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such: objects are manipulated, designed, assembled, identified, etc., but not
defined. By analogy, concepts can be provided of properties of objects, such as the
length of a rod and the reading comprehension ability of an individual, but lengths
of given rods and reading comprehension abilities of given individuals are not
themselves concepts. Indeed, while properties of objects can be subjected to
empirical transformations (the length of a rod can change, the reading comprehension ability of an individual can improve, etc.), the concepts of properties of
objects are unaffected by such transformations. Importantly, then, when expressions such as “unit definition” (e.g., throughout the SI Brochure, BIPM, 2019)
and “measurand definition” are used (e.g., in the definition of given by the International Vocabulary of Metrology (VIM) (JCGM, 2012:
2.27)), they are just shorthands for “definition of the concept of the unit” and
“definition of the concept of the measurand”, or, more operationally, “definition
of the mode of identification of the unit” and “definition of the mode of identification of the measurand”.
An exception to this is found in objects and properties of objects whose existence is dependent on (usually but not always shared) belief and social agreement,
such as money, limited liability corporations, marriages, and beauty, which are
often referred to as “social constructs” (see, e.g., Searle, 1995) to emphasize the
role of human intentionality in their existence. But even in such cases there is a
distinction between the object or property and the concepts one may have of it
(e.g., one may have a concept of money, separately from having money), and so
the other comments given here about the distinction between objects and concepts
remain applicable. In Sect. 6.6 we further discuss the existence of these kinds of
properties.
A summary can be depicted as in Fig. 5.3, adapted from ISO (2009a: 5.4.1,
where the term “characteristic” is used to denote concepts of properties of objects).
In this context, the condition that properties of objects are associated with modes
of interaction is not obvious. In Sect. 3.4.1 we mentioned the “hage” of a person,
defined as the product of his or her height and age, and presented as an exemplary
case of a supposedly non-existing property of human beings (Ellis, 1968: p. 31). In
other words, this is a definition of a perfectly legitimate concept, but it might not
correspond to any empirical property. However, this is not something that can be
taken for granted: sooner or later, it might happen that a hage-related interaction of
human beings is discovered. Again, the problem is meaningful because it relates to
the claim that a property does exist as such, whereas that the concept of hage exists
is a matter of fact.
While the arrow in Fig. 5.3 points from property to concept of property, indicating (properly) that a concept of an empirical property must be derived from the
property itself, the historical relationship may have well gone the other way; that is,
one might develop a concept of a property before the conceived property is found
empirically. This sort of historical sequence is far too many centuries in the past to
be observed for common physical properties like length and weight, but this is not
so for properties such as energy and temperature, and for many properties in the
human sciences.
5.2 Some clarifications about properties
such: objects are manipulated, designed, assembled, identified, etc., but not
defined. By analogy, concepts can be provided of properties of objects, such as the
length of a rod and the reading comprehension ability of an individual, but lengths
of given rods and reading comprehension abilities of given individuals are not
themselves concepts. Indeed, while properties of objects can be subjected to
empirical transformations (the length of a rod can change, the reading comprehension ability of an individual can improve, etc.), the concepts of properties of
objects are unaffected by such transformations. Importantly, then, when expressions such as “unit definition” (e.g., throughout the SI Brochure, BIPM, 2019)
and “measurand definition” are used (e.g., in the definition of
2.27)), they are just shorthands for “definition of the concept of the unit” and
“definition of the concept of the measurand”, or, more operationally, “definition
of the mode of identification of the unit” and “definition of the mode of identification of the measurand”.
An exception to this is found in objects and properties of objects whose existence is dependent on (usually but not always shared) belief and social agreement,
such as money, limited liability corporations, marriages, and beauty, which are
often referred to as “social constructs” (see, e.g., Searle, 1995) to emphasize the
role of human intentionality in their existence. But even in such cases there is a
distinction between the object or property and the concepts one may have of it
(e.g., one may have a concept of money, separately from having money), and so
the other comments given here about the distinction between objects and concepts
remain applicable. In Sect. 6.6 we further discuss the existence of these kinds of
properties.
A summary can be depicted as in Fig. 5.3, adapted from ISO (2009a: 5.4.1,
where the term “characteristic” is used to denote concepts of properties of objects).
In this context, the condition that properties of objects are associated with modes
of interaction is not obvious. In Sect. 3.4.1 we mentioned the “hage” of a person,
defined as the product of his or her height and age, and presented as an exemplary
case of a supposedly non-existing property of human beings (Ellis, 1968: p. 31). In
other words, this is a definition of a perfectly legitimate concept, but it might not
correspond to any empirical property. However, this is not something that can be
taken for granted: sooner or later, it might happen that a hage-related interaction of
human beings is discovered. Again, the problem is meaningful because it relates to
the claim that a property does exist as such, whereas that the concept of hage exists
is a matter of fact.
While the arrow in Fig. 5.3 points from property to concept of property, indicating (properly) that a concept of an empirical property must be derived from the
property itself, the historical relationship may have well gone the other way; that is,
one might develop a concept of a property before the conceived property is found
empirically. This sort of historical sequence is far too many centuries in the past to
be observed for common physical properties like length and weight, but this is not
so for properties such as energy and temperature, and for many properties in the
human sciences.
5.2 Some clarifications about properties