territories which are inhabited by specific people. Inhabitation is full of values
(“place making”, “coiling the land”) which might be shared by particular communities but can’t be as universal as moral rules. Grounding values in specific territories
reveals that territories are not just neutral space. Inhabitation values, if grounded,
may conflict with cosmopolitan values.
A conflict-laden dialectic takes place here. If intergenerational justice to an
absolute standard cannot be limited to future people and should not be ignorant
against current poverty and misery, and if some states can ensure a high comparative
environmental standard exclusively for their own present and future populations,
then the demands of morality and global justice will inevitably exert high pressure on
such comparative standards as being “privileges”. From the moral point of view, the
universal absolute standard seems to override certain comparative standards being
enjoyed by some, but not all people. The future world might be highly patchy in
terms of nature conservation. Some people will enjoy the results of success stories in
nature conservation, while other people have to face results of environmental
destruction. On which grounds are the few happy wealthy Norwegians entitled to
enjoy their sublime landscape in a world full of slums? Such moral dialectic also
points to immigration policy, for wealthy states that pursue ambitious environmental
(and social) policies will become attractive destinations for migrants.
The moral tension between absolute and comparative standards makes a brief
meta-ethical reflection on the problem of overridingness and a presumed hierarchy
of reasons mandatory. Should specific moral reasons to help poor people always
“trump” all other kinds of reasons, be they based in values, traditions, loyalties, role
obligations, prescriptions, cost estimates, nature conservation objectives etc.? Are
moral reasons to be embedded in other kinds of practical reasons or are moral
reasons always to be placed at the very top of a hierarchy of reasons? Embedding
moral reasons, however, will bring different results with respect to nature conservation than a supremacy of moral reasons. Just think of curtailing human entitlements
in order to safe species from extinction, restrict access to protected areas, or enhance
local biodiversity via reforestation at the expense of agriculture. Both TEV and ESS
are too schematic to address such peculiar and highly political casuistry.
5.4 Inherent Moral Value
One major approach to environmental philosophy looks for the “right” solution to
the demarcation problem and bases its obligations and virtues on this solution. The
problem of demarcation concerns the question of how to draw the line between
morally considerable beings and other entities or to put it otherwise: which entities
have intrinsic (or inherent) moral value and which have instrumental (functional,
economic) or eudemonic value. Another approach is environmental pragmatism, as
presented by Bryan Norton (2005). Environmental pragmatism is embedded in the
democratic-reformist philosophy of pragmatism (Dewey), it lets itself be convinced
by valid argumentations, it is based on ideas about strong sustainability, it is liberally
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
147
(“place making”, “coiling the land”) which might be shared by particular communities but can’t be as universal as moral rules. Grounding values in specific territories
reveals that territories are not just neutral space. Inhabitation values, if grounded,
may conflict with cosmopolitan values.
A conflict-laden dialectic takes place here. If intergenerational justice to an
absolute standard cannot be limited to future people and should not be ignorant
against current poverty and misery, and if some states can ensure a high comparative
environmental standard exclusively for their own present and future populations,
then the demands of morality and global justice will inevitably exert high pressure on
such comparative standards as being “privileges”. From the moral point of view, the
universal absolute standard seems to override certain comparative standards being
enjoyed by some, but not all people. The future world might be highly patchy in
terms of nature conservation. Some people will enjoy the results of success stories in
nature conservation, while other people have to face results of environmental
destruction. On which grounds are the few happy wealthy Norwegians entitled to
enjoy their sublime landscape in a world full of slums? Such moral dialectic also
points to immigration policy, for wealthy states that pursue ambitious environmental
(and social) policies will become attractive destinations for migrants.
The moral tension between absolute and comparative standards makes a brief
meta-ethical reflection on the problem of overridingness and a presumed hierarchy
of reasons mandatory. Should specific moral reasons to help poor people always
“trump” all other kinds of reasons, be they based in values, traditions, loyalties, role
obligations, prescriptions, cost estimates, nature conservation objectives etc.? Are
moral reasons to be embedded in other kinds of practical reasons or are moral
reasons always to be placed at the very top of a hierarchy of reasons? Embedding
moral reasons, however, will bring different results with respect to nature conservation than a supremacy of moral reasons. Just think of curtailing human entitlements
in order to safe species from extinction, restrict access to protected areas, or enhance
local biodiversity via reforestation at the expense of agriculture. Both TEV and ESS
are too schematic to address such peculiar and highly political casuistry.
5.4 Inherent Moral Value
One major approach to environmental philosophy looks for the “right” solution to
the demarcation problem and bases its obligations and virtues on this solution. The
problem of demarcation concerns the question of how to draw the line between
morally considerable beings and other entities or to put it otherwise: which entities
have intrinsic (or inherent) moral value and which have instrumental (functional,
economic) or eudemonic value. Another approach is environmental pragmatism, as
presented by Bryan Norton (2005). Environmental pragmatism is embedded in the
democratic-reformist philosophy of pragmatism (Dewey), it lets itself be convinced
by valid argumentations, it is based on ideas about strong sustainability, it is liberally
Environmental Evaluation between Economics and Ethics: An Argument for. . .
147