntarily agreed to a rare ‘gold standard’ whereby
prohibition against uranium enrichment and reprocessing is enshrined
in the country’s legal code, a move that earned the UAE worldwide
praise and respect. Iran, by contrast, is the only country in the world
with a major nuclear project that is not a member of the Convention on
Nuclear Safety. 72 The difference of the UAE’s approach with that in Saudi
Arabia is striking. The Kingdom has defended its right to enrich domestic
uranium resources, despite the high costs and lengthy lead time of an
indigenous uranium programme and availability of multiple suppliers
of enriched uranium. 73 Coupled with bin Salman’s infamous declaration, discomfort about Saudi-Pakistani nuclear ties, and Saudi refusal to
sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, it is little wonder that the Saudi
programme has encountered a much higher level of negative policy feedback from external audiences. In any event, not all external stakeholders
were on board about Barakah. Qatar, for example, decried the lack of
cooperation with Gulf neighbours over disaster planning. 74
Build Domestic Public Support
The fourth aspect of coalition building focused on the UAE public.
ENEC and FANR have been proactive in engaging with the wider public
through regular information sessions even prior to the Fukushima nuclear
incident in 2011. The result has been consistent and overwhelming
support of over 80% for the country’s nuclear energy programme; among
residents of the Al Dhafra region where the Barakah nuclear power station
is located, support is even higher at 94% in 2018. 75 To put these numbers
in perspective, it is worth noting that public support for nuclear energy
stands at 38–50% in the G7 countries, almost 60% in South Korea, and
over 70% in Russia. 76 Public receptivity to information sessions was positive partly because ‘the Emirates is an engineering-intensive society, much
281
as Chairman of the UAE’s International Advisory Board. In comparison,
the heads of the regulatory agencies in Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan are
local citizens; this raises questions since all three host countries are nuclear
newcomers albeit with limited experience of research reactors in the case
of Egypt and Turkey. Leveraging on the European Union’s stature as
Turkey’s trading partner and foreign director investor, the European
Parliament even recommended the termination of Akkuyu’s construction.
To further assuage foreign concerns, Abu Dhabi became a signatory
of all basic and additional protocols for acquiring civilian nuclear technology. It even voluntarily agreed to a rare ‘gold standard’ whereby
prohibition against uranium enrichment and reprocessing is enshrined
in the country’s legal code, a move that earned the UAE worldwide
praise and respect. Iran, by contrast, is the only country in the world
with a major nuclear project that is not a member of the Convention on
Nuclear Safety. 72 The difference of the UAE’s approach with that in Saudi
Arabia is striking. The Kingdom has defended its right to enrich domestic
uranium resources, despite the high costs and lengthy lead time of an
indigenous uranium programme and availability of multiple suppliers
of enriched uranium. 73 Coupled with bin Salman’s infamous declaration, discomfort about Saudi-Pakistani nuclear ties, and Saudi refusal to
sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, it is little wonder that the Saudi
programme has encountered a much higher level of negative policy feedback from external audiences. In any event, not all external stakeholders
were on board about Barakah. Qatar, for example, decried the lack of
cooperation with Gulf neighbours over disaster planning. 74
Build Domestic Public Support
The fourth aspect of coalition building focused on the UAE public.
ENEC and FANR have been proactive in engaging with the wider public
through regular information sessions even prior to the Fukushima nuclear
incident in 2011. The result has been consistent and overwhelming
support of over 80% for the country’s nuclear energy programme; among
residents of the Al Dhafra region where the Barakah nuclear power station
is located, support is even higher at 94% in 2018. 75 To put these numbers
in perspective, it is worth noting that public support for nuclear energy
stands at 38–50% in the G7 countries, almost 60% in South Korea, and
over 70% in Russia. 76 Public receptivity to information sessions was positive partly because ‘the Emirates is an engineering-intensive society, much