412
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
In this chapter, we have presented design of novel hardware Trojans [244] in
embedded processor that target leaking secret information. These hardware Trojans
can be triggered in field by an intrude by introduction of modifications in the software
or input data. Secret information can be leaked either through processor ports as
logic values or through side channels (e.g., supply current), and the Trojan trigger
conditions can be in diverse forms. The authors [244] have also proposed innovative
circuit-level techniques of designing Trojans and placing them inside a circuit in a way
that effectively evades existing protection mechanisms. Simulation and experimental
results demonstrate that smart design of hardware Trojans can successfully evade
conventional logic testing, thus bypassing side-channel analysis based detection,
e.g., DfS approaches based on on-chip monitors (RO). The Trojan design approaches
presented have been shown effective for both FPGA and ASIC platforms.
4.11 Analytical Review of Basic Techniques for Detection
of Hardware Trojans in Microchips
4.11.1 Introduction
As discussed above, hardware Trojans (malicious modifications or inclusions made
by malevolent third parties) pose major security concerns, especially for those integrated circuits (ICs) and systems used in critical applications and cyberinfrastructure, most significantly in military and space infrastructures. While hardware Trojans
have been largely studied over the last decade, many issues remain unstudied. In this
chapter, using work [259] as a basic one, we review the results of hardware Trojan
research carried out during the last decade. This fundamental review was prepared
by “a combined team” of experienced “hunters for Trojans” of the leading academic
centers, who have been professionally engaged in this issue. In particular, these are
K. Xiao, M. Tehranipoor and S. Bhunia (University of Connecticut), Y. Jin (University of Central Florida), R. Karri (Polytechnic Institute of New York University).
This work was written comparatively not long ago, in September 2015, underwent a
comprehensive examination of the editorial staff in January 2016, was accepted for
publication in March 2016, and finally published in the peer-reviewed journal ACM
Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (issue 22, No. 1) in May
2016.
With the emergence of information technology and its critical role in our daily
lives, the risk of cyberattacks is larger today than ever before. While the battle between
software developers and hackers has raged since the 1980s, the hardware was generally considered to be unexposed to such attacks. However, in the last decade or so,
the increased complexity of the design, fabrication, and distribution of electronics
has caused a shift throughout the industry toward a global business model, thereby
creating new sources of attack. In this global model, various “untrusted” entities
4 Hardware Trojans in Microcircuits
In this chapter, we have presented design of novel hardware Trojans [244] in
embedded processor that target leaking secret information. These hardware Trojans
can be triggered in field by an intrude by introduction of modifications in the software
or input data. Secret information can be leaked either through processor ports as
logic values or through side channels (e.g., supply current), and the Trojan trigger
conditions can be in diverse forms. The authors [244] have also proposed innovative
circuit-level techniques of designing Trojans and placing them inside a circuit in a way
that effectively evades existing protection mechanisms. Simulation and experimental
results demonstrate that smart design of hardware Trojans can successfully evade
conventional logic testing, thus bypassing side-channel analysis based detection,
e.g., DfS approaches based on on-chip monitors (RO). The Trojan design approaches
presented have been shown effective for both FPGA and ASIC platforms.
4.11 Analytical Review of Basic Techniques for Detection
of Hardware Trojans in Microchips
4.11.1 Introduction
As discussed above, hardware Trojans (malicious modifications or inclusions made
by malevolent third parties) pose major security concerns, especially for those integrated circuits (ICs) and systems used in critical applications and cyberinfrastructure, most significantly in military and space infrastructures. While hardware Trojans
have been largely studied over the last decade, many issues remain unstudied. In this
chapter, using work [259] as a basic one, we review the results of hardware Trojan
research carried out during the last decade. This fundamental review was prepared
by “a combined team” of experienced “hunters for Trojans” of the leading academic
centers, who have been professionally engaged in this issue. In particular, these are
K. Xiao, M. Tehranipoor and S. Bhunia (University of Connecticut), Y. Jin (University of Central Florida), R. Karri (Polytechnic Institute of New York University).
This work was written comparatively not long ago, in September 2015, underwent a
comprehensive examination of the editorial staff in January 2016, was accepted for
publication in March 2016, and finally published in the peer-reviewed journal ACM
Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (issue 22, No. 1) in May
2016.
With the emergence of information technology and its critical role in our daily
lives, the risk of cyberattacks is larger today than ever before. While the battle between
software developers and hackers has raged since the 1980s, the hardware was generally considered to be unexposed to such attacks. However, in the last decade or so,
the increased complexity of the design, fabrication, and distribution of electronics
has caused a shift throughout the industry toward a global business model, thereby
creating new sources of attack. In this global model, various “untrusted” entities