101
Realism is also sometimes misperceived as necessarily entailing a commitment
to the possibility of absolute truth, or the position that there exists one true and
complete description of the way the world really is. Particularly in the human sciences, this position is sometimes associated with an unflattering portrait of logical
positivism or other forms of empiricism, and contrasted with non-realist or antirealist views such as social constructionism or postmodernism (see Haig, 2014: Preface).
In the context of human sciences, the assumption that properties of objects must
objectively exist in order to be measurable is often interpreted as implying a form of
physical reductionism, and more specifically that the properties are exhaustively
definable in biological (e.g., neurophysiological) terms; it is sometimes further concluded that there must exist a genetically determined basis for variation in the property. Such claims may evoke a negative reaction from many scholars familiar with,
for example, the controversial history of intelligence testing and its association with
race and institutional racism (see Nisbett et al., 2012, for a recent review).
Of course, realism in general need not be associated with physical reductionism,
and in fact the broad consensus among contemporary realist philosophers and philosophers of mind is that mental phenomena (properties, states, events, etc.) are no
less a part of reality than physical phenomena (see in particular Dennett, 1991; Kim,
1998; Searle, 1992; see also Footnote 3 in Chap. 2). Perhaps even more importantly,
realism need not be associated with a commitment to the possibility of absolute
truth, nor do most contemporary philosophers formulate realist claims in this way.
For example, Hilary Putnam (1985, 1990, 1994), whose outlook was broadly realist
throughout his career, argued that there are simply too many ways in which beliefs
and symbols can be mapped onto the world for it to be plausible that there could be
a single best description of the way the world is. As an example from the human
sciences, it is often the case that there are many possible ways to describe psychological phenomena that are equally consistent with all available empirical data, but
are inconsistent: for example, it can be shown that variation in personality
characteristics as evaluated by a given set of responses to survey items is equally
consistent with a model that describes personality in terms of a typology (that is, in
terms of a set of classes) and a model that describes personality in terms of continuous dimensions (e.g., Molenaar & Von Eye, 1994, cited in Borsboom, 2005).
27
As a
that such physical properties are only approximately measurable. This has to do with the traditional
distinction of quantities as either pluralities (or multitudes) or magnitudes, i.e., discretely or continuously divisible properties. According to Aristotle, “‘Quantum’ means that which is divisible
into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a ‘one’ and a ‘this’. A quantum is a
plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is measurable. ‘Plurality’ means that which is divisible
potentially into non-continuous parts, ‘magnitude’ that which is divisible into continuous parts”
(Metaphysics, Book 5, Part 13; classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.5.v.html). The idea that
measurability only refers to continuous quantities is désuet today.
27 Examples of such pluralism are not limited only to the human sciences. A well-known case from
the physical sciences is about mechanical phenomena, for which Newtonian and relativistic
mechanics are studied and operationally used, even though for some aspects they are incompatible
(e.g., the speed of light in vacuum is relative in the former and constant in the latter). The justification of this multiplicity is pragmatic: at nonrelativistic speeds the two theories basically provide
the same results, and Newtonian mechanics is simpler than relativistic mechanics.
4.5 A preliminary synthesis: model-dependent realism
Realism is also sometimes misperceived as necessarily entailing a commitment
to the possibility of absolute truth, or the position that there exists one true and
complete description of the way the world really is. Particularly in the human sciences, this position is sometimes associated with an unflattering portrait of logical
positivism or other forms of empiricism, and contrasted with non-realist or antirealist views such as social constructionism or postmodernism (see Haig, 2014: Preface).
In the context of human sciences, the assumption that properties of objects must
objectively exist in order to be measurable is often interpreted as implying a form of
physical reductionism, and more specifically that the properties are exhaustively
definable in biological (e.g., neurophysiological) terms; it is sometimes further concluded that there must exist a genetically determined basis for variation in the property. Such claims may evoke a negative reaction from many scholars familiar with,
for example, the controversial history of intelligence testing and its association with
race and institutional racism (see Nisbett et al., 2012, for a recent review).
Of course, realism in general need not be associated with physical reductionism,
and in fact the broad consensus among contemporary realist philosophers and philosophers of mind is that mental phenomena (properties, states, events, etc.) are no
less a part of reality than physical phenomena (see in particular Dennett, 1991; Kim,
1998; Searle, 1992; see also Footnote 3 in Chap. 2). Perhaps even more importantly,
realism need not be associated with a commitment to the possibility of absolute
truth, nor do most contemporary philosophers formulate realist claims in this way.
For example, Hilary Putnam (1985, 1990, 1994), whose outlook was broadly realist
throughout his career, argued that there are simply too many ways in which beliefs
and symbols can be mapped onto the world for it to be plausible that there could be
a single best description of the way the world is. As an example from the human
sciences, it is often the case that there are many possible ways to describe psychological phenomena that are equally consistent with all available empirical data, but
are inconsistent: for example, it can be shown that variation in personality
characteristics as evaluated by a given set of responses to survey items is equally
consistent with a model that describes personality in terms of a typology (that is, in
terms of a set of classes) and a model that describes personality in terms of continuous dimensions (e.g., Molenaar & Von Eye, 1994, cited in Borsboom, 2005).
27
As a
that such physical properties are only approximately measurable. This has to do with the traditional
distinction of quantities as either pluralities (or multitudes) or magnitudes, i.e., discretely or continuously divisible properties. According to Aristotle, “‘Quantum’ means that which is divisible
into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a ‘one’ and a ‘this’. A quantum is a
plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is measurable. ‘Plurality’ means that which is divisible
potentially into non-continuous parts, ‘magnitude’ that which is divisible into continuous parts”
(Metaphysics, Book 5, Part 13; classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.5.v.html). The idea that
measurability only refers to continuous quantities is désuet today.
27 Examples of such pluralism are not limited only to the human sciences. A well-known case from
the physical sciences is about mechanical phenomena, for which Newtonian and relativistic
mechanics are studied and operationally used, even though for some aspects they are incompatible
(e.g., the speed of light in vacuum is relative in the former and constant in the latter). The justification of this multiplicity is pragmatic: at nonrelativistic speeds the two theories basically provide
the same results, and Newtonian mechanics is simpler than relativistic mechanics.
4.5 A preliminary synthesis: model-dependent realism