172 O. BAYULGEN
that AKP has established in society over the years. For example, the
free delivery of coal, which is roughly 500 kg per household, ranks
highest among the various goods that the urban poor receive from AKPcontrolled municipalities. Since the beginning of the coal aid program
in 2003, more than 2 million households have benefitted from this
subsidy. Coal also provides much-needed employment for certain regions
in the country even though its contribution to overall employment has
decreased over time, from 1.3% in 1998 to 0.7% in 2013. 68 The government uses its support for coal projects to obtain votes from coal miners
and those living near coal mines and power plants. The popularity of such
projects has been shown to be a strong predictor of the party’s durability
and success across 900 municipal districts in mayoral elections of 2004,
2009, and 2014. 69
Foreign Policy Interests: Energy Projects for Geostrategic Leverage
Energy choices and priorities can also be understood as an extension
of government’s foreign policy objectives. Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, successive Turkish governments have been interested in
capitalizing on Turkey’s geographic position, surrounded by producing
countries to its north, east, and south and major consumer markets to its
west to become an energy corridor with several oil and natural gas pipeline
projects passing through it. 70 It is possible to argue that this obsession
with building an extensive pipeline infrastructure was never only about the
domestic energy needs of the country. On top of bringing transit fees and
construction jobs to the country, these projects offered the potential of
increasing Turkish governments’ leverage in defining relations with neighbors as well as promoting regional integration and stability. For instance,
in the 1990s, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and the South Caucasus,
also known as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), natural gas pipeline projects
made Turkey indispensable for the East-West energy corridor that was
designed to bypass Russia and limit its traditional influence over the
newly independent states in Eurasia. In addition to elevating Turkey’s
prominence with the West, these projects also enhanced the strategic
partnership between Turkey and the Caspian producer states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan and cemented the Turkish sphere
of influence in Eurasia.
In the 2000s when AKP came to power, pipeline diplomacy accelerated
to a whole new level. Criticizing the depiction of Turkey as just an energy
that AKP has established in society over the years. For example, the
free delivery of coal, which is roughly 500 kg per household, ranks
highest among the various goods that the urban poor receive from AKPcontrolled municipalities. Since the beginning of the coal aid program
in 2003, more than 2 million households have benefitted from this
subsidy. Coal also provides much-needed employment for certain regions
in the country even though its contribution to overall employment has
decreased over time, from 1.3% in 1998 to 0.7% in 2013. 68 The government uses its support for coal projects to obtain votes from coal miners
and those living near coal mines and power plants. The popularity of such
projects has been shown to be a strong predictor of the party’s durability
and success across 900 municipal districts in mayoral elections of 2004,
2009, and 2014. 69
Foreign Policy Interests: Energy Projects for Geostrategic Leverage
Energy choices and priorities can also be understood as an extension
of government’s foreign policy objectives. Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, successive Turkish governments have been interested in
capitalizing on Turkey’s geographic position, surrounded by producing
countries to its north, east, and south and major consumer markets to its
west to become an energy corridor with several oil and natural gas pipeline
projects passing through it. 70 It is possible to argue that this obsession
with building an extensive pipeline infrastructure was never only about the
domestic energy needs of the country. On top of bringing transit fees and
construction jobs to the country, these projects offered the potential of
increasing Turkish governments’ leverage in defining relations with neighbors as well as promoting regional integration and stability. For instance,
in the 1990s, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and the South Caucasus,
also known as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), natural gas pipeline projects
made Turkey indispensable for the East-West energy corridor that was
designed to bypass Russia and limit its traditional influence over the
newly independent states in Eurasia. In addition to elevating Turkey’s
prominence with the West, these projects also enhanced the strategic
partnership between Turkey and the Caspian producer states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan and cemented the Turkish sphere
of influence in Eurasia.
In the 2000s when AKP came to power, pipeline diplomacy accelerated
to a whole new level. Criticizing the depiction of Turkey as just an energy