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12 Societal Effects of a Nuclear Attack
Emergency responders who find themselves or their precinct or station house
within the footprint of the plume will be unable to respond until radiation dose
rates drop to safe levels; the responders can determine this themselves if they have
appropriate radiation detectors and are trained in their use or they can shelter until
they are told that it is safe to evacuate. Either way it will be important for them
to communicate their status—including their health—periodically to their chain of
command.
The effect of lack of access to these areas is difficult to predict since the areas to
which access is restricted cannot be known in advance of an attack, thus there is no
way to predict what might lie within those areas. For example, if these areas contain
critical emergency management and communications facilities then the short-term
response to the attack might be hampered at a time when organized leadership is
most important. If these areas include major medical centers then the city’s medical
response will be impaired; if crucial transportation arteries are cut then it might be
difficult or impossible to move people, responders, or supplies around the city. To
this last point, one discussion that took place during the New York City IND exercise
was on the topic of using fire boats to wash contamination from the deck of the
George Washington Bridge and from the bridges across the East River to facilitate
safe evacuations from Manhattan.
An important early task will be to delineate those areas that are unsafe to enter or
in which entry is not possible due to physical damage to the city, and the manner in
which these areas change with time. In fact, knowing the outlines of the radiological
“no-go” areas will be an important part of each day’s activities so that responders
understand where they can (and cannot) operate as they attempt to stabilize affected
parts of the city, to evacuate the public, and to extend the areas within which they
can safely operate.
After the emergency phase ends it will be necessary to determine the criteria
needed to restore access to and to reoccupy areas contaminated by fallout.
These criteria—radiation dose rate, contamination levels, anticipated dose to residents, concerns about resuspended contamination, and so forth—are likely to be
contentious, with many stakeholders demanding cleanup to pre-attack background
radiation levels before considering reoccupancy and others recommending cleanup
standards based on the risk posed by residual contaminants. A third option would
involve limiting access to contaminated areas and letting them decay to background
over the course of years or decades, and yet another option might combine aspects
of all of these—remediating the most essential areas, restoring limited access to
others, and restricting access to still other areas until they decay to pre-attack levels
of radiation. Each of these possibilities represents an attempt to balance the radiological and other risks against the short- and long-term economic, health, political,
and social impacts on a large number and variety of stakeholders, some of whom will
understand the relevant radiation science and most of whom will not. Thus, restoring
access to areas restricted on account of physical damage and contamination is likely
to be a controversial process that might take years to resolve to the satisfaction of all
stakeholders.
12 Societal Effects of a Nuclear Attack
Emergency responders who find themselves or their precinct or station house
within the footprint of the plume will be unable to respond until radiation dose
rates drop to safe levels; the responders can determine this themselves if they have
appropriate radiation detectors and are trained in their use or they can shelter until
they are told that it is safe to evacuate. Either way it will be important for them
to communicate their status—including their health—periodically to their chain of
command.
The effect of lack of access to these areas is difficult to predict since the areas to
which access is restricted cannot be known in advance of an attack, thus there is no
way to predict what might lie within those areas. For example, if these areas contain
critical emergency management and communications facilities then the short-term
response to the attack might be hampered at a time when organized leadership is
most important. If these areas include major medical centers then the city’s medical
response will be impaired; if crucial transportation arteries are cut then it might be
difficult or impossible to move people, responders, or supplies around the city. To
this last point, one discussion that took place during the New York City IND exercise
was on the topic of using fire boats to wash contamination from the deck of the
George Washington Bridge and from the bridges across the East River to facilitate
safe evacuations from Manhattan.
An important early task will be to delineate those areas that are unsafe to enter or
in which entry is not possible due to physical damage to the city, and the manner in
which these areas change with time. In fact, knowing the outlines of the radiological
“no-go” areas will be an important part of each day’s activities so that responders
understand where they can (and cannot) operate as they attempt to stabilize affected
parts of the city, to evacuate the public, and to extend the areas within which they
can safely operate.
After the emergency phase ends it will be necessary to determine the criteria
needed to restore access to and to reoccupy areas contaminated by fallout.
These criteria—radiation dose rate, contamination levels, anticipated dose to residents, concerns about resuspended contamination, and so forth—are likely to be
contentious, with many stakeholders demanding cleanup to pre-attack background
radiation levels before considering reoccupancy and others recommending cleanup
standards based on the risk posed by residual contaminants. A third option would
involve limiting access to contaminated areas and letting them decay to background
over the course of years or decades, and yet another option might combine aspects
of all of these—remediating the most essential areas, restoring limited access to
others, and restricting access to still other areas until they decay to pre-attack levels
of radiation. Each of these possibilities represents an attempt to balance the radiological and other risks against the short- and long-term economic, health, political,
and social impacts on a large number and variety of stakeholders, some of whom will
understand the relevant radiation science and most of whom will not. Thus, restoring
access to areas restricted on account of physical damage and contamination is likely
to be a controversial process that might take years to resolve to the satisfaction of all
stakeholders.