10 POWERING THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA …
279
Nuclear power, with its dispatchable energy, large utility-scale operations owned by the state, centralized production, distribution and
transmission systems, replicates the infrastructure of conventional fossil
fuel, as well as the implications for top-down, state-society relations. It
does not upend incumbent regime networks as much as the ‘soft’ nature
of variable, distributed, decentralized renewable energy systems with its
consequences for grassroots democracy. 64 In this way, nuclear energy
segues with the ‘modernizing autocracy’ narrative in the UAE and the
wider Gulf, where technology and technical management are perceived as
instrumental in solving agricultural, environmental, and economic obstacles to development. Dams, irrigation, drainage, and desalination have
contemporary equivalents in carbon capture and storage, zero-carbon
cities, solar parks, hyperloops, and space travel. In this connection, nuclear
energy confers onto Abu Dhabi’s ruling elites increased legitimacy from
its citizenry.
The co-beneficial relationship between niche and incumbent regimes
is also evident in other MENA countries. Turkey’s first-ever nuclear plant
at Akkuyu, together with a new airport in Istanbul, additional hydroelectric dams, the world’s longest suspension bridge, and the world’s first
three-storey tunnel are all part of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s ambitious Vision 2023 plan to make the country one of the top 10 economies
in the world. Having broken ground in April 2018, TAEK and Russia’s
Rosatom, which is building Akkuyu, have committed (improbably) to
completing the plant by 2023 to mark the centenary of the proclamation of the Turkish republic. Nuclear electricity will help to perpetuate
current control of the energy sector by Erdogan’s relatives and friends as
well as loyalists of his AKP party. 65
Pre-empt Negative Policy Feedback
A third aspect of coalition building involved disarming potential negative
policy feedback effects. In the UAE, potential critics of nuclear energy
from health and environmental circles were co-opted as board members
of FANR. The role of the Environment Agency Abu Dhabi (EAD), whose
Managing Director is on FANR’s board, is particularly interesting. Originally established in 1996, it had been stretched thin as a ‘do-it-all’ entity;
a re-constitution in 2005 re-focused its expertise on policy and regulatory, instead of operational, matters. As an environmental regulator for
the Barakah nuclear plant, EAD was tasked with reviewing and approving
279
Nuclear power, with its dispatchable energy, large utility-scale operations owned by the state, centralized production, distribution and
transmission systems, replicates the infrastructure of conventional fossil
fuel, as well as the implications for top-down, state-society relations. It
does not upend incumbent regime networks as much as the ‘soft’ nature
of variable, distributed, decentralized renewable energy systems with its
consequences for grassroots democracy. 64 In this way, nuclear energy
segues with the ‘modernizing autocracy’ narrative in the UAE and the
wider Gulf, where technology and technical management are perceived as
instrumental in solving agricultural, environmental, and economic obstacles to development. Dams, irrigation, drainage, and desalination have
contemporary equivalents in carbon capture and storage, zero-carbon
cities, solar parks, hyperloops, and space travel. In this connection, nuclear
energy confers onto Abu Dhabi’s ruling elites increased legitimacy from
its citizenry.
The co-beneficial relationship between niche and incumbent regimes
is also evident in other MENA countries. Turkey’s first-ever nuclear plant
at Akkuyu, together with a new airport in Istanbul, additional hydroelectric dams, the world’s longest suspension bridge, and the world’s first
three-storey tunnel are all part of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s ambitious Vision 2023 plan to make the country one of the top 10 economies
in the world. Having broken ground in April 2018, TAEK and Russia’s
Rosatom, which is building Akkuyu, have committed (improbably) to
completing the plant by 2023 to mark the centenary of the proclamation of the Turkish republic. Nuclear electricity will help to perpetuate
current control of the energy sector by Erdogan’s relatives and friends as
well as loyalists of his AKP party. 65
Pre-empt Negative Policy Feedback
A third aspect of coalition building involved disarming potential negative
policy feedback effects. In the UAE, potential critics of nuclear energy
from health and environmental circles were co-opted as board members
of FANR. The role of the Environment Agency Abu Dhabi (EAD), whose
Managing Director is on FANR’s board, is particularly interesting. Originally established in 1996, it had been stretched thin as a ‘do-it-all’ entity;
a re-constitution in 2005 re-focused its expertise on policy and regulatory, instead of operational, matters. As an environmental regulator for
the Barakah nuclear plant, EAD was tasked with reviewing and approving