258 P. MAHDAVI AND N. UDDIN
11. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, (1995), “Natural Resource
Abundance and Economic Growth,” National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 5398, Cambridge, MA.
12. See van der Ploeg (2011) for a review. On the issue of whether the
curse is limited to certain time periods, see Yu-Ming Liou and Paul
Musgrave, (2014), “Refining the Oil Curse: Country-Level Evidence
From Exogenous Variations in Resource Income,” Comparative Political
Studies 47(11): 1584–1610.
13. James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier, (2006), “Political
Foundations of the Resource Curse,” Journal of Development Economics
79(2): 447–468; Paul Collier and Benedikt Goderis, (2007), “Commodity
Prices, Growth and Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum,”
Centre for the Study of African Economies WP Series #274.
14. Thorvaldur Gylfason, (2001), “Natural Resources, Education, and
Economic Development,” European Economic Review 45(4–6): 847–859.
15. Regarding the institutional conditionality of the economic resource curse,
see Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. “Institutions and
the Resource Curse,” The Economic Journal 116(508): 1–20.
16. Thad Dunning, (2008), Crude Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press).
17. Timothy Mitchell, (2011), Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age
of Oil (Verso Press).
18. Christina N. Brunnschweiler and E.H. Bulte, (2008), “Linking Natural
Resources to Slow Growth and More Conflict,” Science 320: 616–617.
19. Victor Menaldo, (2016), The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources,
Politics, and Development (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
20. Kojima and Koplow (2015), Parry et al. (2014), Coady et al. (2015),
Davis (2014, 2016).
21. Jun Rentschler and Morgan Bazilian, (2017), “Reforming Fossil Fuel
Subsidies: Drivers, Barriers and the State of Progress,” Climate Policy
17(7): 891–914.
22. Calculations made based on monthly gasoline price data from Michael
Ross, Chad Hazlett, and Paasha Mahdavi, (2017), “Global Progress and
Backsliding on Gasoline Taxes and Subsidies,” Nature Energy 2(16201).
23. Oil exporters are defined here as countries where fuel exports (oil and
gas) are more than 50% of total merchandise exports, averaged across
the 2003–2015 period. Based on fuel exports (% of merchandise exports)
variable from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
24. Note that the UAE simultaneously has the highest gasoline price in the
MENA region. See Statistical Appendix of Middle East, North Africa,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan REO Update, April 2019, IMF.
25. See Ross, Hazlett, and Mahdavi (2017). Note that the oil-importing
MENA states also differ in governance outcomes when compared to the
11. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, (1995), “Natural Resource
Abundance and Economic Growth,” National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 5398, Cambridge, MA.
12. See van der Ploeg (2011) for a review. On the issue of whether the
curse is limited to certain time periods, see Yu-Ming Liou and Paul
Musgrave, (2014), “Refining the Oil Curse: Country-Level Evidence
From Exogenous Variations in Resource Income,” Comparative Political
Studies 47(11): 1584–1610.
13. James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier, (2006), “Political
Foundations of the Resource Curse,” Journal of Development Economics
79(2): 447–468; Paul Collier and Benedikt Goderis, (2007), “Commodity
Prices, Growth and Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum,”
Centre for the Study of African Economies WP Series #274.
14. Thorvaldur Gylfason, (2001), “Natural Resources, Education, and
Economic Development,” European Economic Review 45(4–6): 847–859.
15. Regarding the institutional conditionality of the economic resource curse,
see Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. “Institutions and
the Resource Curse,” The Economic Journal 116(508): 1–20.
16. Thad Dunning, (2008), Crude Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press).
17. Timothy Mitchell, (2011), Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age
of Oil (Verso Press).
18. Christina N. Brunnschweiler and E.H. Bulte, (2008), “Linking Natural
Resources to Slow Growth and More Conflict,” Science 320: 616–617.
19. Victor Menaldo, (2016), The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources,
Politics, and Development (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
20. Kojima and Koplow (2015), Parry et al. (2014), Coady et al. (2015),
Davis (2014, 2016).
21. Jun Rentschler and Morgan Bazilian, (2017), “Reforming Fossil Fuel
Subsidies: Drivers, Barriers and the State of Progress,” Climate Policy
17(7): 891–914.
22. Calculations made based on monthly gasoline price data from Michael
Ross, Chad Hazlett, and Paasha Mahdavi, (2017), “Global Progress and
Backsliding on Gasoline Taxes and Subsidies,” Nature Energy 2(16201).
23. Oil exporters are defined here as countries where fuel exports (oil and
gas) are more than 50% of total merchandise exports, averaged across
the 2003–2015 period. Based on fuel exports (% of merchandise exports)
variable from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
24. Note that the UAE simultaneously has the highest gasoline price in the
MENA region. See Statistical Appendix of Middle East, North Africa,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan REO Update, April 2019, IMF.
25. See Ross, Hazlett, and Mahdavi (2017). Note that the oil-importing
MENA states also differ in governance outcomes when compared to the