176 O. BAYULGEN
policies that could develop energy sources in a sustainable and socially
equitable manner. By appropriating the energy rents more directly to
themselves or through their crony intermediaries, AKP elites were able to
generate financial sources to sustain their hegemonic hold on society. The
majoritarian politics of the AKP and removal of checks and balances in
the system have also made reviewing, questioning, or critiquing of AKP’s
developmentalist and extractivist policies more difficult and risky over
time. What some call ‘authoritarian post-neoliberalism,’ this new political economic structure increasingly relied on coercive state power as well
as legal and extralegal intimidation to discipline and suppress locals who
mobilize to stop the construction of contested energy projects. 76
With more concentration of power, the state bureaucracy has also over
time become more dysfunctional and ineffective. Historically, Turkish
bureaucracy has been characterized by red tape, delays, inertia, and
infighting among various state agencies and ministries. 77 Some of these
bureaucratic problems can be attributed to a lack of bureaucratic maturity and competence. It is likely that limited state resources and lack of
adequate financial incentives based on performance affected the ability to
recruit (and retain) qualified people to bureaucratic agencies and train
them to gain specialized knowledge and expertise. For instance, when the
State Hydraulic Works Agency or DSI received over 1700 license applications for construction of the Deriner Dam and Hydroelectric Power
Plant after the passage of the water use rights regulation in 2003, it was
not equipped to examine each project, issue licenses, and monitor compliance in a short period of time. Moreover, private companies were hiring
DSI employees experienced in hydro projects for higher wages than what
the institution could offer. 78
Yet, interviews with sector experts and bureaucrats reveal that in the
past decade, the problem has been less about bureaucratic incompetence and more about bureaucratic powerlessness and lack of discretion. 79
Bureaucrats lament that there is too much political interference which
undercut merit-based performance and that they are usually asked to
perform tasks by parliamentarians and government officials that favor
clientelist networks instead of being subject to a set of clearly defined,
transparent set of objectifiable targets. 80 The fact that the former minister
of Energy and Natural Resources and the person who oversaw the
operations of EMRA was none other than the son-in-law of President
Erdogan and the former CEO of a conglomerate that owns many hydroelectric dams and coal plants, demonstrates the extent of bureaucratic
policies that could develop energy sources in a sustainable and socially
equitable manner. By appropriating the energy rents more directly to
themselves or through their crony intermediaries, AKP elites were able to
generate financial sources to sustain their hegemonic hold on society. The
majoritarian politics of the AKP and removal of checks and balances in
the system have also made reviewing, questioning, or critiquing of AKP’s
developmentalist and extractivist policies more difficult and risky over
time. What some call ‘authoritarian post-neoliberalism,’ this new political economic structure increasingly relied on coercive state power as well
as legal and extralegal intimidation to discipline and suppress locals who
mobilize to stop the construction of contested energy projects. 76
With more concentration of power, the state bureaucracy has also over
time become more dysfunctional and ineffective. Historically, Turkish
bureaucracy has been characterized by red tape, delays, inertia, and
infighting among various state agencies and ministries. 77 Some of these
bureaucratic problems can be attributed to a lack of bureaucratic maturity and competence. It is likely that limited state resources and lack of
adequate financial incentives based on performance affected the ability to
recruit (and retain) qualified people to bureaucratic agencies and train
them to gain specialized knowledge and expertise. For instance, when the
State Hydraulic Works Agency or DSI received over 1700 license applications for construction of the Deriner Dam and Hydroelectric Power
Plant after the passage of the water use rights regulation in 2003, it was
not equipped to examine each project, issue licenses, and monitor compliance in a short period of time. Moreover, private companies were hiring
DSI employees experienced in hydro projects for higher wages than what
the institution could offer. 78
Yet, interviews with sector experts and bureaucrats reveal that in the
past decade, the problem has been less about bureaucratic incompetence and more about bureaucratic powerlessness and lack of discretion. 79
Bureaucrats lament that there is too much political interference which
undercut merit-based performance and that they are usually asked to
perform tasks by parliamentarians and government officials that favor
clientelist networks instead of being subject to a set of clearly defined,
transparent set of objectifiable targets. 80 The fact that the former minister
of Energy and Natural Resources and the person who oversaw the
operations of EMRA was none other than the son-in-law of President
Erdogan and the former CEO of a conglomerate that owns many hydroelectric dams and coal plants, demonstrates the extent of bureaucratic