Greece 183
but may also lead to foreseeable negative outcomes (consequential risks). Using
the same MCGDM methodology, a different, more diverse group of ten stakeholders was interviewed in order to elicit their knowledge and assess the risks
themselves, this time against specific evaluation criteria. The engaged expert
group comprised of three policymakers from the Ministry of Environment and
Energy (also included in the first stakeholder engagement process), two researchers, one representative of the financial sector, one representative of electric utilities and regulators, one member of associations involved in the provision of GHG
emissions, and two technology suppliers (including manufacturers and importers).
This process gave us a good overview of how different experts perceive the underlying implementation and consequential risks, providing us with insights into
which of these risks appear to be more critical for the successful promotion of a
sustainable transition pathway. Furthermore, this analysis was used to complement
a fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM) approach (Nikas and Doukas, 2016) for determining, from the experts’ perspective, the policy focus that appears to be most
robust, the findings of which are also discussed.
Context: an uncertain environment
The policy framework in Greece is uncertain per se: an overview of the past
pathway indicates that, as far as energy efficiency is concerned, the country has
seen significant delays in adopting European directives into the national policy
framework. After the early determination of thermal insulation requirements for
buildings in 1979, the first notable policy in the country was the late adoption of
the 1993 EU directive on limiting carbon emissions by improving energy efficiency
(in 1998). Respectively, National Law 3661/2008 brought Directive 2002/91/EC
into effect by defining minimum energy performance requirements, introducing
energy performance certificates and referring to qualified and accredited energy
inspectors. It was amended in 2010 so as to provide for the gradual implementation of energy management systems in all public buildings. Although the adoption
of the Regulation on the Energy Performance of Buildings (KENAK) in 2010 is
considered to have set a milestone in national energy efficiency policy – and has
since been updated based on European regulatory advancements – it was the
belated Law 4342/2015 that adopted the Union’s 2020 objectives (Directive
2012/27/EU). This record of significant delays in adopting European directives
into the national policy framework can itself be considered as an uncertainty for
future developments in both energy and climate policy.
On the micro- generation front, which could prove instrumental in accomplishing renewable energy targets and is included in energy efficiency improvement programmes, large investments took place in a period of strong fiscal
incentives for boosting solar power development (2008–2012). This eventually
led to an excessive burden on the operator. Due to the ever- growing deficit, the
government proceeded with a 12.5% cut in the support scheme for solar installations commissioned after February 2012 and a larger (44%) cut on feed- in
but may also lead to foreseeable negative outcomes (consequential risks). Using
the same MCGDM methodology, a different, more diverse group of ten stakeholders was interviewed in order to elicit their knowledge and assess the risks
themselves, this time against specific evaluation criteria. The engaged expert
group comprised of three policymakers from the Ministry of Environment and
Energy (also included in the first stakeholder engagement process), two researchers, one representative of the financial sector, one representative of electric utilities and regulators, one member of associations involved in the provision of GHG
emissions, and two technology suppliers (including manufacturers and importers).
This process gave us a good overview of how different experts perceive the underlying implementation and consequential risks, providing us with insights into
which of these risks appear to be more critical for the successful promotion of a
sustainable transition pathway. Furthermore, this analysis was used to complement
a fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM) approach (Nikas and Doukas, 2016) for determining, from the experts’ perspective, the policy focus that appears to be most
robust, the findings of which are also discussed.
Context: an uncertain environment
The policy framework in Greece is uncertain per se: an overview of the past
pathway indicates that, as far as energy efficiency is concerned, the country has
seen significant delays in adopting European directives into the national policy
framework. After the early determination of thermal insulation requirements for
buildings in 1979, the first notable policy in the country was the late adoption of
the 1993 EU directive on limiting carbon emissions by improving energy efficiency
(in 1998). Respectively, National Law 3661/2008 brought Directive 2002/91/EC
into effect by defining minimum energy performance requirements, introducing
energy performance certificates and referring to qualified and accredited energy
inspectors. It was amended in 2010 so as to provide for the gradual implementation of energy management systems in all public buildings. Although the adoption
of the Regulation on the Energy Performance of Buildings (KENAK) in 2010 is
considered to have set a milestone in national energy efficiency policy – and has
since been updated based on European regulatory advancements – it was the
belated Law 4342/2015 that adopted the Union’s 2020 objectives (Directive
2012/27/EU). This record of significant delays in adopting European directives
into the national policy framework can itself be considered as an uncertainty for
future developments in both energy and climate policy.
On the micro- generation front, which could prove instrumental in accomplishing renewable energy targets and is included in energy efficiency improvement programmes, large investments took place in a period of strong fiscal
incentives for boosting solar power development (2008–2012). This eventually
led to an excessive burden on the operator. Due to the ever- growing deficit, the
government proceeded with a 12.5% cut in the support scheme for solar installations commissioned after February 2012 and a larger (44%) cut on feed- in