6 BYZANTINE ENERGY POLITICS: THE COMPLEX TALE …
171
around extraction of energy resources, specifically the relaxation of environmental requirements as well as law enforcement on labor rights and
workspace safety inspections. For instance, according to the Ministry
of Environment and Urbanization, none of the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) reports of coal projects have been rejected between
1999 and 2015. 63 These deregulations dramatically decreased the costs
for businessowners and allowed them to accrue huge profits in their operations at the expense of workers, the environment, and the well-being of
the communities where energy projects are located.
At the same time, AKP governments changed the regulations around
land leasing and acquisitions as well as the rules on judicial oversight of
these regulatory mechanisms. For instance, the government can use an
originally war-time intended administrative procedure, called the Urgent
Expropriation (UE), to confiscate private land from farmers and lease
them for extended periods to hydropower developers. The use of this
procedure skyrocketed under the AKP rule and between 2004 and 2014
the government made 1,785 UE decisions, about 1,500 of them related
to energy production. 64 Finally, the government disrupted the energy
playing field by providing huge subsidies to fossil fuel producers and
investors in the form of tax breaks, discounts on electricity bills, research
and development (R&D) support, rehabilitation support, investment
guarantees, and electricity purchase guarantees. According to a report,
the Turkish government provides US$300 million to US$1.6 billion per
year in fossil fuel producer subsidies. 65
In return for getting lucrative deals and regulatory exemptions from
the government, business cronies provided the governing elites with
campaign and in-kind donations to the party and party-affiliated charities
and disproportionate access to media outlets. For example, an investigative report revealed that the prime minister himself had forced companies
such as Cengiz Holding and Kolin to take over the bid for a major newspaper and TV group, Sabah-ATV. 66 Businessmen with strong ties to the
ruling party also used part of their profits to support AKP’s agenda.
State-led capital accumulation has fed the patronage networks organized
around the AKP and provided resources for the party’s populist, redistributionist policies and appeals to grandeur to attract large number of
voters. The energy sector became one of the founding blocks of AKP’s
regime maintenance. 67
Other than enabling capital accumulation for government cronies,
energy policies have also figured prominently in the clientelist networks
171
around extraction of energy resources, specifically the relaxation of environmental requirements as well as law enforcement on labor rights and
workspace safety inspections. For instance, according to the Ministry
of Environment and Urbanization, none of the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) reports of coal projects have been rejected between
1999 and 2015. 63 These deregulations dramatically decreased the costs
for businessowners and allowed them to accrue huge profits in their operations at the expense of workers, the environment, and the well-being of
the communities where energy projects are located.
At the same time, AKP governments changed the regulations around
land leasing and acquisitions as well as the rules on judicial oversight of
these regulatory mechanisms. For instance, the government can use an
originally war-time intended administrative procedure, called the Urgent
Expropriation (UE), to confiscate private land from farmers and lease
them for extended periods to hydropower developers. The use of this
procedure skyrocketed under the AKP rule and between 2004 and 2014
the government made 1,785 UE decisions, about 1,500 of them related
to energy production. 64 Finally, the government disrupted the energy
playing field by providing huge subsidies to fossil fuel producers and
investors in the form of tax breaks, discounts on electricity bills, research
and development (R&D) support, rehabilitation support, investment
guarantees, and electricity purchase guarantees. According to a report,
the Turkish government provides US$300 million to US$1.6 billion per
year in fossil fuel producer subsidies. 65
In return for getting lucrative deals and regulatory exemptions from
the government, business cronies provided the governing elites with
campaign and in-kind donations to the party and party-affiliated charities
and disproportionate access to media outlets. For example, an investigative report revealed that the prime minister himself had forced companies
such as Cengiz Holding and Kolin to take over the bid for a major newspaper and TV group, Sabah-ATV. 66 Businessmen with strong ties to the
ruling party also used part of their profits to support AKP’s agenda.
State-led capital accumulation has fed the patronage networks organized
around the AKP and provided resources for the party’s populist, redistributionist policies and appeals to grandeur to attract large number of
voters. The energy sector became one of the founding blocks of AKP’s
regime maintenance. 67
Other than enabling capital accumulation for government cronies,
energy policies have also figured prominently in the clientelist networks