1 LOW CARBON ENERGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST …
11
UAE has not sought an active profile at UN climate change negotiations—an issue taken up by Luomi in her contribution in this volume.
Her analysis of the disconnect between climate change and energy policies in Saudi Arabia also casts doubt on a proposal that the G20, of which
the kingdom is a member, should take the lead in the energy transition. 24
In the medium term during the period of transition to a low carbon
world, it is not inconceivable that economic stress and struggles over
remaining hydrocarbon resources, rents, and power may lead to more
violent confrontations instead of a peace dividend. 25 Two scenarios are
especially relevant. The first is the recovery of Iraq’s oil industry and
its success in wresting market share from Saudi customers in Asia; this
will have implications for hegemony in the Persian Gulf and for influence within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries+. 26
The second concerns the relative ascendency of major gas producers
Qatar and Iran (assuming the easing of sanctions) as the global demand
for gas increases in the run-up to a low carbon world. This is because
gas-fired power plants are easily paired with solar and wind energy for
system balancing purposes. Likewise, geopolitics may trip up Morocco
and Jordan; these include a renewed intensity in the simmering conflicts
with Algeria and with Israel, respectively.
Low carbon power also raises the issue of the geopolitics of electricity
trading. MENA countries that have successfully developed large amounts
of low carbon power may seek to export surpluses at certain times. They
may also rely on dispatchable capacity in other countries to reduce their
need for balancing variable renewables. And time differences across the
region can be exploited. Iraq’s Ministry of Electricity, which already buys
power from Iran, recently signed an electricity purchase agreement of up
to 2 gigawatts with the GCC Interconnection Authority. Iraq shall receive
power supplied by GCC countries (which have a pre-existing interconnection grid) from transmission lines from Kuwait. Egypt has also shown
interest in a linking its national grid with Saudi Arabia’s to meet peak
demand with imports.
However, political rivalry has stymied robust intra-GCC exchanges.
Consequently, only small volumes of trading take place among Gulf states
on an emergency basis or during scheduled outages. Large-scale electricity
exports from MENA to Europe are also unlikely in the medium term,
although Morocco currently exports small volumes to Spain. From the
Middle East, transmission lines would have to cross unstable areas in Syria,
Iraq, or Lebanon. From North Africa, the distance is shorter and easier
11
UAE has not sought an active profile at UN climate change negotiations—an issue taken up by Luomi in her contribution in this volume.
Her analysis of the disconnect between climate change and energy policies in Saudi Arabia also casts doubt on a proposal that the G20, of which
the kingdom is a member, should take the lead in the energy transition. 24
In the medium term during the period of transition to a low carbon
world, it is not inconceivable that economic stress and struggles over
remaining hydrocarbon resources, rents, and power may lead to more
violent confrontations instead of a peace dividend. 25 Two scenarios are
especially relevant. The first is the recovery of Iraq’s oil industry and
its success in wresting market share from Saudi customers in Asia; this
will have implications for hegemony in the Persian Gulf and for influence within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries+. 26
The second concerns the relative ascendency of major gas producers
Qatar and Iran (assuming the easing of sanctions) as the global demand
for gas increases in the run-up to a low carbon world. This is because
gas-fired power plants are easily paired with solar and wind energy for
system balancing purposes. Likewise, geopolitics may trip up Morocco
and Jordan; these include a renewed intensity in the simmering conflicts
with Algeria and with Israel, respectively.
Low carbon power also raises the issue of the geopolitics of electricity
trading. MENA countries that have successfully developed large amounts
of low carbon power may seek to export surpluses at certain times. They
may also rely on dispatchable capacity in other countries to reduce their
need for balancing variable renewables. And time differences across the
region can be exploited. Iraq’s Ministry of Electricity, which already buys
power from Iran, recently signed an electricity purchase agreement of up
to 2 gigawatts with the GCC Interconnection Authority. Iraq shall receive
power supplied by GCC countries (which have a pre-existing interconnection grid) from transmission lines from Kuwait. Egypt has also shown
interest in a linking its national grid with Saudi Arabia’s to meet peak
demand with imports.
However, political rivalry has stymied robust intra-GCC exchanges.
Consequently, only small volumes of trading take place among Gulf states
on an emergency basis or during scheduled outages. Large-scale electricity
exports from MENA to Europe are also unlikely in the medium term,
although Morocco currently exports small volumes to Spain. From the
Middle East, transmission lines would have to cross unstable areas in Syria,
Iraq, or Lebanon. From North Africa, the distance is shorter and easier