6 The Status and Future of Charcoal in the Energy …
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is ensuring supply security for business continuity regardless of seasonal
variations. Indeed, Kambewa, Mataya, Sichinga, and Johnson (2007)
observed in Malawi that firewood is often wet, and power outages are
more frequent during the rainy season, which increases the demand for
and consumption of charcoal as an alternative. The ubiquity of charcoal
and the relative assurance of its supply in all seasons often means that the
fuel is economically accessible or affordable to people at varying income
levels (Mwampamba et al., 2013; Bailis, Rujanavech, Dwivedi, Chang,
& de Miranda, 2013). In sub-Saharan urban centres, such as Kampala,
Dar es Salaam, Bagamoyo, and Lusaka (Alfaro & Jones, 2018; Cotton,
Kirshner, & Salite, 2019; Namaalwa, Hofstad, & Sankhayan, 2009; Pesa,
2017; Malimbwi & Zahabu, 2008), where purchasing power is higher
and the charcoal trade is more viable, prevailing market conditions
dictate what consumers ultimately pay for this fuel.
Unlike in the case of other energy commodities, such as electricity and
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), there is no centralized economic regulation for price-setting or subsidization to consumers for the purchase of
charcoal. The production of charcoal is also usually not economically
incentivized, for example, through government grants or loans. Furthermore, even though producers are paid meagre prices by middlemen,
thus leaving them impoverished (Branch & Martiniello, 2018), the fact
that charcoal production is illegal in some areas (WWF, 2018; Butz,
2013; Tabuti, Dhillion, & Lye, 2003) makes direct involvement of the
government to financially support its stakeholders immensely complicated. These setbacks make gauging of charcoal’s true market or financial
value challenging (see also Sect. 6.8).
Nonetheless, government intervention through policies that affect the
trade can have a direct impact on market prices of charcoal. For instance,
declaring production illegal through environmental protection regulation means that producers in rural areas, under secrecy, may be prone
to selling at very low prices because they do not trade openly in legal
markets. During our fieldwork, we observed that prices were meagre at
the kiln, yet the same charcoal was sold for drastically higher prices in
urban centres where trade is more conspicuous and legal (see Nabukalu
& Gieré, 2019). The illegalization of charcoal can interrupt typical
market dynamics of demand and supply, further driving up prices when
207
is ensuring supply security for business continuity regardless of seasonal
variations. Indeed, Kambewa, Mataya, Sichinga, and Johnson (2007)
observed in Malawi that firewood is often wet, and power outages are
more frequent during the rainy season, which increases the demand for
and consumption of charcoal as an alternative. The ubiquity of charcoal
and the relative assurance of its supply in all seasons often means that the
fuel is economically accessible or affordable to people at varying income
levels (Mwampamba et al., 2013; Bailis, Rujanavech, Dwivedi, Chang,
& de Miranda, 2013). In sub-Saharan urban centres, such as Kampala,
Dar es Salaam, Bagamoyo, and Lusaka (Alfaro & Jones, 2018; Cotton,
Kirshner, & Salite, 2019; Namaalwa, Hofstad, & Sankhayan, 2009; Pesa,
2017; Malimbwi & Zahabu, 2008), where purchasing power is higher
and the charcoal trade is more viable, prevailing market conditions
dictate what consumers ultimately pay for this fuel.
Unlike in the case of other energy commodities, such as electricity and
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), there is no centralized economic regulation for price-setting or subsidization to consumers for the purchase of
charcoal. The production of charcoal is also usually not economically
incentivized, for example, through government grants or loans. Furthermore, even though producers are paid meagre prices by middlemen,
thus leaving them impoverished (Branch & Martiniello, 2018), the fact
that charcoal production is illegal in some areas (WWF, 2018; Butz,
2013; Tabuti, Dhillion, & Lye, 2003) makes direct involvement of the
government to financially support its stakeholders immensely complicated. These setbacks make gauging of charcoal’s true market or financial
value challenging (see also Sect. 6.8).
Nonetheless, government intervention through policies that affect the
trade can have a direct impact on market prices of charcoal. For instance,
declaring production illegal through environmental protection regulation means that producers in rural areas, under secrecy, may be prone
to selling at very low prices because they do not trade openly in legal
markets. During our fieldwork, we observed that prices were meagre at
the kiln, yet the same charcoal was sold for drastically higher prices in
urban centres where trade is more conspicuous and legal (see Nabukalu
& Gieré, 2019). The illegalization of charcoal can interrupt typical
market dynamics of demand and supply, further driving up prices when