beneficiaries to mobilize in favor of programmatic maintenance or expansion’
(Pierson, 1993, p599). Second, policies can also transform state capacities and institu -
tions, changing the administrative possibilities for government initiatives in the future
and affecting later prospects for policy implementation. For example, policies that
involve the collection or generation of new types of information then make possible
other kinds of policies dependent on that information.
Most importantly, feedback effects can work via what Pierson calls the ‘mass
public’, transforming the interests, identity and political participation of large
groups of people. For example, the introduction of social security in the US created
the conditions for the invention of a new social category (‘retired people’) and the
formation of the politically powerful American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP). Another important mass public policy feedback effect can occur where
a policy induces large numbers of people to make commitments or investments
that it subsequently becomes ‘both expensive and politically perilous’ (Béland,
2010, p575) to reverse, thereby ‘locking in’ the policy decision (see also Pierson,
1993, p610).
As well as the allocation of material or political resources, there are also what
Pierson calls ‘interpretive effects’ (1993, p611), where policies may produce ‘cues’
for parts of the electorate that ‘help them develop political identities, goals, and
strategies’ (ibid., p619). Particular policies can become iconic of particular political
approaches and help mobilize support for or opposition to that approach, above
and beyond any material effect. Given the complexity of modern life, policies can
generate ‘focusing events’ or cues for social actors, but in that process also ‘heighten
the visibility of some social and political connections while obscuring others’.
Much of the policy feedback literature has tended to focus on cases of positive
feedback, not least because it is in these cases that policies become successfully
entrenched. As Pierson (2000, p259) notes, positive policy feedback is one of the
drivers of increasing returns in politics, which by analogy from economics (e.g. Arthur,
1989) creates the lock-in noted above. Increasing returns also make political processes path-dependent, in the sense that small details of policy design or institu tional
context will lead to rapidly diverging paths if one involves positive feedback and the
other does not. By contrast, negative political feedback effects undermine policies and
limit their transformative reach (Pierson, 1993, p600; Béland, 2010, p575). This is
particularly important for understanding the political dynamics of attempted green
transformations, since such transformations often involve additional financial costs
and challenges to vested interests, which can quickly create oppo sition.
Overall, whether and how quickly transformation occurs depends on the
balance of positive and negative effects, whether policies can be amended to improve
that balance, or indeed whether new and more transformative policies are feasible
(Weaver, 2010, p138). Where policies have strongly positive feedback effects they
become successfully locked in, but where there are both potential negative and
positive feedbacks there can be a ‘snakes and ladders’ pattern whereby what appear
to be similar policies can diverge according to which feedback effect dominates
(Weaver, 2010).
90 Matthew Lockwood
(Pierson, 1993, p599). Second, policies can also transform state capacities and institu -
tions, changing the administrative possibilities for government initiatives in the future
and affecting later prospects for policy implementation. For example, policies that
involve the collection or generation of new types of information then make possible
other kinds of policies dependent on that information.
Most importantly, feedback effects can work via what Pierson calls the ‘mass
public’, transforming the interests, identity and political participation of large
groups of people. For example, the introduction of social security in the US created
the conditions for the invention of a new social category (‘retired people’) and the
formation of the politically powerful American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP). Another important mass public policy feedback effect can occur where
a policy induces large numbers of people to make commitments or investments
that it subsequently becomes ‘both expensive and politically perilous’ (Béland,
2010, p575) to reverse, thereby ‘locking in’ the policy decision (see also Pierson,
1993, p610).
As well as the allocation of material or political resources, there are also what
Pierson calls ‘interpretive effects’ (1993, p611), where policies may produce ‘cues’
for parts of the electorate that ‘help them develop political identities, goals, and
strategies’ (ibid., p619). Particular policies can become iconic of particular political
approaches and help mobilize support for or opposition to that approach, above
and beyond any material effect. Given the complexity of modern life, policies can
generate ‘focusing events’ or cues for social actors, but in that process also ‘heighten
the visibility of some social and political connections while obscuring others’.
Much of the policy feedback literature has tended to focus on cases of positive
feedback, not least because it is in these cases that policies become successfully
entrenched. As Pierson (2000, p259) notes, positive policy feedback is one of the
drivers of increasing returns in politics, which by analogy from economics (e.g. Arthur,
1989) creates the lock-in noted above. Increasing returns also make political processes path-dependent, in the sense that small details of policy design or institu tional
context will lead to rapidly diverging paths if one involves positive feedback and the
other does not. By contrast, negative political feedback effects undermine policies and
limit their transformative reach (Pierson, 1993, p600; Béland, 2010, p575). This is
particularly important for understanding the political dynamics of attempted green
transformations, since such transformations often involve additional financial costs
and challenges to vested interests, which can quickly create oppo sition.
Overall, whether and how quickly transformation occurs depends on the
balance of positive and negative effects, whether policies can be amended to improve
that balance, or indeed whether new and more transformative policies are feasible
(Weaver, 2010, p138). Where policies have strongly positive feedback effects they
become successfully locked in, but where there are both potential negative and
positive feedbacks there can be a ‘snakes and ladders’ pattern whereby what appear
to be similar policies can diverge according to which feedback effect dominates
(Weaver, 2010).
90 Matthew Lockwood