6 BYZANTINE ENERGY POLITICS: THE COMPLEX TALE …
173
‘bridge’ or ‘transit’ country, AKP officials sought a more active role for
Turkey and insisted on turning it into an energy ‘hub,’ which would
not only connect the producers to consumers but also establish other
upstream and downstream facilities in the country and set the regional
price for energy. 71 By the end of 2000s, the AKP governments had some
success in realizing their ambitious goals. EU’s overdependence on Russia
for natural gas and concerns with Russian threats to use the gas weapon
led to the formulation of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) strategy, in
which EU officially acknowledged Turkey’s role as a natural energy bridge
and energy hub. When the Nabucco pipeline project, which would have
transported gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe through Turkey in an
effort to bypass Russia, failed due to various commercial and financial
issues, Ankara teamed up with the government of Azerbaijan to propose
a new infrastructure project, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP).
Once the combination of three SGC pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
(BTE), Trans-Anatolian (TANAP), and the Trans Adriatic (TAP), is operational in 2020, Turkish leaders expect their political leverage vis-à-vis the
EU to grow. 72
Despite its commitment to cooperate with the EU in the SGC project,
the AKP government has also not hesitated to participate in a competing
pipeline project with Russia. 73 In order to reduce its dependence on the
Ukrainian transit route to Europe, Russia has been pursuing alternative
pipeline projects; Nord Stream pipeline connecting Russia directly with
Germany via the Baltic Sea and the South Stream pipeline to Austria via
the Black Sea. When the latter failed to materialize, Russia replaced it with
the Turkish Stream project that would transport Russian gas to Turkey
under the Black Sea with a total annual capacity of 63 billion cubic meters
(bcm), some of which would be used for Turkish domestic consumption.
The Turkish Stream is arguably very important for Gazprom: Turkey has
become its second biggest customer in Europe after Germany. 74 Sensing
this economic importance for Russia, the Turkish government seems to
be using the pipeline as a bargaining chip to resolve the serious disagreements between the two countries on a number of issues in Crimea,
Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh, and Syria.
In addition to SGC and Turkish Stream projects, the Turkish government has also plans to build or expand on other pipelines in the near
future. The discovery of new large natural gas fields in the East Mediterranean region including places like Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt, expansion
173
‘bridge’ or ‘transit’ country, AKP officials sought a more active role for
Turkey and insisted on turning it into an energy ‘hub,’ which would
not only connect the producers to consumers but also establish other
upstream and downstream facilities in the country and set the regional
price for energy. 71 By the end of 2000s, the AKP governments had some
success in realizing their ambitious goals. EU’s overdependence on Russia
for natural gas and concerns with Russian threats to use the gas weapon
led to the formulation of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) strategy, in
which EU officially acknowledged Turkey’s role as a natural energy bridge
and energy hub. When the Nabucco pipeline project, which would have
transported gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe through Turkey in an
effort to bypass Russia, failed due to various commercial and financial
issues, Ankara teamed up with the government of Azerbaijan to propose
a new infrastructure project, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP).
Once the combination of three SGC pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
(BTE), Trans-Anatolian (TANAP), and the Trans Adriatic (TAP), is operational in 2020, Turkish leaders expect their political leverage vis-à-vis the
EU to grow. 72
Despite its commitment to cooperate with the EU in the SGC project,
the AKP government has also not hesitated to participate in a competing
pipeline project with Russia. 73 In order to reduce its dependence on the
Ukrainian transit route to Europe, Russia has been pursuing alternative
pipeline projects; Nord Stream pipeline connecting Russia directly with
Germany via the Baltic Sea and the South Stream pipeline to Austria via
the Black Sea. When the latter failed to materialize, Russia replaced it with
the Turkish Stream project that would transport Russian gas to Turkey
under the Black Sea with a total annual capacity of 63 billion cubic meters
(bcm), some of which would be used for Turkish domestic consumption.
The Turkish Stream is arguably very important for Gazprom: Turkey has
become its second biggest customer in Europe after Germany. 74 Sensing
this economic importance for Russia, the Turkish government seems to
be using the pipeline as a bargaining chip to resolve the serious disagreements between the two countries on a number of issues in Crimea,
Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh, and Syria.
In addition to SGC and Turkish Stream projects, the Turkish government has also plans to build or expand on other pipelines in the near
future. The discovery of new large natural gas fields in the East Mediterranean region including places like Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt, expansion