84 Rocío Alvarez-Tinoco et al.
effects for nuclear power. Brexit was also recognised by the great majority of
stakeholders as a major driver of uncertainty for renewable electricity production in the UK. Brexit- related uncertainties are most importantly related to
investment, doubts about the robustness of the UK’s mitigation commitments,
exit from the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), and more difficult
relationships with European partners.
Conclusions
The choice of focusing on nuclear power for the UK case study was based on the
strong commitment of the UK government to new nuclear as a major component of its climate mitigation strategy, when no other EU member state has
made commitments greater than marginal further nuclear construction. If the
UK government is successful in pursuing this strategy there could, however, be
significant implications for mitigation policies in many other countries. The two
pathways investigated – involving, respectively, a very high rate of nuclear construction and an abandonment of nuclear power – were deliberately framed as
possible ‘extremes’ in relation to the future of mitigation in the UK, though
both have credible storylines.
Our results have limitations, partly because our stakeholder sample was
skewed towards academics with relatively limited consultation of other stakeholders. The need for strict stakeholder anonymity (especially stressed by industry participants) also means that we cannot report attributions of particular
stakeholder views to stakeholder categories. Nevertheless, it is striking that in
relation to assessment of several of the risks considered, there was a high degree
of consensus about the existence and seriousness of risks across stakeholders
with widely differing interests and views. A good example is the related risks of
high cost and problematic financing that could affect both a high nuclear and a
no nuclear pathway – a serious risk expressed by a large majority of stakeholders.
Stakeholders also often showed substantial agreement on the most effective
actions that could mitigate several of the risks. These included greater publicsector commitment to technology and skill development and the need to avoid
conflict between different spheres of policy and regulation at sub- national,
national, and international levels.
Both pathways were shown to have significant risks attached, often
common to both pathways. However, it was clear that stakeholder views suggested that the 40 GW nuclear pathway had particularly difficult risks attached
to it, involving large and controversial state and consumer funding. Recent
developments, including very high nuclear costs, slow progress in nuclear construction, and regulatory problems associated with Brexit tend to give external
confirmation of the severity of risks to a high nuclear future. However, UK
government sees the need to support new nuclear as an option in case no
better and credible technological alternatives emerge (e.g. low- cost tidal and
biomass and full development and deployment of CCS) to reduce risk and
uncertainty for energy security if heat, transportation, and industry would be
effects for nuclear power. Brexit was also recognised by the great majority of
stakeholders as a major driver of uncertainty for renewable electricity production in the UK. Brexit- related uncertainties are most importantly related to
investment, doubts about the robustness of the UK’s mitigation commitments,
exit from the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), and more difficult
relationships with European partners.
Conclusions
The choice of focusing on nuclear power for the UK case study was based on the
strong commitment of the UK government to new nuclear as a major component of its climate mitigation strategy, when no other EU member state has
made commitments greater than marginal further nuclear construction. If the
UK government is successful in pursuing this strategy there could, however, be
significant implications for mitigation policies in many other countries. The two
pathways investigated – involving, respectively, a very high rate of nuclear construction and an abandonment of nuclear power – were deliberately framed as
possible ‘extremes’ in relation to the future of mitigation in the UK, though
both have credible storylines.
Our results have limitations, partly because our stakeholder sample was
skewed towards academics with relatively limited consultation of other stakeholders. The need for strict stakeholder anonymity (especially stressed by industry participants) also means that we cannot report attributions of particular
stakeholder views to stakeholder categories. Nevertheless, it is striking that in
relation to assessment of several of the risks considered, there was a high degree
of consensus about the existence and seriousness of risks across stakeholders
with widely differing interests and views. A good example is the related risks of
high cost and problematic financing that could affect both a high nuclear and a
no nuclear pathway – a serious risk expressed by a large majority of stakeholders.
Stakeholders also often showed substantial agreement on the most effective
actions that could mitigate several of the risks. These included greater publicsector commitment to technology and skill development and the need to avoid
conflict between different spheres of policy and regulation at sub- national,
national, and international levels.
Both pathways were shown to have significant risks attached, often
common to both pathways. However, it was clear that stakeholder views suggested that the 40 GW nuclear pathway had particularly difficult risks attached
to it, involving large and controversial state and consumer funding. Recent
developments, including very high nuclear costs, slow progress in nuclear construction, and regulatory problems associated with Brexit tend to give external
confirmation of the severity of risks to a high nuclear future. However, UK
government sees the need to support new nuclear as an option in case no
better and credible technological alternatives emerge (e.g. low- cost tidal and
biomass and full development and deployment of CCS) to reduce risk and
uncertainty for energy security if heat, transportation, and industry would be