9 GOVERNANCE AMID THE TRANSITION TO RENEWABLE …
259
oil-exporting MENA states, though remain noticeably lower in institutional quality when compared to comparable states in Latin America and
Asia. On this debate, see Ross (2012) and Victor Menaldo, (2012), “The
Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” Journal of Politics
74(3): 707–722.
26. Paasha Mahdavi and Michael Ross, (2017), “The Political Economy of
Hydrocarbon Wealth and Fuel Prices,” UC Berkeley: Center for Effective
Global Action.
27. This is a stylized adaptation of the oft-cited “first law of petropolitics,”
as popularized by the journalist Thomas Freidman in 2009, wherein the
“price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions.”
See Thomas Freidman, (2009), “The First Law of Petropolitics,” Foreign
Policy (October).
28. Irfan Nooruddin, (2008), “The Political Economy of National Debt
Burdens, 1970–2000,” International Interactions 34(2): 156–185;
Stephen Kretzman and Irfan Nooruddin, (2011), Drilling into Debt: An
Investigation into the Relationship Between Debt and Oil (Washington,
DC: Oil Change International).
29. Benjamin J. Cohen, (2009), “Sovereign Wealth Funds and National
Security: The Great Tradeoff,” International Affairs 85(4): 713–731.
30. IEA World Energy Outlook 2019.
31. Citi GPS: Energy Darwinism II: Why a Low Carbon Future Doesn’t Have
to Cost the Earth (Citicorp Global Perspectives & Solutions, 2015).
32. Mohammad S. Masnadi, Hassan M. El-Houjeiri, Dominik Schunack,
Yunpo Li, Jacob G. Englander, Alhassan Badahdah, Jean-Christophe
Monfort et al., (2018), “Global Carbon Intensity of Crude Oil Production,” Science 361(6405): 851–853. Masnadi et al. (2018) note that
roughly 40% of Algeria’s high carbon intensity is due to flaring alone,
which, in a carbon-constrained world, would be significantly reduced.
33. Much of the difference in estimates arises from lower natural gas flaring
at Saudi wells compared to Algerian wells, where routine flaring is
substantial.
34. We thank Robin Mills for clarifying this point.
35. Margaret Levi, (1989), Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press).
36. Ross, Hazlett, and Mahdavi, (2017).
37. Paasha Mahdavi, (2020), Power Grab: Political Survival Through Extractive Resource Nationalization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press).
38. Michael Herb, (1999), All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and
Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany, NY: SUNY Press). The
exception would be the House of Thani in Qatar, which do not share
the same confident outlook given recent rifts with long-time allies in
259
oil-exporting MENA states, though remain noticeably lower in institutional quality when compared to comparable states in Latin America and
Asia. On this debate, see Ross (2012) and Victor Menaldo, (2012), “The
Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” Journal of Politics
74(3): 707–722.
26. Paasha Mahdavi and Michael Ross, (2017), “The Political Economy of
Hydrocarbon Wealth and Fuel Prices,” UC Berkeley: Center for Effective
Global Action.
27. This is a stylized adaptation of the oft-cited “first law of petropolitics,”
as popularized by the journalist Thomas Freidman in 2009, wherein the
“price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions.”
See Thomas Freidman, (2009), “The First Law of Petropolitics,” Foreign
Policy (October).
28. Irfan Nooruddin, (2008), “The Political Economy of National Debt
Burdens, 1970–2000,” International Interactions 34(2): 156–185;
Stephen Kretzman and Irfan Nooruddin, (2011), Drilling into Debt: An
Investigation into the Relationship Between Debt and Oil (Washington,
DC: Oil Change International).
29. Benjamin J. Cohen, (2009), “Sovereign Wealth Funds and National
Security: The Great Tradeoff,” International Affairs 85(4): 713–731.
30. IEA World Energy Outlook 2019.
31. Citi GPS: Energy Darwinism II: Why a Low Carbon Future Doesn’t Have
to Cost the Earth (Citicorp Global Perspectives & Solutions, 2015).
32. Mohammad S. Masnadi, Hassan M. El-Houjeiri, Dominik Schunack,
Yunpo Li, Jacob G. Englander, Alhassan Badahdah, Jean-Christophe
Monfort et al., (2018), “Global Carbon Intensity of Crude Oil Production,” Science 361(6405): 851–853. Masnadi et al. (2018) note that
roughly 40% of Algeria’s high carbon intensity is due to flaring alone,
which, in a carbon-constrained world, would be significantly reduced.
33. Much of the difference in estimates arises from lower natural gas flaring
at Saudi wells compared to Algerian wells, where routine flaring is
substantial.
34. We thank Robin Mills for clarifying this point.
35. Margaret Levi, (1989), Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press).
36. Ross, Hazlett, and Mahdavi, (2017).
37. Paasha Mahdavi, (2020), Power Grab: Political Survival Through Extractive Resource Nationalization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press).
38. Michael Herb, (1999), All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and
Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany, NY: SUNY Press). The
exception would be the House of Thani in Qatar, which do not share
the same confident outlook given recent rifts with long-time allies in