10 L.-C. SIM AND R. MILLS
this book, non-financial considerations such as prestige, regime legitimacy, and sovereignty are equally significant drivers of low carbon energy
adoption.
The Geopolitics of Low Carbon Energy in MENA
Oil has shaped international conflict for decades. According to one
estimate, 25–50% of interstate wars between 1973 and 2012 had oilrelated linkages. 18 In contrast, it is generally thought that a low carbon
energy world is likely to reap a peace dividend in geopolitics. 19 This is
partly because national energy security will be less contested; the limited
number of countries endowed with hydrocarbon resources is trumped by
indigenous production of readily-available low carbon energy. Trade in
electricity is also assumed to be more interdependent and reciprocal than
trade in oil, which in turn decreases the likelihood of interstate war.
Within MENA, Morocco and Jordan are consistently touted as winners
in a low carbon world, given their credible potential to produce, consume,
and export renewable electricity 20 ; this could render them regional
leaders. Despite their declared 100% renewable power target, Lebanon
and the State of Palestine are highly unlikely to be in the same league as
their regional peers largely due to political dysfunction and other reasons
outlined by Obeid in her contribution. As for the oil-exporting states in
the Gulf, they are typically identified as losers given the massive loss of
revenues due to ‘stranded’ hydrocarbon assets and the slow progress in
developing a non-oil export-oriented sector. 21
Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that in the run-up to a low
carbon world, some ‘losers’ will be able to adapt. Mahdavi and Uddin
highlight in their chapter that the UAE is ranked among the countries
best prepared for the energy transition in MENA given its credible project
execution toward a 44% share of installed low carbon power by 2050. It
was also the destination of nearly one-quarter of planned and committed
investments in renewable power projects in MENA in 2019. 22 UAEbased private firms are also active investors in renewable energy in MENA,
as noted earlier. In addition, the UAE has complemented its traditional
petro-diplomacy with clean energy diplomacy by investing in overseas
projects through Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based parastatal, and through
collaboration between the International Renewable Energy Agency and
the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. 23 Interestingly, however, the
this book, non-financial considerations such as prestige, regime legitimacy, and sovereignty are equally significant drivers of low carbon energy
adoption.
The Geopolitics of Low Carbon Energy in MENA
Oil has shaped international conflict for decades. According to one
estimate, 25–50% of interstate wars between 1973 and 2012 had oilrelated linkages. 18 In contrast, it is generally thought that a low carbon
energy world is likely to reap a peace dividend in geopolitics. 19 This is
partly because national energy security will be less contested; the limited
number of countries endowed with hydrocarbon resources is trumped by
indigenous production of readily-available low carbon energy. Trade in
electricity is also assumed to be more interdependent and reciprocal than
trade in oil, which in turn decreases the likelihood of interstate war.
Within MENA, Morocco and Jordan are consistently touted as winners
in a low carbon world, given their credible potential to produce, consume,
and export renewable electricity 20 ; this could render them regional
leaders. Despite their declared 100% renewable power target, Lebanon
and the State of Palestine are highly unlikely to be in the same league as
their regional peers largely due to political dysfunction and other reasons
outlined by Obeid in her contribution. As for the oil-exporting states in
the Gulf, they are typically identified as losers given the massive loss of
revenues due to ‘stranded’ hydrocarbon assets and the slow progress in
developing a non-oil export-oriented sector. 21
Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that in the run-up to a low
carbon world, some ‘losers’ will be able to adapt. Mahdavi and Uddin
highlight in their chapter that the UAE is ranked among the countries
best prepared for the energy transition in MENA given its credible project
execution toward a 44% share of installed low carbon power by 2050. It
was also the destination of nearly one-quarter of planned and committed
investments in renewable power projects in MENA in 2019. 22 UAEbased private firms are also active investors in renewable energy in MENA,
as noted earlier. In addition, the UAE has complemented its traditional
petro-diplomacy with clean energy diplomacy by investing in overseas
projects through Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based parastatal, and through
collaboration between the International Renewable Energy Agency and
the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. 23 Interestingly, however, the