6 BYZANTINE ENERGY POLITICS: THE COMPLEX TALE …
175
Changing Institutional Capacity: Concentration of Power
and Politicization of Bureaucracy
The political interests of the AKP leaders to build a loyal business class,
coopt large segments of the population, and establish Turkish hegemony
in the region cannot by themselves explain why certain energy paths
prevailed over others in Turkey in the past two decades. We need to also
look at the institutional capacity of the AKP governments to pursue and
implement their energy agenda. The initial energy reforms that opened
the way for renewables were successful not only because AKP embraced
(strategically) the neoliberal agenda promulgated by the external actors
but also because they could carry out the reforms effectively.
Unlike the numerous coalitional governments before it, the AKP
government in its first election commanded a comfortable parliamentary
majority with 66% of the seats and has ruled as a single party government
ever since. The consecutive electoral victories gave Erdogan, the prime
minister at the time, enough political capital and institutional capacity to
push for reforms with the intensity and commitment he saw fit. Moreover,
the party cohesion and discipline under the charismatic and dominant
Erdogan established an undisputed system of hierarchy in his cabinet
where he acted as the mediator among conflicting ministers but always
had the last word. AKP’s control of the legislature and executive was also
magnified by its control of numerous municipal administrations around
the country. Even though the neoliberal reforms of the 2000s decentralized some of the formerly centralized administrative structure in Turkey,
AKP’s success in local elections allowed it to form and command extensive
local networks to implement policies. The consolidation of executive and
legislative power for consecutive AKP governments created a high degree
of political stability that gave AKP leaders the ability to make credible
commitments and draw significant amount of energy investments into the
country.
In the past decade, concentration of political power around AKP and
especially its leader, Erdogan, increased even further. Erdogan became the
president in 2014 and changed the constitution to dismantle the parliamentary system and establish a ‘super presidential’ regime. By weakening
and eliminating judicial veto-players to government economic policies—
particularly to privatizations and land confiscations—this new institutional
structure allowed the government to politicize energy decisions and
protect and enrich its business cronies at the expense of sound energy
175
Changing Institutional Capacity: Concentration of Power
and Politicization of Bureaucracy
The political interests of the AKP leaders to build a loyal business class,
coopt large segments of the population, and establish Turkish hegemony
in the region cannot by themselves explain why certain energy paths
prevailed over others in Turkey in the past two decades. We need to also
look at the institutional capacity of the AKP governments to pursue and
implement their energy agenda. The initial energy reforms that opened
the way for renewables were successful not only because AKP embraced
(strategically) the neoliberal agenda promulgated by the external actors
but also because they could carry out the reforms effectively.
Unlike the numerous coalitional governments before it, the AKP
government in its first election commanded a comfortable parliamentary
majority with 66% of the seats and has ruled as a single party government
ever since. The consecutive electoral victories gave Erdogan, the prime
minister at the time, enough political capital and institutional capacity to
push for reforms with the intensity and commitment he saw fit. Moreover,
the party cohesion and discipline under the charismatic and dominant
Erdogan established an undisputed system of hierarchy in his cabinet
where he acted as the mediator among conflicting ministers but always
had the last word. AKP’s control of the legislature and executive was also
magnified by its control of numerous municipal administrations around
the country. Even though the neoliberal reforms of the 2000s decentralized some of the formerly centralized administrative structure in Turkey,
AKP’s success in local elections allowed it to form and command extensive
local networks to implement policies. The consolidation of executive and
legislative power for consecutive AKP governments created a high degree
of political stability that gave AKP leaders the ability to make credible
commitments and draw significant amount of energy investments into the
country.
In the past decade, concentration of political power around AKP and
especially its leader, Erdogan, increased even further. Erdogan became the
president in 2014 and changed the constitution to dismantle the parliamentary system and establish a ‘super presidential’ regime. By weakening
and eliminating judicial veto-players to government economic policies—
particularly to privatizations and land confiscations—this new institutional
structure allowed the government to politicize energy decisions and
protect and enrich its business cronies at the expense of sound energy