8.2 Modern Space Weapons: Technical Possibilities and Limitations
763
The fact that separate types of these weapons are referred to as non-lethal, which
is stated below, shall not misguide the reader—these are actually modern (and
promising) weapons aimed primarily at humans regardless of their position relative
to the symbolic line of battle.
Moreover, it has been known for a long time that if a new weapon emerges on
one side of this symbolic line, it will sooner or later appear on the other side as well
(arms race).
One of the things that motivated the authors to write this chapter was a somewhat
idealistic hope that some of generals, politicians, diplomats, or government officials
will eventually read it and think about all aspects of this branch of scientific and
technical progress and possible negative issues and will consider these aspects (both
the ones unconditionally useful for the international community and every individual
and the very problematic and even extremely dangerous ones) in future professional
activities.
Another equally (or even more) important component of the general problem of
ensuring reliability of the SBS and layer components in general is the so-called operational reliability, which characterizes the ability to perform programmed combat
functions in any situations and in all operation modes requested by military customers
in the specifications. First of all, this applies to the main function—destruction of the
target—both enemy missiles in any segment of their trajectory and the selected air,
ground (stationary and/or mobile) targets, including small-sized and quickly moving
targets (helicopters, planes), nuclear missile pits and bases, surface ships, places of
supposed location of submarine rocket carriers with ballistic missiles ready to be
launched, etc.
Unfortunately, the subject of operational safety of space layer components has
been fully prohibited for publication since the early 1990s. Simply put, there are a
lot of technical problems and extremely few ways to solve them, while the simplest
technical solutions require huge financial costs that cast doubt on the very possibility
of effective operation of missile defense in general.
Therefore, we present the information below without references to literary sources,
as it was obtained by authors from unofficial sources, as well as a result of personal
contacts of the authors with technical specialists involved in solving this problem,
which occurred during international conferences, workshops, and lectures given by
the authors in specialized study institutions and research institutes and laboratories
of China, India, Germany, France, England, and other countries.
For example, one of the obvious solutions to the problem of increasing operational
reliability is the qualitative improvement of specific weapons deployed on SBS taking
into account the best possible combination of reserve ammunition and rate of fire.
Moreover, while the straightforward to simply increase the reserve ammunition
(number of weapons) on the SBS is a complicated but absolutely achievable task,
it would be much more difficult to extend its rate of fire beyond the possibilities
permitted by the system.
The best possible balance of reserve ammunition and rate of fire depends on
multiple technical parameters of both munitions (weapons) themselves and various
auxiliary components, without which it is impossible to ensure effective operation of
763
The fact that separate types of these weapons are referred to as non-lethal, which
is stated below, shall not misguide the reader—these are actually modern (and
promising) weapons aimed primarily at humans regardless of their position relative
to the symbolic line of battle.
Moreover, it has been known for a long time that if a new weapon emerges on
one side of this symbolic line, it will sooner or later appear on the other side as well
(arms race).
One of the things that motivated the authors to write this chapter was a somewhat
idealistic hope that some of generals, politicians, diplomats, or government officials
will eventually read it and think about all aspects of this branch of scientific and
technical progress and possible negative issues and will consider these aspects (both
the ones unconditionally useful for the international community and every individual
and the very problematic and even extremely dangerous ones) in future professional
activities.
Another equally (or even more) important component of the general problem of
ensuring reliability of the SBS and layer components in general is the so-called operational reliability, which characterizes the ability to perform programmed combat
functions in any situations and in all operation modes requested by military customers
in the specifications. First of all, this applies to the main function—destruction of the
target—both enemy missiles in any segment of their trajectory and the selected air,
ground (stationary and/or mobile) targets, including small-sized and quickly moving
targets (helicopters, planes), nuclear missile pits and bases, surface ships, places of
supposed location of submarine rocket carriers with ballistic missiles ready to be
launched, etc.
Unfortunately, the subject of operational safety of space layer components has
been fully prohibited for publication since the early 1990s. Simply put, there are a
lot of technical problems and extremely few ways to solve them, while the simplest
technical solutions require huge financial costs that cast doubt on the very possibility
of effective operation of missile defense in general.
Therefore, we present the information below without references to literary sources,
as it was obtained by authors from unofficial sources, as well as a result of personal
contacts of the authors with technical specialists involved in solving this problem,
which occurred during international conferences, workshops, and lectures given by
the authors in specialized study institutions and research institutes and laboratories
of China, India, Germany, France, England, and other countries.
For example, one of the obvious solutions to the problem of increasing operational
reliability is the qualitative improvement of specific weapons deployed on SBS taking
into account the best possible combination of reserve ammunition and rate of fire.
Moreover, while the straightforward to simply increase the reserve ammunition
(number of weapons) on the SBS is a complicated but absolutely achievable task,
it would be much more difficult to extend its rate of fire beyond the possibilities
permitted by the system.
The best possible balance of reserve ammunition and rate of fire depends on
multiple technical parameters of both munitions (weapons) themselves and various
auxiliary components, without which it is impossible to ensure effective operation of