208
C. Nabukalu and R. Giere
supply is artificially constricted, i.e. by arresting skilled producers, or
withdrawing their labour from the trade, despite the high demand in
urban centres. In Tanzania, for example, the national charcoal ban of
2006 led to steady price increases, which persisted well into 2010, even
though the ban lasted only two weeks, because of the emergence of black
markets for the illegal charcoal (Malimbwi & Zahabu, 2008). What
applies to other commodities is also true for charcoal: when demand
for charcoal exceeds its supply, charcoal prices rise, as was observed,
for example, in Tanzania (Malimbwi & Zahabu, 2008; Sander, Gros, &
Peter, 2013; World Bank, 2010).
In final markets, quality is a major differentiator in what consumers
ultimately pay for charcoal. However, because the supply chain is
informal, quality is judged very subjectively in a number of unstandardized ways depending on the stakeholder. For example, even though charcoal is not typically weighed with scales in these markets, ‘lightweight’
charcoal is deemed to be of lower quality than denser types, and it is
generally sold at lower prices because it depletes faster on stoves (see
Nabukalu & Gieré, 2019). Malimbwi and Zahabu (2008) discussed that
charcoal ranges in its calorific content, depending on the tree species
burned, which determines consumer preference and ultimately its price.
Indeed, our observations in Uganda showed that charcoal produced from
tree species that tend to grow in the North were perceived to be of higher
quality than those produced from trees with softer stems growing in the
South or in the Central districts and the islands in Lake Victoria. Where
consumers are knowledgeable of these variations, for example, through
experience with smoky and non-smoky types, they actively pursue better
quality and pay higher prices to traders to obtain ‘value for money’.
Still, as stock is mixed up in final markets to obtain full-sack inventories
(Fig. 6.3c and d), charcoal quality is immensely challenging to establish
(Nabukalu & Gieré, 2019).
C. Nabukalu and R. Giere
supply is artificially constricted, i.e. by arresting skilled producers, or
withdrawing their labour from the trade, despite the high demand in
urban centres. In Tanzania, for example, the national charcoal ban of
2006 led to steady price increases, which persisted well into 2010, even
though the ban lasted only two weeks, because of the emergence of black
markets for the illegal charcoal (Malimbwi & Zahabu, 2008). What
applies to other commodities is also true for charcoal: when demand
for charcoal exceeds its supply, charcoal prices rise, as was observed,
for example, in Tanzania (Malimbwi & Zahabu, 2008; Sander, Gros, &
Peter, 2013; World Bank, 2010).
In final markets, quality is a major differentiator in what consumers
ultimately pay for charcoal. However, because the supply chain is
informal, quality is judged very subjectively in a number of unstandardized ways depending on the stakeholder. For example, even though charcoal is not typically weighed with scales in these markets, ‘lightweight’
charcoal is deemed to be of lower quality than denser types, and it is
generally sold at lower prices because it depletes faster on stoves (see
Nabukalu & Gieré, 2019). Malimbwi and Zahabu (2008) discussed that
charcoal ranges in its calorific content, depending on the tree species
burned, which determines consumer preference and ultimately its price.
Indeed, our observations in Uganda showed that charcoal produced from
tree species that tend to grow in the North were perceived to be of higher
quality than those produced from trees with softer stems growing in the
South or in the Central districts and the islands in Lake Victoria. Where
consumers are knowledgeable of these variations, for example, through
experience with smoky and non-smoky types, they actively pursue better
quality and pay higher prices to traders to obtain ‘value for money’.
Still, as stock is mixed up in final markets to obtain full-sack inventories
(Fig. 6.3c and d), charcoal quality is immensely challenging to establish
(Nabukalu & Gieré, 2019).