280 L.-C. SIM
licence applications for site preparation, construction, and operation. 66
Although tensions between environmental regulators and nuclear operators are common, ENEC had a ‘very positive’ working relationship with
EAD. 67 For example, ENEC undertook design modifications to the original reactors to ensure a thermal discharge environmental limit of no
more than five degree Celsius to protect marine flora and fauna around
Barakah; it constructed a much longer breakwater than the reference plant
in South Korea to minimize thermal recirculation in the shallow Arabian
Sea; it also created artificial reefs to grow new areas for sea life by way
of compensatory activities. Consequently, EAD had no cause to delay or
block nuclear energy in the UAE.
The UAE was also proactive in disarming negative policy feedback
from abroad. 68 The leadership was fully cognizant that the security risks
of its nuclear programme would be under the global microscope, thanks
to earlier developments at the landscape level. These included the participation of Emirati citizens in 9/11, concerns about the impact of DP
World’s acquisitions on port security in the US, and possible lapses in
export control as underlined by AQ Khan’s illicit nuclear network in
Dubai. 69 Consequently, Abu Dhabi placed a high priority on winning
the confidence of external stakeholders. It made sure the credibility of
its nuclear regulator was unquestioned. 70 The board of management of
the UAE’s FANR is appointed by a Cabinet resolution thus avoiding
direct ministerial control over nuclear safety regulation; Turkey’s TAEK
reports to the Prime Minister, who appoints members for a fixed fouryear term. This means that FANR’s board members are better protected
from discretionary removal from duty. FANR derives part of its budget
from licensing fees and is hence more financially independent than TAEK,
which depends on annual appropriations from the Prime Minister’s office.
In the UAE, regulatory and promotional responsibilities are carried out
by separate entities—FANR and ENEC respectively—to avoid conflicts
of interest, such as pressure to speed up approvals. 71 In Turkey’s case,
TAEK, which was established in 1982, combines both roles; a regulatory
agency was never created although one was envisaged under the country’s
Nuclear Law of 2007.
Abu Dhabi also did not shy away from hiring foreigners with vast experience in the nuclear industry, particularly in safety and non-proliferation.
They included William Travers and his successor at FANR, Christer
Viktorsson; Hans Blix, the UN’s former chief weapons inspector and
former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, was appointed
licence applications for site preparation, construction, and operation. 66
Although tensions between environmental regulators and nuclear operators are common, ENEC had a ‘very positive’ working relationship with
EAD. 67 For example, ENEC undertook design modifications to the original reactors to ensure a thermal discharge environmental limit of no
more than five degree Celsius to protect marine flora and fauna around
Barakah; it constructed a much longer breakwater than the reference plant
in South Korea to minimize thermal recirculation in the shallow Arabian
Sea; it also created artificial reefs to grow new areas for sea life by way
of compensatory activities. Consequently, EAD had no cause to delay or
block nuclear energy in the UAE.
The UAE was also proactive in disarming negative policy feedback
from abroad. 68 The leadership was fully cognizant that the security risks
of its nuclear programme would be under the global microscope, thanks
to earlier developments at the landscape level. These included the participation of Emirati citizens in 9/11, concerns about the impact of DP
World’s acquisitions on port security in the US, and possible lapses in
export control as underlined by AQ Khan’s illicit nuclear network in
Dubai. 69 Consequently, Abu Dhabi placed a high priority on winning
the confidence of external stakeholders. It made sure the credibility of
its nuclear regulator was unquestioned. 70 The board of management of
the UAE’s FANR is appointed by a Cabinet resolution thus avoiding
direct ministerial control over nuclear safety regulation; Turkey’s TAEK
reports to the Prime Minister, who appoints members for a fixed fouryear term. This means that FANR’s board members are better protected
from discretionary removal from duty. FANR derives part of its budget
from licensing fees and is hence more financially independent than TAEK,
which depends on annual appropriations from the Prime Minister’s office.
In the UAE, regulatory and promotional responsibilities are carried out
by separate entities—FANR and ENEC respectively—to avoid conflicts
of interest, such as pressure to speed up approvals. 71 In Turkey’s case,
TAEK, which was established in 1982, combines both roles; a regulatory
agency was never created although one was envisaged under the country’s
Nuclear Law of 2007.
Abu Dhabi also did not shy away from hiring foreigners with vast experience in the nuclear industry, particularly in safety and non-proliferation.
They included William Travers and his successor at FANR, Christer
Viktorsson; Hans Blix, the UN’s former chief weapons inspector and
former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, was appointed