9 GOVERNANCE AMID THE TRANSITION TO RENEWABLE …
257
populations. This chapter serves as an introduction to some of these implications and how institutions can promote these developmental goals for
the MENA while taking part in the global pursuit divesting from fossil
fuels in favor of renewable energy enterprises.
Notes
1. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), (2019), Renewable
Energy Market Analysis: GCC 2019.
2. Hussein Mahdavy, (1970), “Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” in M.A. Cook (ed.), Studies in
Economic History of the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press),
p. 466.
3. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, (1987), The Rentier State
(London: Croom Helm), p. 50.
4. Hazem Beblawi, (1987), “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), The Rentier State (London:
Croom Helm), pp. 61 and 66.
5. Giacomo Luciani, “Allocative vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,” in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1990), pp. 65–84.
6. Given the chapter’s focus on the governance effects of the renewable
energy transition, we deliberately limit our discussion of the resource curse
to select political components. This, of course, leaves out the broader
effects on corruption, civil and interstate conflict, gender and income
inequality, and others. For a review of these issues, see Michael Ross
(2015), “What Have We Learned About the Resource Curse?” Annual
Review of Political Science 18: 239–259 and Andrew Rosser (2006), “The
Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey,” Institute
of Development Studies working paper.
7. Quintan Wiktorowicz, (1999), “State Power and the Regulation of Islam
in Jordan,” Journal of Church and State, 41(4): 677–696, p. 680.
8. Terry Lynn Karl, (1997), The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and PetroStates (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
9. Michael Ross, (2001), “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics
53(3): 325–361.
10. Benjamin Smith, (2004), “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999,” American Journal of Political Science 48(2):
232–246; Michael Ross, (2012), The Oil Curse (New York: Princeton
University Press); Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes,
(2015), “Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival,” British Journal of Political
Science 45(2): 287–306.
257
populations. This chapter serves as an introduction to some of these implications and how institutions can promote these developmental goals for
the MENA while taking part in the global pursuit divesting from fossil
fuels in favor of renewable energy enterprises.
Notes
1. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), (2019), Renewable
Energy Market Analysis: GCC 2019.
2. Hussein Mahdavy, (1970), “Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” in M.A. Cook (ed.), Studies in
Economic History of the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press),
p. 466.
3. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, (1987), The Rentier State
(London: Croom Helm), p. 50.
4. Hazem Beblawi, (1987), “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), The Rentier State (London:
Croom Helm), pp. 61 and 66.
5. Giacomo Luciani, “Allocative vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,” in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1990), pp. 65–84.
6. Given the chapter’s focus on the governance effects of the renewable
energy transition, we deliberately limit our discussion of the resource curse
to select political components. This, of course, leaves out the broader
effects on corruption, civil and interstate conflict, gender and income
inequality, and others. For a review of these issues, see Michael Ross
(2015), “What Have We Learned About the Resource Curse?” Annual
Review of Political Science 18: 239–259 and Andrew Rosser (2006), “The
Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey,” Institute
of Development Studies working paper.
7. Quintan Wiktorowicz, (1999), “State Power and the Regulation of Islam
in Jordan,” Journal of Church and State, 41(4): 677–696, p. 680.
8. Terry Lynn Karl, (1997), The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and PetroStates (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
9. Michael Ross, (2001), “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics
53(3): 325–361.
10. Benjamin Smith, (2004), “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999,” American Journal of Political Science 48(2):
232–246; Michael Ross, (2012), The Oil Curse (New York: Princeton
University Press); Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes,
(2015), “Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival,” British Journal of Political
Science 45(2): 287–306.