within a single company – for example Siemens, which manufactures both wind
turbines and conventional turbines for coal and gas power plants.
Overall, much of the process by which policy-makers shape the institutions that
govern the energy system is effectively a balancing act between the perceived
interests of energy users with those of energy provider incumbents (Peltzman, 1976).
This is what makes a sustainable energy transition so challenging, because policymakers have to find some way of managing this balance through a process of pro -
found change.
This framework is very general. The actors and relationships in any actual case
will depend on the institutional context. For example, in many OECD (Organ -
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, the energy sector
has been liberalized, and incumbents are large (often multinational) private cor -
porations. In countries like China and India, most energy companies remain stateowned, giving their relationships with policy-makers a different quality. There
will also be differences in the relationship between policy-makers and energy
users, determined especially by differences in the nature of politics between coun -
tries. This can apply even between countries with apparently very similar polities.
For example, Germany and the UK are both mature European democ racies, but
Germany’s proportional representation electoral system means that environmentally minded voters have enjoyed much stronger political representation
through its Green Party, whereas in the UK the first-past-the-post system prevents
this, and the route to influencing policy goes via environmental campaign organ -
izations. In non-democratic systems, such as China’s, the relationship between
political elites and mass publics is obviously different again, as political pressure comes
not through voting but through different kinds of demands from a range of actors,
from urban communities protesting about pollution, to local governments seeking
to maximize economic growth (Lampton, 2014). However, even in authoritarian
China, ensuring that energy is available at an affordable cost will still be a major
concern of political elites (e.g. Yuan and Zuo, 2011a).
Feedback effects and renewable energy policies
Policy feedback effects
The idea that policies can have political effects is now a well-established idea in
political science, with a number of applications in areas such as welfare and
pensions policy (e.g. Béland, 2010). As Skocpol puts it, ‘Policies not only flow
from prior institutions and politics; they also reshape institutions and politics, making
some future developments more likely, and hindering the possibilities for others’
(quoted in Patashnik and Zelizer, 2009, p1).
In a classic essay on such effects, Pierson (1993) distinguishes a number of
potential routes for such effects. One is that policies distribute resources and create
material incentives, which can work to create or strengthen particular social interest
groups: ‘Public policies often create “spoils” that provide a strong motivation for
Political dynamics of green transformations 89
turbines and conventional turbines for coal and gas power plants.
Overall, much of the process by which policy-makers shape the institutions that
govern the energy system is effectively a balancing act between the perceived
interests of energy users with those of energy provider incumbents (Peltzman, 1976).
This is what makes a sustainable energy transition so challenging, because policymakers have to find some way of managing this balance through a process of pro -
found change.
This framework is very general. The actors and relationships in any actual case
will depend on the institutional context. For example, in many OECD (Organ -
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, the energy sector
has been liberalized, and incumbents are large (often multinational) private cor -
porations. In countries like China and India, most energy companies remain stateowned, giving their relationships with policy-makers a different quality. There
will also be differences in the relationship between policy-makers and energy
users, determined especially by differences in the nature of politics between coun -
tries. This can apply even between countries with apparently very similar polities.
For example, Germany and the UK are both mature European democ racies, but
Germany’s proportional representation electoral system means that environmentally minded voters have enjoyed much stronger political representation
through its Green Party, whereas in the UK the first-past-the-post system prevents
this, and the route to influencing policy goes via environmental campaign organ -
izations. In non-democratic systems, such as China’s, the relationship between
political elites and mass publics is obviously different again, as political pressure comes
not through voting but through different kinds of demands from a range of actors,
from urban communities protesting about pollution, to local governments seeking
to maximize economic growth (Lampton, 2014). However, even in authoritarian
China, ensuring that energy is available at an affordable cost will still be a major
concern of political elites (e.g. Yuan and Zuo, 2011a).
Feedback effects and renewable energy policies
Policy feedback effects
The idea that policies can have political effects is now a well-established idea in
political science, with a number of applications in areas such as welfare and
pensions policy (e.g. Béland, 2010). As Skocpol puts it, ‘Policies not only flow
from prior institutions and politics; they also reshape institutions and politics, making
some future developments more likely, and hindering the possibilities for others’
(quoted in Patashnik and Zelizer, 2009, p1).
In a classic essay on such effects, Pierson (1993) distinguishes a number of
potential routes for such effects. One is that policies distribute resources and create
material incentives, which can work to create or strengthen particular social interest
groups: ‘Public policies often create “spoils” that provide a strong motivation for
Political dynamics of green transformations 89