102
separate but related point, it would seem to be a fairly straightforward observation
that the meanings of terms about human beings, in both informal and formal discourse, are indexed to particular sociohistorical conditions; for example, the meaning of a term such as “nursing competence” is likely to change over time (as new
medical technologies are developed, social expectations and roles of hospital staff
change, etc.), and from one geographical region to another, and even from one hospital ward to another (Maul, 2013). Similar comments could clearly be made about
reading comprehension ability, as new kinds of texts and modes of interacting with
texts are constantly being developed and introduced.
Scholars such as Jane Loevinger (1957) and Samuel Messick (1989) formulated
versions of constructive realism that allow for the idea that properties measured by
educational and psychological tests are, to an important extent, defined by socially,
culturally, and historically situated perspectives and concerns, as well as current
theories of cognition, all of which may vary over time, and between different stakeholders at any given time.
28
An example of a philosophical framework that is consistent with such a view is found in Putnam’s later (2000) writings on pragmatic
realism (also termed natural realism), which acknowledges that conceptual pluralism is not at odds with realism, but rather, “to use a Wittgensteinian idiom, seeing is
always seeing as, and it is the interface between the world and the rich fabric of our
concepts that jointly determines what we see” (Putnam, 2000: p. 20). On such an
account, the existence of objective reality is not denied, but neither is it thought to
be directly presented to our senses; instead, our conceptual and linguistic schemes
and frameworks—both informally and formally via models—actively shape our
experiences and frame our knowledge of the world. Thus we organize and prioritize
experience in a particular way, leading to the privileging of particular contrast
classes, descriptive groupings, levels of explanation, and linguistic devices, and
calling attention to specific observable facts, all of which might have been different
for another observer or community of observers.
In the field of educational measurement, a sophisticated version of this position
has recently been developed by Robert Mislevy (2018), who describes how withinperson resources (e.g., developed forms of knowledge and skills) develop around
between-person regularities in individuals’ environments and experiences, then
framing the challenge of human measurement in terms of assessing individuals’
resources for engaging with high- level “linguistic, cultural, and substantive patterns” (p. 3)—which are real, albeit complex, features of the world—using data
derived at the mid-level of personal experiences, which in turn are either approxi28 As was briefly discussed in Sect. 4.3.2, one interpretation of the term “construct” as used in the
human sciences is that it refers to a property that is in some sense constructed by us. As discussed
by Earl Babbie (2013: p. 167), in reference to Kaplan’s (1964) seminal analysis: “concepts such as
compassion and prejudice are … created from your conception of them, my conception of them,
and the conceptions of all those who have ever used these terms. They cannot be observed directly
or indirectly, because they don’t exist. We made them up” (p. 168). As is argued in this section,
however, it is fallacious to infer from the observation that we “made up” a property that its referents do not exist.
4 Philosophical perspectives on measurement
separate but related point, it would seem to be a fairly straightforward observation
that the meanings of terms about human beings, in both informal and formal discourse, are indexed to particular sociohistorical conditions; for example, the meaning of a term such as “nursing competence” is likely to change over time (as new
medical technologies are developed, social expectations and roles of hospital staff
change, etc.), and from one geographical region to another, and even from one hospital ward to another (Maul, 2013). Similar comments could clearly be made about
reading comprehension ability, as new kinds of texts and modes of interacting with
texts are constantly being developed and introduced.
Scholars such as Jane Loevinger (1957) and Samuel Messick (1989) formulated
versions of constructive realism that allow for the idea that properties measured by
educational and psychological tests are, to an important extent, defined by socially,
culturally, and historically situated perspectives and concerns, as well as current
theories of cognition, all of which may vary over time, and between different stakeholders at any given time.
28
An example of a philosophical framework that is consistent with such a view is found in Putnam’s later (2000) writings on pragmatic
realism (also termed natural realism), which acknowledges that conceptual pluralism is not at odds with realism, but rather, “to use a Wittgensteinian idiom, seeing is
always seeing as, and it is the interface between the world and the rich fabric of our
concepts that jointly determines what we see” (Putnam, 2000: p. 20). On such an
account, the existence of objective reality is not denied, but neither is it thought to
be directly presented to our senses; instead, our conceptual and linguistic schemes
and frameworks—both informally and formally via models—actively shape our
experiences and frame our knowledge of the world. Thus we organize and prioritize
experience in a particular way, leading to the privileging of particular contrast
classes, descriptive groupings, levels of explanation, and linguistic devices, and
calling attention to specific observable facts, all of which might have been different
for another observer or community of observers.
In the field of educational measurement, a sophisticated version of this position
has recently been developed by Robert Mislevy (2018), who describes how withinperson resources (e.g., developed forms of knowledge and skills) develop around
between-person regularities in individuals’ environments and experiences, then
framing the challenge of human measurement in terms of assessing individuals’
resources for engaging with high- level “linguistic, cultural, and substantive patterns” (p. 3)—which are real, albeit complex, features of the world—using data
derived at the mid-level of personal experiences, which in turn are either approxi28 As was briefly discussed in Sect. 4.3.2, one interpretation of the term “construct” as used in the
human sciences is that it refers to a property that is in some sense constructed by us. As discussed
by Earl Babbie (2013: p. 167), in reference to Kaplan’s (1964) seminal analysis: “concepts such as
compassion and prejudice are … created from your conception of them, my conception of them,
and the conceptions of all those who have ever used these terms. They cannot be observed directly
or indirectly, because they don’t exist. We made them up” (p. 168). As is argued in this section,
however, it is fallacious to infer from the observation that we “made up” a property that its referents do not exist.
4 Philosophical perspectives on measurement