128
13 Developing a Radiological and Nuclear Interdiction Network
more important due to the truncated timeline. Thus, when developing an interdiction
network one must consider not only the threat of an RDD or nuclear weapon brought
into the city from outside, but also the possibility that a source might be obtained
from a location within the city limits. Having said that, it seems safe to assume that a
nuclear device would originate outside the city since these weapons are not normally
stored in urban areas.
13.2.1 Interdiction for Sources Obtained Within the City
Interdicting radioactive sources that are stolen from within the city can be difficult; it requires securing the sources against theft as well as possible and installing
alarm systems to alert Security and law enforcement forces so that they can react
quickly to prevent the source from leaving the building in which it is stored. This
can include installing cameras, intrusion detection devices, radiation detectors, and
the like, transmitting alarms to one or more central locations (e.g. Security office,
the local police station, etc.).
Having security systems is a good start, but they are insufficient unless facility
Security forces and/or the local law enforcement personnel can respond to alarms
quickly and appropriately. This was the reason for the training provided at Oak Ridge,
to give these two groups the opportunity to not only respond to alarms in an exercise
setting, but to also have the opportunity to train together to better coordinate their
response.
It is also important for those who own high-activity sources to examine their
existing source security systems and procedures to ensure their sources are adequately
protected; if sources are adequately protected against theft then a response will
not be necessary. The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
helped to develop a series of tools—checklists and self-audit forms, for example—to
assist organizations with high-activity radioactive sources to determine if they are
adequately protected and actions that can be taken to help better secure them [7].
More recently, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission developed similar guidance
for radioactive materials licensees [10].
13.2.2 Interdiction for Sources Obtained Outside the City
Trying to interdict radioactive or nuclear materials being transported into a city from
elsewhere poses challenges as well [3]. Consider, for example, a scenario in which
a radioactive source is reported as having been stolen from a facility in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. Major cities close to Harrisburg include Washington DC, New York
City, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. Between Harrisburg and these four cities is about
1000 km of highway and several thousand km of secondary roads; the area through
which the source might be transported or hidden is over 50,000 km
2 .
13 Developing a Radiological and Nuclear Interdiction Network
more important due to the truncated timeline. Thus, when developing an interdiction
network one must consider not only the threat of an RDD or nuclear weapon brought
into the city from outside, but also the possibility that a source might be obtained
from a location within the city limits. Having said that, it seems safe to assume that a
nuclear device would originate outside the city since these weapons are not normally
stored in urban areas.
13.2.1 Interdiction for Sources Obtained Within the City
Interdicting radioactive sources that are stolen from within the city can be difficult; it requires securing the sources against theft as well as possible and installing
alarm systems to alert Security and law enforcement forces so that they can react
quickly to prevent the source from leaving the building in which it is stored. This
can include installing cameras, intrusion detection devices, radiation detectors, and
the like, transmitting alarms to one or more central locations (e.g. Security office,
the local police station, etc.).
Having security systems is a good start, but they are insufficient unless facility
Security forces and/or the local law enforcement personnel can respond to alarms
quickly and appropriately. This was the reason for the training provided at Oak Ridge,
to give these two groups the opportunity to not only respond to alarms in an exercise
setting, but to also have the opportunity to train together to better coordinate their
response.
It is also important for those who own high-activity sources to examine their
existing source security systems and procedures to ensure their sources are adequately
protected; if sources are adequately protected against theft then a response will
not be necessary. The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
helped to develop a series of tools—checklists and self-audit forms, for example—to
assist organizations with high-activity radioactive sources to determine if they are
adequately protected and actions that can be taken to help better secure them [7].
More recently, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission developed similar guidance
for radioactive materials licensees [10].
13.2.2 Interdiction for Sources Obtained Outside the City
Trying to interdict radioactive or nuclear materials being transported into a city from
elsewhere poses challenges as well [3]. Consider, for example, a scenario in which
a radioactive source is reported as having been stolen from a facility in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. Major cities close to Harrisburg include Washington DC, New York
City, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. Between Harrisburg and these four cities is about
1000 km of highway and several thousand km of secondary roads; the area through
which the source might be transported or hidden is over 50,000 km
2 .