260 P. MAHDAVI AND N. UDDIN
the GCC. See Zeina Azzam and Imad K. Harb, eds., (2019), The GCC
Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality (Washington, DC:
Arab Center Washington DC, Inc.).
39. David Ricardo, (1976 [1871]), The Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 3rd edition). See also H.
Hotelling, (1931), “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,” Journal
of Political Economy 39(2): 137–175.
40. Luciani (1990).
41. Of course, lack of access to external rents does not preclude states from
pursuing an allocative strategy. Still, decarbonization will remove a key
source of revenue typically used for patronage; while these states may
continue to adopt such a clientelistic strategy of governance, this will be
harder to maintain in the presence of fiscal pressures and redistributive
demands.
42. Mick Moore, “Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance
in Developing Countries,” International Political Science Review 25(3):
297–319.
43. Alberto Ades and Raphael Di Tella, (1999), “Rents, Competition,
and Corruption,” American Economic Review 89(4): 982–993; Rabah
Arezki and Markus Brukner, (2012), “Oil Rents, Corruption, and State
Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions,” European Economic
Review 55(7). See, however, Pradeep Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee,
(2000), “Corruption and Decentralization of Infrastructure Delivery in
Developing Countries.”
44. This is not to say there is no value across the rest of the oil supply chain,
as several states successfully generate revenues from taxing gasoline and
other downstream oil services.
45. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), (2014), The SocioEconomic Benefits of Solar and Wind Energy.
46. We thank Li-Chen Sim for this point.
47. This follows a similar rationale for MENA states pursuing nuclear energy
though nuclearization is not without its own dependencies (for example,
if fuel enrichment is completed abroad).
48. Montassar Kahia, Mohamed Safouane Ben Aïssa, and Charfeddine
Lanouar, (2017), “Renewable and Non-renewable Energy Use-Economic
Growth Nexus: The Case of MENA Net Oil Importing Countries,”
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 71: 127–140.
49. Andrew England, Ahmed Al Omran, Najmeh Bozorgmehr, and Demetri
Sevastopulo, (2019), “Why Saudi Attacks Changed the Calculations on
Regional Security,” The Financial Times, 20 September 2019. This is not
to say that renewable energy systems are without their own vulnerabilities,
particularly to long-term transmission lines and highly-concentrated power
plants.
the GCC. See Zeina Azzam and Imad K. Harb, eds., (2019), The GCC
Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality (Washington, DC:
Arab Center Washington DC, Inc.).
39. David Ricardo, (1976 [1871]), The Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 3rd edition). See also H.
Hotelling, (1931), “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,” Journal
of Political Economy 39(2): 137–175.
40. Luciani (1990).
41. Of course, lack of access to external rents does not preclude states from
pursuing an allocative strategy. Still, decarbonization will remove a key
source of revenue typically used for patronage; while these states may
continue to adopt such a clientelistic strategy of governance, this will be
harder to maintain in the presence of fiscal pressures and redistributive
demands.
42. Mick Moore, “Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance
in Developing Countries,” International Political Science Review 25(3):
297–319.
43. Alberto Ades and Raphael Di Tella, (1999), “Rents, Competition,
and Corruption,” American Economic Review 89(4): 982–993; Rabah
Arezki and Markus Brukner, (2012), “Oil Rents, Corruption, and State
Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions,” European Economic
Review 55(7). See, however, Pradeep Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee,
(2000), “Corruption and Decentralization of Infrastructure Delivery in
Developing Countries.”
44. This is not to say there is no value across the rest of the oil supply chain,
as several states successfully generate revenues from taxing gasoline and
other downstream oil services.
45. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), (2014), The SocioEconomic Benefits of Solar and Wind Energy.
46. We thank Li-Chen Sim for this point.
47. This follows a similar rationale for MENA states pursuing nuclear energy
though nuclearization is not without its own dependencies (for example,
if fuel enrichment is completed abroad).
48. Montassar Kahia, Mohamed Safouane Ben Aïssa, and Charfeddine
Lanouar, (2017), “Renewable and Non-renewable Energy Use-Economic
Growth Nexus: The Case of MENA Net Oil Importing Countries,”
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 71: 127–140.
49. Andrew England, Ahmed Al Omran, Najmeh Bozorgmehr, and Demetri
Sevastopulo, (2019), “Why Saudi Attacks Changed the Calculations on
Regional Security,” The Financial Times, 20 September 2019. This is not
to say that renewable energy systems are without their own vulnerabilities,
particularly to long-term transmission lines and highly-concentrated power
plants.