174 O. BAYULGEN
of the pipeline from Iran (Tabriz-Erzurum pipeline), and the construction of a natural gas pipeline between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional
Government in Northern Iraq are keeping the pipeline diplomacy and
frenzy alive and well. AKP’s ambitious external energy policy, which has
already secured significant volumes of hydrocarbons and attracted huge
investments for the realization of extensive energy transportation projects,
fits squarely with AKP’s overall foreign policy objective of expanding
Turkey’s sphere of influence in the region and making it a key player
in world politics. Similarly, the electricity trade, which allows Turkey
to establish interconnections with all her neighbors, in the West with
Bulgaria and Greece and in the East with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and
Iraq, contributes to the strategic plan of creating mutual interdependencies and cementing Turkey’s significance in the region. This ‘powerful
Turkey’ image, in turn, has been conveniently utilized by AKP leaders to
project an aura of legitimacy around the regime and ensure its survival.
Yet, it is important to point out the perverse implications of this
strategy. The government’s geostrategic goal of becoming an energy hub
between Europe and Asia ironically contradicts its goal of reducing import
dependency and especially dependence on a single country. It is fair to
assume that Turkey’s overdependence on Russia will continue, as opposed
to shrink, in the future. Because of long-term ‘take or pay’ gas contracts
and lack of an extensive storage capacity, Turkey is contractually obligated to pay Russia huge payments for large volumes of gas it does not
always use. 75 The completion of the proposed Turkish Stream project
and Rosneft (Russian oil and gas company)’s ownership of the planned
Kurdistan gas pipeline will only deepen that dependency and so will the
Akkuyu nuclear power plant project that Turkey signed with the Russian
state company, Rosatom, when it gets built.
And so, not only is the pipeline diplomacy not mitigating Turkey’s
energy supply vulnerabilities, one can argue that it is also slowing down
Turkey’s transition to clean energy. Committing large amounts of capital
and time for pipeline infrastructure and signing long-term oil and gas
contracts with producer countries arguably locks-in Turkey’s dependence
on fossil fuels for decades to come and makes it more difficult to
reduce their share in the energy mix. Being over-contracted to natural
gas imports leaves less room for the renewable energy sector to grow.
While Turkey’s geographical location may be regarded by some to be a
geostrategic blessing, it arguably also presents a roadblock for Turkey’s
clean energy transition.
of the pipeline from Iran (Tabriz-Erzurum pipeline), and the construction of a natural gas pipeline between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional
Government in Northern Iraq are keeping the pipeline diplomacy and
frenzy alive and well. AKP’s ambitious external energy policy, which has
already secured significant volumes of hydrocarbons and attracted huge
investments for the realization of extensive energy transportation projects,
fits squarely with AKP’s overall foreign policy objective of expanding
Turkey’s sphere of influence in the region and making it a key player
in world politics. Similarly, the electricity trade, which allows Turkey
to establish interconnections with all her neighbors, in the West with
Bulgaria and Greece and in the East with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and
Iraq, contributes to the strategic plan of creating mutual interdependencies and cementing Turkey’s significance in the region. This ‘powerful
Turkey’ image, in turn, has been conveniently utilized by AKP leaders to
project an aura of legitimacy around the regime and ensure its survival.
Yet, it is important to point out the perverse implications of this
strategy. The government’s geostrategic goal of becoming an energy hub
between Europe and Asia ironically contradicts its goal of reducing import
dependency and especially dependence on a single country. It is fair to
assume that Turkey’s overdependence on Russia will continue, as opposed
to shrink, in the future. Because of long-term ‘take or pay’ gas contracts
and lack of an extensive storage capacity, Turkey is contractually obligated to pay Russia huge payments for large volumes of gas it does not
always use. 75 The completion of the proposed Turkish Stream project
and Rosneft (Russian oil and gas company)’s ownership of the planned
Kurdistan gas pipeline will only deepen that dependency and so will the
Akkuyu nuclear power plant project that Turkey signed with the Russian
state company, Rosatom, when it gets built.
And so, not only is the pipeline diplomacy not mitigating Turkey’s
energy supply vulnerabilities, one can argue that it is also slowing down
Turkey’s transition to clean energy. Committing large amounts of capital
and time for pipeline infrastructure and signing long-term oil and gas
contracts with producer countries arguably locks-in Turkey’s dependence
on fossil fuels for decades to come and makes it more difficult to
reduce their share in the energy mix. Being over-contracted to natural
gas imports leaves less room for the renewable energy sector to grow.
While Turkey’s geographical location may be regarded by some to be a
geostrategic blessing, it arguably also presents a roadblock for Turkey’s
clean energy transition.