764
8 Modern Weapons: Possibilities and Limitations
the SBS during the active combat phase. For example, the problem of performance
and quick removal of excess heat energy in the combat mode—as demonstrated
above, none of the weapons of directional energy transfer (including laser and EMR
weapons) described in openly published sources have the sufficient efficiency, and
the vast levels of heat emitted during combat operation (firing) will simply cause
failure of the SBS.
For over 30 years, special laboratories of private institutes in the USA and the
USSR (Russia) have been dealing with the creation of such effective heat removal
systems for space platforms that carry the above weapons; however, according to the
available scattered information, all the tested technical solution with all their significant masses and dimensions currently are not effective enough for this class of tasks.
The situation is further complicated by the obvious factor that the missile defense of
the space layer, which is deployed in space and widely promoted, cannot be tested in
real conditions due to obvious reasons; as American specialists evasively say, there
is considerable uncertainty in quantitative assessments of technical and operational
reliability of SBS and battle platforms, as well as auxiliary means deployed on their
bases.
Another obvious problem is ensuring effective protection of SBS and other orbital
means of missile defense from active countermeasures and direct attacks of the
enemy. Since all battle stations and other necessary components of the space layer
of a missile defense system have significant dimensions and weight (potentially up
to hundreds of tons), they all move in the near-Earth space in constant orbits known
to the enemy in advance; they all are fairly vulnerable to attacks by various (often
exclusively simple and chip) anti-satellite means (one of the possible variants of the
possible response of the Russian Federation to the European ballistic missile defense
deployed by NATO declared by Russian Presidents Putin and Medvedev).
The analysis of vulnerability of both SBS and all space-based layers of the missile
defense system allows us to conclude that any means of such protection will clearly
be expensive in terms of financial costs regardless of the specific technical versions
of provision and will require taking significant weights to space.
Of course, specialists are also developing various low-budget means, including—
maneuvering of SBS and battle platforms on orbit to avoid strikes, special technical masking measures (due to deployment of a branched network of false targets
immediately activating upon an attack on the SBS), etc.
Other known directions of passive protections include equipping space layer of
missile defense with protective shields of various types, the use of special coating
materials, etc.
Another group of protection measures includes development and use of various
intellectual active attack systems that create a “sovereignty area” in this protected
radius; in this case, self-defense means installed on the SBS can destroy any object
that approaches the station closer than the predetermined distance or at a prohibited
speed.
However, another problem emerges here—the problem of limitedness of the limitless space. Actual dimensions of such protective area will increase inevitably with
development of weapons; under certain parameters, they can create serious obstacles
8 Modern Weapons: Possibilities and Limitations
the SBS during the active combat phase. For example, the problem of performance
and quick removal of excess heat energy in the combat mode—as demonstrated
above, none of the weapons of directional energy transfer (including laser and EMR
weapons) described in openly published sources have the sufficient efficiency, and
the vast levels of heat emitted during combat operation (firing) will simply cause
failure of the SBS.
For over 30 years, special laboratories of private institutes in the USA and the
USSR (Russia) have been dealing with the creation of such effective heat removal
systems for space platforms that carry the above weapons; however, according to the
available scattered information, all the tested technical solution with all their significant masses and dimensions currently are not effective enough for this class of tasks.
The situation is further complicated by the obvious factor that the missile defense of
the space layer, which is deployed in space and widely promoted, cannot be tested in
real conditions due to obvious reasons; as American specialists evasively say, there
is considerable uncertainty in quantitative assessments of technical and operational
reliability of SBS and battle platforms, as well as auxiliary means deployed on their
bases.
Another obvious problem is ensuring effective protection of SBS and other orbital
means of missile defense from active countermeasures and direct attacks of the
enemy. Since all battle stations and other necessary components of the space layer
of a missile defense system have significant dimensions and weight (potentially up
to hundreds of tons), they all move in the near-Earth space in constant orbits known
to the enemy in advance; they all are fairly vulnerable to attacks by various (often
exclusively simple and chip) anti-satellite means (one of the possible variants of the
possible response of the Russian Federation to the European ballistic missile defense
deployed by NATO declared by Russian Presidents Putin and Medvedev).
The analysis of vulnerability of both SBS and all space-based layers of the missile
defense system allows us to conclude that any means of such protection will clearly
be expensive in terms of financial costs regardless of the specific technical versions
of provision and will require taking significant weights to space.
Of course, specialists are also developing various low-budget means, including—
maneuvering of SBS and battle platforms on orbit to avoid strikes, special technical masking measures (due to deployment of a branched network of false targets
immediately activating upon an attack on the SBS), etc.
Other known directions of passive protections include equipping space layer of
missile defense with protective shields of various types, the use of special coating
materials, etc.
Another group of protection measures includes development and use of various
intellectual active attack systems that create a “sovereignty area” in this protected
radius; in this case, self-defense means installed on the SBS can destroy any object
that approaches the station closer than the predetermined distance or at a prohibited
speed.
However, another problem emerges here—the problem of limitedness of the limitless space. Actual dimensions of such protective area will increase inevitably with
development of weapons; under certain parameters, they can create serious obstacles